U.S. Embassy Turned a Blind Eye as
Suspected CIA Banker Allen Stanford
Bilked Investors, Secret Cables Reveal
While R. Allen Stanford was happily ensconced on the
Caribbean island of Antigua, allegedly bribing officials there as he
expanded his banking empire, secret cables released by the
whistleblowing web site
WikiLeaks
revealed that U.S. Embassy officials held themselves at arm's length
even as they provided the accused fraudster with political cover.
Fraudster "Sir" Allen in custody
As Antifascist Calling
reported last summer, Stanford International Bank (SIB) and Stanford
Financial Group (SFG), once conservatively valued at $50 billion, were
no more legitimate than penny stock frauds or advance fee scams on the
internet. To make matters worse, for years federal regulators turned a blind eye towards the bank's reckless practices.
As it turns out, so too did the U.S. Embassy.
Cablegate file 06BRIDGETOWN755,
"Cricket Breakfast Serves Up First Encounter with Allen Stanford,"
dated 03 May 2006, revealed that "Ambassador Kramer met controversial
Texan billionaire Allen Stanford for the first time at an April 21
'Legends of Cricket' breakfast in Barbados."
The confidential embassy cable reported that "Stanford
bent the Ambassador's ear concerning his significant new tourism and
property investments in Antigua and plans for his Caribbean Star and
Caribbean Sun airlines."
The occasion for the meeting, an inadvertent encounter if
the embassy's account is to be believed, was an April 21, 2006 breakfast
at the Barbados Hilton.
Stanford, who went on to donate some $20 million to the
England and Wales Cricket Board, attended the lavish affair in the
company of Barbados Prime Minister Owen Arthur, U.S. Ambassador Mary E.
Kramer, assorted sports stars and local luminaries.
The cable averred that "Allen Stanford is a controversial
Texan billionaire who has made significant investments in offshore
finance, aviation, and property development in Antigua and throughout
the region. His companies are rumored to engage in bribery, money
laundering, and political manipulation."
Rumored by whom, one might reasonably ask? An important point since this was certainly not general knowledge at the time, particularly amongst those who were being fleeced.
But rather than blowing the whistle when it could have
mattered most to investors and Antiguan citizens, the Bush-appointed
official took cover. "Embassy officers do not reach out to Stanford" we
read, "because of the allegations of bribery and money laundering. The
Ambassador managed to stay out of any one-on-one photos with Stanford
during the breakfast."
Why would Kramer have done otherwise? After all, as
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton piously intoned last month denouncing
WikiLeaks, "this is the role our diplomats play in serving America."
A "Unique Investment Strategy"
When "Sir Allen" was arrested in 2009, the federal indictment
charged that the high-flying Texan had sold more than $7 billion in
fraudulent certificates of deposit and some $1.2 billion in mutual
funds.
The centerpiece of SIB's "unique investment strategy" were
financial instruments that were claimed to be safe, liquid and
redeemable at a moment's notice.
According to a blurb on the "Sir Allen Stanford" web site,
the Stanford Financial Group "provides private and institutional
investors with global expertise in asset allocation strategies,
investment advisory services, equity research, international private
banking and trust administration, commercial banking, investment
banking, merchant banking, institutional sales and trading, real estate
investment and insurance."
The reality was far different, however. In fact, the
majority of Group "assets" were in very illiquid real estate holdings
and private accounts managed by just two individuals, Allen Stanford and
his college roommate, James M. Davis, the bank's chief financial
officer.
According to federal prosecutors, accounts were divided
into three tiers, I, II and III with Tier III accounts representing
"more than 80% of the purported total value of SIBL's investments."
"STANFORD and DAVIS" the charge sheet reads, "directed,
managed, and monitored ... the Tier III investments. According to
internal SIBL documents, as of June 30, 2008, these Tier III investments
comprised the majority of the purported value of SIBL's investment
portfolio. Approximately 50% of the purported value of Tier III
(approximately $3.2 billion) included investments in artificially valued
real estate and approximately 30% of the purported value of Tier III
(approximately $1.6 billion) included notes on personal loans to
STANFORD. STANFORD, DAVIS and others did not disclose to, and actively
concealed from, investors, SGC and SIBL employees, and others the fact
that approximately $4.8 billion in purported Tier III investments
consisted of such artificially valued real estate and notes on personal
loans to STANFORD."
A sweet deal if you're in on the fix.
