Wikileaks and the Wicked Disinformers
by Paul J. Balles
That Afghanistan is corrupt is not news. Just how corrupt is news.
According to a report by Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins of the New York Times,
WikiLeaks exposes how, "From hundreds of diplomatic cables, Afghanistan
emerges as a looking-glass land where bribery, extortion and
embezzlement are the norm and the honest man is a distinct outlier."
The New York Times report reveals how; "…the collection of confidential diplomatic cables obtained by
WikiLeaks and made available to a number of publications, offers a fresh
sense of its pervasive nature, its overwhelming scale and the
dispiriting challenge it poses to American officials who have made
shoring up support for the Afghan government a cornerstone of America’s
counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan."
Several commentators have complained of the embarrassment engendered by the WikiLeaks exposure. Washington Post commentator Charles Krauthammer claims that WikiLeaks has caused more problems than embarrassment.
First, says Krauthammer, "damage to our war-fighting capacity...
Second, we've suffered a major blow to our ability to collect
information... Third, this makes us look bad, very bad."
As an example of damage to our war-fighting capacity, Krauthammer says:
"This will undoubtedly limit our freedom of action against [Al-Qaeda’s]
Yemeni branch.” Translated into reality, that means the CIA will be
constrained from going into Yemen at will and assassinating Al-Qaeda
suspects on its hit list.
But that's an argument that you might expect from a neo-conservative commentator who pushed for the invasion of Afghanistan and pre-emptive strikes and occupation of Iraq.
Krauthammer's rationale for his second argument reads: "Success in the
war on terror depends on being trusted with other countries' secrets.
Who's going to trust us now?"
This displays Krauthammer’s ignorance of the US classification system.
In the US, information is "classified" if it has been assigned one of
the three levels: confidential, secret or top secret.
If information related to "the war on terror" is vital to others’ trust
or US security, it should have been classified top secret. None of the
documents released by WikiLeaks were top secret. "By law, information
may not be classified merely because it would be embarrassing or to
cover illegal activity; information may only be classified to protect
national-security objectives."
"Third, this makes us look bad, very bad," writes Krauthammer. "What's
appalling is the helplessness of a superpower that not only cannot
protect its own secrets, but shows the world that if you violate its
secrets – massively, wantonly and maliciously – there are no
consequences."
If there are consequences that should be imposed, they should fall to
the US government. They complained bitterly about how Afghan informants
names were included in the WikiLeaks report, thus endangering the
informants.
However, Australian investigative journalist John Pilger reported that
prior to the release of the Afghan War Diaries in July, WikiLeaks
contacted the White House in writing, asking that it identify names that
might draw reprisals, but received no response.
Yet Krauthammer has called the WikiLeaks documents "sabotage" and
concludes by saying “I’m not advocating that we bring out of retirement
the KGB proxy who, on a London street, killed a Bulgarian dissident."
If that's not what Krauthammer advocates, why does he even mention such a fate in his hammering of WikiLeaks?
Countries and organizations need to protect their valid secrets with
the right kind of classification. Laws concerning classifications were
not created to allow careless failure to protect legitimate national
interests.
At the same time, classification should not be used as a shield to
inhibit whistleblowers and to prevent public disclosures of activity
that should be exposed.
Transparency precludes keeping secrets that should not be secret.
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