by Walter C. Uhler
And although both the United States and Soviet Union subsequently
intervened to foil the French/British scheme, Israel lived up to its
side of the dishonorable bargain — by launching an assault on Egypt on
October 29, 1956. And, for that, France honored its promise to help
build the Dimona nuclear reactor in the Negev. The first French
technicians arrived in late 1957, construction was completed in 1962,
and Israel produced its first two bombs in mid-1967.
According to Karpin, "For years experts have been busy estimating or
guessing the actual capacity, and a consensus of a sort has emerged
that the reactor was originally built with a 40-megawatt capacity and
was upgraded in the 1970s. This meant it could produce 15-20 kilograms
of plutonium and four to five bombs a year." [p. 109] Information
subsequently supplied by Mordechai Vanunu indicates that "Israel's
annual plutonium output is some 40 kilos, and that it manufactures ten
bombs a year." [Ibid] Today, Israel is thought to possess as many as
200 atomic warheads.
Judging by Michael Karpin's book, Israel paid no price for its lies and
deceit surrounding its nuclear program, because: (1) the U.S. has
always tilted toward Israel (or as Harry Truman observed: "I have to
answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of
Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs in my
constituents." (2) Israel was able to deceive the U.S. until Dimona
became a fait accompli, (3) American presidents, especially Lyndon
Johnson, turned a blind eye to the emerging evidence that Israel was
pursuing the bomb until (4) President Nixon and Henry Kissinger finally
acknowledged it, but also embraced it as being in America's national
interest.
As Karpin acknowledges, although it was U.S. policy to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, Israel "was a special case. The
influence of the Jewish vote and the pro-Israel lobby in the United
States was growing, and at least three presidents — Kennedy, Johnson
and Nixon — set their policy toward Israel's nuclear program with one
eye on the Jewish electorate." [p. 181]
Special case, indeed! Consider, for example, Abe Feinberg's role in
financing Israel's nuclear program during late-1958 to late-1960.
Feinberg was President Truman's "close friend," [p. 135] "who had been
bequeathed to Kennedy by Eisenhower, who had in turn inherited him from
Truman." [p. 185] He also was "Ben-Gurion's representative in charge of
obtaining donations from the wealthiest Jews in the world" [p. 136]
During late-1958 to late-1960, Feinberg led a secret and successful
fund raising campaign to finance Israel's nuclear program.
Thanks to Feinberg's "Dimona campaign" [p. 136], which was bolstered by
the contributions of the Sonneborn Institute ("the group formed by the
eighteen richest Jews in North America"), "some twenty-five
millionaires contributed a total of about $40 million dollars" to
finance Israel's nuclear program. Today that $40 million would equal
$250 million. [Ibid]
Feinberg's secret fund raising campaign commenced some six months
before American intelligence channels first learned of "the building
site in the Negev." [p. 154] And it continued, even after an American
reconnaissance satellite photographed Dimona in September 1960. [p.
155] President Eisenhower was especially concerned about the source of
the funding: "We do not know where they obtained the funds, but have a
proper interest in this because of the aid we are giving them." [p.
159]
The fund raising campaign succeeded, notwithstanding the fact that it
was official U. S. policy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. And, it succeeded, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.
already had supplied Israel with a low-power nuclear reactor, one that
became operational in 1960. That reactor, however, could not produce
the plutonium necessary for bombs.
Thus, it's difficult to avoid the conclusion that the contributors to
the Dimona campaign knew precisely what they were supporting. That
being the case, just imagine the national outcry — highlighting
America's pro-Israel bias — were it to be revealed that U.S. citizens
of Iranian descent had been making secret contributions to finance
Iran's nuclear program!
In December 1960, after the American news media got wind of Dimona and
suggested that that Israel might be "developing a nuclear option," [pp.
156-57] Ben-Gurion spoke to the Knesset and lied about the allegations.
He lied when he asserted: "This reactor…is meant to be used only for
peaceful purposes, and is being built under the direction of Israeli
experts." [p. 161]
Karpin claims that the departing Eisenhower administration "had no
interest in revealing its suspicion that Israel was building a bomb,"
[p. 158] and that the incoming Kennedy administration wasn't much
better. Kennedy accepted the comforting words of two American
scientists, who had been duped by the Israelis when they visited Dimona
ten days before the president met with Ben-Gurion on May 30, 1961.