Lured by "high rates that exceed those available through
true certificates of deposits offered by traditional banks," thousands
of investors were indelicately relieved of their life savings. Of the
more than $8 billion hoovered up by the banker and his cronies, only
about $500 million has been recovered.
This raises the question: where did all that money go? Did it just simply vanish into thin air, secret Stanford accounts, or perhaps, was it diverted elsewhere by the banker's silent partners in a certain three-lettered agency?
When asked during a 2009 interview
by CNBC's Scott Cohn whether he had been "helpful" to U.S. authorities
in Latin America, Stanford replied, "Are you talking about the CIA?"
Cohn: "Well, you tell me?" Stanford: "I'm just not going to talk about
that."
Stanford's reticence to discuss possible Agency connections are certainly understandable.
We do know however, that like many dubious banking
ventures before it, Stanford Financial Group had powerful friends in
high places, in the White House, Congress, amongst regulatory agencies
and, plausibly, the CIA; all of whom tripped over themselves furnishing
Stanford's "family" of companies with a watertight "roof."
The More Things "Change"
According to available evidence, why would the banker have
believed his shady empire was on the brink of collapse in 2009, or that
well-connected friends wouldn't come to the rescue? After all, it
happened before.
Last year The New York Times
disclosed that Stephen J. Korotash, an associate regional director of
enforcement at the Ft. Worth, Texas office of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) said the regulatory agency "stood down" their
investigation "at the request of another federal agency, which he
declined to name."
A curious admission all the more damning for regulators
considering that suspicions, and hastily-closed investigations, have
dogged the bank for the better part of two decades.
Damning perhaps, but not surprising.
Nearly a quarter century before charges were laid against
Allen Stanford, the late investigative reporter Penny Lernoux recounted
in her still-timely book, In Banks We Trust, a fraudulent scheme
by Citibank (now Citigroup) to evade paying taxes while cooking the
books and dodging "legal requirements on bank reserves, liquidity, and
lending limits." And, similar to the Stanford grift, the SEC did worse
than nothing.
Lernoux averred that even after a whistleblower and former
bank vice president proved "conclusively" that Citibank had
"systematically" violated the law, "the SEC's enforcement staff refused
to take any action against the bank on the ground that its pursuit of
unlawful profits accorded with 'reasonable and standard business
judgement'."
Here's the kicker. Lernoux wrote that the "SEC also
concluded that Citibank's management had no duty to disclose improper
actions since the bank had never claimed its top officers possessed
'honesty and integrity'." Sound familiar?
Fast forward to the era of the Bush crime family and we learn that in 2006, BusinessWeek
revealed that the president "bestowed on his intelligence czar ...
broad authority, in the name of national security" to excuse companies
from "their normal accounting and securities-disclosure obligations" if
they revealed "certain top-secret defense projects."
Would such "broad authority" also cover financial
institutions accused of laundering drug money for select "War on Terror"
allies?
Interestingly enough, Bush's "intelligence czar" at the
time, John D. Negroponte, was U.S. Ambassador in Honduras during the
1980s at the height of the Reagan administration's anticommunist jihad
in Central America.
In addition to covering for the CIA as the Agency stood-up death squads in Honduras, Negroponte, as The Baltimore Sun
revealed in 1995, turned a blind eye as America's "freedom fighters,"
the Nicaraguan Contras, financed their terrorist insurgency against the
leftist Sandinista government by importing billions of dollars of
cocaine into the United States with a major assist from their
ideological soul-mates, the Medellín and Cali drug cartels.
Recall that during this period of intensified U.S. covert operations, the Reagan Justice Department signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the CIA. That 1982 memo, brokered between U.S. Attorney General
William French Smith and CIA Director William Casey, absolved the Agency
from reporting drug smuggling by their assets, the Nicaraguan Contras
and Afghan mujahideen.
Leveraging their anticommunist bona fides to import
massive quantities of drugs into the United States, and laundering the
proceeds through a spider's web of U.S. and offshore banks including, as
several investigative reports have alleged, a Stanford bank, one can
only wonder whether similar cosy arrangements are in force today.
Recall also that illegal activities by institutions as diverse as Paul Helliwell's Castle Bank and Trust in the Bahamas, Frank Nugan and Michael Hand's Nugan Hand Bank in Sydney, Saudi Arabia and the Cayman Islands, or the far-flung, crooked empire of Agha Hasan Abedi's Bank of Credit and Commerce International,
were all financial black holes where organized crime, drug-fueled
intelligence operations and geopolitical intrigue freely intermixed.
Separated in time and geography, what all three banks had
in common was their close proximity to international drug trafficking
networks and the CIA, particularly in areas of acute interest to U.S.
policy planners. Did Stanford International Bank have an analogous
relationship with the Agency?
After all the Stanford bank, like Castle, Nugan Hand and
BCCI before it had been focal points of unseemly financial practices for
years. Indeed, nearly thirty years ago investigative journalist Nancy
Grodin reported in CovertAction (Number 16, March 1982), that
like SIB, Nugan Hand enticed prospective investors "with offers of
private banking services, high interest rates (higher than anywhere else
in the region), tax-free deposits and complete secrecy."
Across the decades, investigations revealed that leading
figures in Castle, Nugan Hand and BCCI had actively conspired with drug
traffickers to import narcotics into the United States.
Top bank officials Helliwell, Nugan, Hand and Abedi worked alongside organized crime figures and
former intelligence and Pentagon officials, including a past director
of the CIA. And when the chips were down, all managed to evade being
held to account for the most serious charges: drug trafficking, money
laundering, arms smuggling, murder, terrorism, even nuclear
proliferation, precisely because such exposure would have revealed
"sensitive intelligence operations."
While some might argue that in the broad scheme of things
considering the depth of capitalism's economic meltdown, Stanford's
alleged grift was mere chump change compared to the trillions of dollars
plundered by even bigger fish.
From a parapolitical perspective however, the
multiple obfuscations, smokescreens and outright falsehoods surrounding
the scandal indicate this is no simple case of greed or another tawdry
example of "elite deviance."
Rather, as researcher Peter Dale Scott has assiduously
documented over the years, the vicissitudes of "L'affaire Stanford" may
be emblematic of "continuous U.S. involvement in the global drug
connection," a "global financial complex of hot money uniting prominent
business ... and government as well as underworld figures" for purposes
of "achieving and maintaining global American dominance."
Drug Links Covered-Up
While Ambassador Kramer may have avoided having her photo
snapped with the accused fraudster, her rather pedestrian concerns pale
in comparison to the fact that Stanford has been the subject of multiple
drugs investigations over a 20-year period that have all been
scrupulously covered-up.
Indeed, years before the federal government ran SIB to
ground, earlier probes, including those investigating drug-money
laundering during the Iran-Contra period were killed.
Stanford's Montserrat-based Guardian International Bank, a
suspected conduit for Contra drug funds, short-circuited investigators
when it pulled-up stakes, surrendered its banking license and left the
island.
By 1986, evidence emerged that top Contra officials and
the Agency enjoyed cosy ties with both Pablo Escobar and the Orejuela
brothers, respective kingpins of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels.
Under pressure from the Reagan administration however,
Congress and corporate media buried the drug angle to the investigation,
as Consortium News journalist Robert Parry has documented in a series of groundbreaking reports.
After his departure from Montserrat under a cloud, the
banker trained his sights on Antigua and Barbuda where he developed a
close relationship with former prime minister Lester Bird.
The Independent
reported that during the course of a joint Scotland Yard-FBI
investigation, the bank "was suspected of laundering drug money from the
notorious Medellin and Cali drug cartels run by Pablo Escobar and the
Orejuela brothers."
"Under the Bird family leadership" The Independent
disclosed, "the island was widely regarded as one of the most corrupt in
the Caribbean, with well-documented links to arms and drug smuggling
and money laundering."
The former FBI agent who led the Guardian probe, Ross Gaffney, told The Independent
"we suspected that Stanford's bank was involved in money laundering."
Gaffney said that even after Guardian closed, the FBI "continued to take
an interest in Stanford and set up a second inquiry into that bank
after receiving intelligence that it continued to launder money for the
Medellin and Cali cartels."
The former federal agent said, "We had hard intelligence
about what he was doing and we began to develop it" but that
investigation died or more likely, was deep-sixed, by officials
higher-up the food chain.
According to The Observer,
a second FBI source "confirmed the agency was looking at links to
international drug gangs as part of the huge investigation into
Stanford's banking activities."
Other sources "in the US Drug Enforcement Administration" The Observer
reported, "also confirmed that while the investigations into Stanford's
affairs were 'with the FBI and Securities Exchange Commission, there
may well have been a trail connecting his Mexican affairs to
narco-trafficking interests'."
But even after the stench of Iran-Contra faded from the
headlines, drug probes targeting the bank continued well into the 1990s.
The Houston Chronicle
reported that according to court documents "operatives of the Juarez
cartel began opening accounts at Stanford's Antigua-based bank in an
effort to launder money amassed under one of Mexico's most vicious drug
lords, Amado Carrillo Fuentes."