Thus, Kennedy not only swallowed Ben-Gurion's false assertion that the
main purpose of the reactor was to produce cheap energy [p. 193] —
Iran's leaders make similar claims today — but he also ignored hints
from Ben-Gurion that Israel reserved the option to build a bomb.
Finally, Kennedy failed to ask Ben-Gurion "why Israel needed a
plutonium extraction plant." [p. 194]
After the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy became much more serious about
nuclear nonproliferation. When he met with Golda Meir in December 1962
in Palm Beach, Florida, Kennedy informed her that the United States
"has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East, really
comparable only to that which it has with Britain over a wide range of
world affairs." [p. 218] He added: "I think it is quite clear that in
the case of an invasion the United States would come to the support of
Israel." [Ibid]
But when Kennedy issued an "ultimatum" [p. 232] about opening Dimona to
inspections, the Israelis stalled until after his assassination.
Moreover, when the first inspection finally took place, on January 18,
1964, the Americans were defrauded again.
Kennedy's failure to halt Israel's nuclear program occurred at a time,
especially during late 1962 and early 1963, when Israel's Mossad was
conducting a campaign of terror (including letter bombs) and
intimidation against German scientists who, allegedly, were helping
Egypt to build it s own bomb. The intelligence behind the terror
campaign proved to be "one big cock-and-bull story," [p. 210] but the
injuries and diplomatic fallout proved to be all too real. (This nasty
business seems to continue. According to
The Sunday Times (UK) of February 4, 2007, an Iranian nuclear scientist was assassinated by Mossad in mid-January 2007)
Yet, as bad as Kennedy's myopia about Israel's bomb was, Lyndon
Johnson's was even worse. It was the product of life-long concern for
the Jews and Israel. First, an aunt, who preached the importance of
helping the Jews, influenced Johnson's childhood. Second, in 1938
Johnson helped to organize a network that smuggled Jews into Texas and,
third, in 1945 he was visibly shaken by a visit to Dachau. When he
became president, he was the first to agree to sell Israel offensive
weapons.
When he met with Israel's Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in January 1968,
Johnson knew that the CIA believed "that Israel already achieved
nuclear capability." [p. 296] Nevertheless, although he informed Eshkol
that the U.S. was "opposed to the presence of nuclear weapons and
strategic missiles in the Middle East," [Ibid] he did not challenge
Eshkol's assertion that Israel would not be the first nation to
introduce them.
Not only did Eshkol lie, by producing two bombs in mid-1967, Israel
already had violated the terms of a March 1965 arms agreement with the
U. S., in which Israel stipulated: "The Government of Israel has
reaffirmed that Israel will not be the first to introduce weapons into
the Arab-Israel area." [p. 257]
Yet, Johnson responded to such lies by Eshkol and Foreign Minister Abba
Eban by overruling his own officials — Dean Rusk and Paul Warnke — who
insisted that Israel submit to regular inspections and sign the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, before being permitted to purchase
technologically sophisticated F-4 Phantoms.
According to Karpin, pressure exerted by Abe Feinberg and Arthur
Goldberg — at the request of Israel's U.S Ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin! —
was decisive. "The assault of the Jewish lobby on the White House and
the heads of the Democratic Party had apparently worked." [p. 309] "In
his memoirs, Rabin describes how he agonized over the propriety of a
foreign ambassador making use of a lobby within the American
governmental system." [p. 308]
The lies and deceit directed at the United States finally ended, when
the new Prime Minister, Golda Meir, decided to "tell the truth to the
American leaders,"[p. 315] in 1969. Fortunately, she encountered a
Nixon administration that, under Henry Kissinger's tutelage, took a
permissive position on nuclear proliferation by America's friends. And,
thus, yet more American hypocrisy when it comes to nuclear
nonproliferation!
Thus, "the United States accepted the fact that Israel possessed
nuclear capability, ceased to demand that Israel sign the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and stopped sending its experts to inspect
Dimona. Israel committed itself to three nos: no publication, no
testing, and no provoking the Arabs with its nuclear option." [p. 318]
And, thus, Israel maintains such "ambiguity" to this day.