"Together," the Chronicle disclosed, "they used
Stanford International Bank to open 10 accounts and deposit $3
million--a small sliver of the cartel's fortunes but enough to pique
authorities' interest."
Despite long-running investigations, federal sources told the Chronicle,
"any alleged Stanford connection to drug cartels and their money could
lie buried in the paperwork gathered for the Security and Exchange
Commission's civil inquiry."
Federal officials claimed, despite probes that resulted in
stiff fines for illicit practices by other U.S. banks including, most
recently, Wachovia, as Bloomberg Markets magazine reported, that tracing drug profits laundered through offshore banks like Stanford's "is difficult to document."
That is, acutely "difficult" if investigators are ordered
to look away, and evidence suggests they were. How else would one
interpret the statement by The Observer's DEA source who told the
British newspaper, "I think we'll find that any possible drug-related
trail and SEC priorities are not all in the same frame."
When the scandal broke, Cablegate file 09BRIDGETOWN114,
18 February 2009, "Antigua: Upheaval on the Eve of Elections," informs
us that the 17 February announcement of new parliamentary elections "was
almost immediately overshadowed by an announcement by the Securities
and Exchange Commission of action being taken against U.S.-Antiguan
citizen Sir Allen Stanford for 'massive, on-going fraud'."
The Embassy informed the State Department that "local
fears over Stanford indictment have led to a run on the Stanford
Financial Group's subsidiary the Bank of Antigua, with depositors lining
up for an hour or more to withdrawal their money."
As reported above, through a series of maneuvers and what
were alleged to be illicit payments to former Antiguan Prime Minister
Lester Bird, Stanford set up shop on the Caribbean island in 1990, and
gobbled up prime real estate, acquired dual citizenship and a
knighthood, and eventually took control of the Bank of Antigua in a
highly-dubious "reorganization."
The ripples from the indictment spread like a rogue wave
across Antigua and the Eastern Caribbean. Antiguan officials, and the
U.S. Embassy, were concerned that once the depth of the fraud sank in,
"unrest" would follow in its wake.
Shortly after that 2009 embassy cable, The Guardian,
reported that an investigation by the Antiguan government uncovered
"large payments ... in Isle of Man bank accounts controlled by Antiguan
politicians."
According "to documents seen by The Guardian, HSBC
bank, in the Isle of Man, accepted $3.2m (£2.3m) on behalf of Asot
Michael, once chief of staff to the former Antigua prime minister Lester
Bird."
"The cash under investigation" the British newspaper
disclosed, "came via an Israeli businessman, Bruce Rappaport, who is
alleged to have diverted Antiguan funds into his own pocket while making
payments to local politicians."
HSBC denied all wrongdoing and "would publicly neither
confirm nor deny information about individual Manx accounts," saying the
bank "has robust anti-money laundering policies and clearly defined
policies and procedures concerning politically exposed persons."
"It is unclear" the Embassy averred, "if either party will
try hard to use the Stanford indictment as an election issue--Stanford
amassed his fortune under an ALP [Antiguan Labor Party] government, and
was knighted by a UPP [United Progressive Party] government, so all
hands are likely equally dirty."
"Many worry that these issues [crime, fraud and violence]
could not only spell disaster for the UPP, but for the country's economy
as a whole, leading to a severe economic depression and intolerable
unemployment creating more violence and a cycle of less tourism, more
unemployment and more crime."
Curiously, while corporate media have focused on
Stanford's lavish lifestyle, girlfriends and upscale island properties,
nary a word has been whispered about the banker's alleged links to
notorious drug cartels or to some of the CIA's dirtiest operations.
Even at this late date, it appears that the dodgy banker
has well-connected friends who want to bury this angle of a scandal that
has defrauded thousands and wrecked entire economies.
The question is, why?
Follow the Money, but Where?
Investors in the Stanford Ponzi scheme have lost their
shirts, and its likely they'll never recover even a fraction of their
losses.
"In the past two years" the Houston Chronicle
reported, "Stanford himself has ceased to be the story. The most
amazing aspect of the Stanford saga is how little money has been
recovered. As the court-appointed receiver has chased assets around the
globe, he's found Stanford's accounts stunningly empty."