Yet, notwithstanding Israel's policy of ambiguity, it's well known
that, on October 9, 1973, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan recommended that
Israel use nuclear weapons in order to avoid losing the Yom Kippur war.
[Avner Cohen, "The Last Nuclear Moment,"
New York Times, Oct. 6. 2003] And according to Scott Ritter, Israel put its "nuclear-tipped
Jericho missile force…on full alert" [Ritter, p. 8] during the 1991 Gulf War.
Worse still (if the January 7, 2007, report in
The Sunday Times
is accurate), "Israel has drawn up secret plans to destroy Iran's
uranium enrichment facilities with tactical nuclear weapons." Not
exactly what one could call ambiguity — or responsible custodianship of
nuclear weapons. (Israel subsequently denied the report.)
Meanwhile, Israeli intelligence has remained vigilant, lest some other
Middle Eastern state emulates Israel and sneaks a bomb into its
basement. Thus the Mossad's letter bombs against innocent German
scientists in 1962-63, Israel's preventive strike on Iraq's Osirak
reactor in 1981, and the alleged Mossad murder of an Iranian scientist
just recently.
Indeed, an Iran in possession of nuclear weapons could pose an
existential threat to Israel, especially if the individuals who wield
military power, such as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, literally seek Israel's
destruction. As Yossi Klein Halevi and Michael B. Oren recently
concluded: An Iran possessing the bomb "would be able to destroy the
Zionist dream without pressing the button." [Yossi Klein Halevi &
Michael B. Oren, "Israel's Worst Nightmare: Contra Iran,"
The New Republic
Feb. 5, 2007] Under the threat of a nuclear attack, people will leave,
especially the elite who have opportunities abroad. Foreign investors
will flee as well. Consequently, "the promise of Zionism to create a
Jewish refuge will have failed, and, instead, Jews will see the
diaspora as a more trustworthy option for both personal and collective
survival." [Ibid]
Thus, their conclusion: "A Jewish state that allows itself to be
threatened with nuclear weapons — by a country that denies the genocide
against Europe's six million Jews while threatening Israel's six
million Jews -will forfeit its right to speak in the name of Jewish
history." [Ibid] Yet, precisely because the authors, like many
Israelis, discount deterrence and rule out negotiations, one has even
more reason to suspect Israel of contemplating nuclear madness.
Yet, Iran denies pursuing nuclear weapons. Indeed, in September 2004,
Ayatollah Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the "production,
stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons." [Ritter, p. 170] Whose
religious edicts count in Iran, if not his?
Moreover, as Israel, America's Israel lobby and its bootlicking neocons
prod the Bush administration to wage war against Iran, by attacking its
nuclear facilities, it's worth recalling that the 1981 attack on Osirak
backfired. For, as Joseph Cirincione has written recently, "After the
Israeli strike on the Osirak reactor in 1981, Saddam Hussein turned the
program from one involving 500 workers into a more ambitious, secret
7,000-person drive that came closer to delivering a bomb by 1991 than
the open program would have" {Joseph Cirincione, "The Clock's Ticking:
Stopping Iran Before It's Too Late,"
Arms Control Today, November 2006]
An attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would certainly provoke Iran to
seek nuclear weapons with a vengeance. And an attack using nuclear
weapons would outrage the world.
Thus, although there are plenty of reasons to suspect that Iran's
leaders, like Israel's before them, are lying about their nuclear
program — a matter to be examined in Part Three of this article — there
also are plenty of reasons to believe that an Osirak-like strike would
be even more counterproductive this time around. As a 2005 study by two
scholars at the National Defense University concluded: "The costs of
rolling back Iran's nuclear program 'may be higher than the costs of
deterring and containing nuclear Iran.'"[Elaine Sciolino, "Chirac's
Iran Gaffe Reveals A Strategy: Containment,"
New York Times, Feb. 3, 2007] Consequently, a different approach is required.
Walter C. Uhler is an independent scholar and freelance writer whose
work has been published in numerous publications, including The Nation,
the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Journal of Military History,
the Moscow Times and the San Francisco Chronicle. He also is President
of the Russian-American International Studies Association (RAISA).
Part one can be found here.