During the investigation that led to the indictments,
auditors learned that that funds were moved through Stanford-controlled
accounts to offshore banks, including HSBC London; Bank Julius Baer,
Zurich; Credit Suisse, United Kingdom; SG Private Banking, Geneva;
Banque Franck Galland & Cie S.A., Geneva; RBS Coutts, Zurich; Coutts
Bank Von Ernst, Geneva and Toronto Dominion Bank, Canada; banks which
have figured in past money laundering or tax-avoidance scandals. In all,
28 numbered accounts were listed by prosecutors, veritable black holes
that escaped regulatory scrutiny.
Nearly a decade ago, investigative journalist Stephen Bender wrote in Z Magazine
that "an understanding of the drug trade's machinations is incomplete
without an analysis of the crucial role transnational banks play in the
laundering of drug proceeds."
The House Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
reported back in 2000: "Despite increasing international attention and
stronger anti-money laundering controls, some current estimates are that
$500 billion to $1 trillion in criminal proceeds are laundered through
banks worldwide each year, with about half of that amount moved through
United States banks."
Recall that at the height of capitalism's current global
economic meltdown, Antonio Maria Costa, the director of the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime told The Observer that "drugs money worth billions of dollars kept the financial system afloat at the height of the global crisis."
Costa told the British newspaper he saw substantial
evidence that that proceeds from the illicit trade were "the only liquid
investment capital" available to some banks on the brink of collapse
last year and that "a majority of the $352bn (£216bn) of drugs profits
was absorbed into the economic system as a result."
The UN drugs chief said that in "many instances, the money
from drugs was the only liquid investment capital." And with markets
tanking and major bank failures a near daily occurrence, "liquidity was
the banking system's main problem and hence liquid capital became an
important factor."
If only a tiny portion of these illegal proceeds were
siphoned-off by secret state agencies, including the CIA, funds
available for covert operations and other dubious purposes, such as
suborning treason amongst foreign officials to spy on their own
governments, as WikiLeaks diplomatic cables revealed, the amounts would
be staggering.
Bender informed us that one conduit for laundering drug profits is the private banking system.
"U.S.-based private banks" Bender wrote, "operate in a
regulatory twilight zone enabling the laundering of drug profits as
confirmed by the GAO. Private banks are 'not subject to the Bank Secrecy
Act,' thus exempting banks from complying with 'specific
anti-money-laundering provisions...such as the one requiring that
suspicious transactions be reported to U.S. authorities'."
And with "international private banking" a prominent
selling-point of the Stanford firm's dark web, one might reasonably
surmise that drug traffickers would also view this regulatory black hole
in the most favourable light.
Indeed, this "twilight zone" was precisely where Allen Stanford operated. As The Miami Herald
reported, state and federal regulators allowed SIB to move "vast
amounts of money offshore--without reporting a penny to regulators."
SIB's arrangements with the Florida Office of Financial
Regulation were so lax that the company "was allowed to sell hundreds of
millions in bank notes without allowing regulators to check for fraud."
Indeed, Florida regulators granted Stanford's bank "sweeping powers
never given to a private company."
But what if that "private company" were handed an
exemption from "their normal accounting and securities-disclosure
obligations" as BusinessWeek reported, on grounds of "national
security," and investigations into that firm were squashed "at the
request of another federal agency," wouldn't this also suggest that
Stanford's Ponzi scheme may have also been a cover for ongoing U.S.
intelligence operations?
And once the scope of the fraud became too large to
ignore, it wouldn't be a stretch to conclude that the Agency decided to
cut their losses and "move on"?
As investigative reporters Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne uncovered in their stunning exposé, The Outlaw Bank, it wouldn't be the first time.
For years the CIA had concealed their close involvement
with the crooked Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), tied
to everything from drug trafficking to money laundering and from nuclear
proliferation to the financing of terrorist groups, including those
that morphed into Al-Qaeda.
And when they "came clean" to Treasury Department
officials in a report that remains classified to this day, "suddenly,
and for no apparent reason," Beaty and Gwynne wrote, Treasury "lost all
interest in BCCI."
Perhaps for similar reasons too, in the years ahead we'll
find that "any alleged Stanford connection to drug cartels and their
money could lie buried in the paperwork gathered for the Security and
Exchange Commission's civil inquiry," where its likely to stay buried.
Tom Burghardt is a researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition to publishing in Covert Action Quarterly and Global Research,
an independent research and media group of writers, scholars,
journalists and activists based in Montreal, his articles can be read onDissident Voice, The Intelligence Daily, Pacific Free Press, Uncommon Thought Journal, and the whistleblowing website WikiLeaks. He is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press and has contributed to the new book from Global Research, The Global Economic Crisis: The Great Depression of the XXI Century.