"
The CIA has argued," the
Post informs,
"that such action is covert, which is traditionally its turf." Pentagon
thrill-kill specialists beg to differ, asserting that "offensive
operations are the province of the military and are part of its mission
to counter terrorism, especially when, as one official put it, 'al-Qaeda
is everywhere'."
That certainly covers a lot of ground! As a practical matter it also
serves as a convenient justification--or pretext, take your pick--for
our minders in Ft. Meade, Langley or Cheltenham to consummate much in
the mischief department.
And with alarmist media reports bombarding us every day with dire
scenarios, reminiscent of the "weapons of mass destruction" spook show
that preceded the Iraq invasion, where China, Iran, Russia and North
Korea are now stand-ins for "Saddam" in the cyberwar Kabuki dance, it is
hardly surprising that "liberal" Democrats and "conservative"
Republicans are marching in lockstep.
InfoSecurity reported
last week that during a recent Manhattan conference, Rep. Yvette Clarke
(D-NY) proclaimed that "the likelihood of a cyberattack that could
bring down our [electrical] grid is ... 100%. Our networks are already
being penetrated as we stand here. We are already under attack. We must
stop asking ourselves 'could this happen to us' and move to a default
posture that acknowledges this fact and instead asks 'what can we do to
protect ourselves'?"
Why cede even more control to the secret state and their corporate
partners who stand to make a bundle in the latest iteration of the
endless "War on Terror" (Cyber Edition), of course!
An Offensive Brief
Despite all the hot air about protecting critical infrastructure and the
mil.com domain, the offensive nature of Pentagon planning is written into Cyber Command's DNA.
As
Antifascist Calling reported
in April, the organization's aggressive posture is writ large in
several Air Force planning documents. In a 2006 presentation to the Air
Force Cyber Task Force for example,
A Warfighting Domain: Cyberspace,
Dr. Lani Kass asserted that "Cyber is a war-fighting domain. The
electromagnetic spectrum is the maneuver space. Cyber is the United
States' Center of Gravity--the hub of all power and movement, upon which
everything else depends. It is the Nation's neural network."
Kass averred that "Cyber superiority is the prerequisite to
effective operations across all strategic and operational
domains--securing freedom from attack and freedom to attack."
Accordingly,
she informed her audience that "Cyber favors the offensive," and that
the transformation of the electromagnetic spectrum into a "warfighting
domain" will be accomplished by: "Strategic Attack directly at enemy
centers of gravity; Suppression of Enemy Cyber Defenses; Offensive
Counter Cyber; Defensive Counter Cyber; Interdiction."
Two years later, the
Strategic Vision unveiled
by the Air Force disclosed that the purpose for standing up a dedicated
cyber command is to "deceive, deny, disrupt, degrade, and destroy" an
adversary's information infrastructure.
Air Force theorists averred that since "the confluence of
globalization, economic disparities, and competition for scarce
resources" pose significant challenges for the U.S. Empire, all the more
pressing in light of capitalism's on-going economic crisis, an
offensive cyber posture must move rapidly beyond the theoretical plane.
Echoing Kass, and in order to get a leg-up on the competition, we
were told that "controlling cyberspace is the prerequisite to effective
operations across all strategic and operational domains--securing
freedom from attack and freedom to attack."
Shortly thereafter, Air Force Col. Charles W. Williamson III wrote in the prestigious
Armed Forces Journal that
"America needs the ability to carpet bomb in cyberspace to create the
deterrent we lack." Williamson averred that "America must have a
powerful, flexible deterrent that can reach far outside our fortresses
and strike the enemy while he is still on the move."
His solution? Create a military-grade botnet that marshals the
computing power of tens of thousands of Defense Department machines. "To
generate the right amount of power for offense," Williamson wrote, "all
the available computers must be under the control of a single
commander, even if he provides the capability for multiple theaters."
And if innocent parties, not to mention a potential adversary's
civilian infrastructure is destroyed in the process, Williamson declares
that "if the botnet is used in a strictly offensive manner, civilian
computers may be attacked, but only if the enemy compels us."
Indeed, "if the U.S. is defending itself against an attack that
originates from a computer which was co-opted by an attacker, then there
are real questions about whether the owner of that computer is truly
innocent."
But as we know from observing the conduct of the U.S. military in
Iraq and
Afghanistan, outside the imperial blast walls no one is "truly innocent."
While the Air Force may have lost the intramural skirmish to run the
organization, a task now shared amongst the other armed services and
NSA, their preemptive war doctrines are firmly in place. And with an
operating budget of $120 million this year, to increase to $150 million
in fiscal year 2011, excluding of course highly-secretive Special Access
Programs hidden deep inside the Pentagon's "black" budget, it's off to
the races.
As I
reported last year, when Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates penned a
Memorandum that
marked its official launch, the former CIA chief and Iran-Contra
criminal specified that CYBERCOM would be a "subordinate unified
command" under U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
As readers are well aware, STRATCOM is the Pentagon satrapy charged
with running space operations, information warfare, missile defense,
global command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(C4ISR), global strike and strategic deterrence; in other words, they're
the trigger finger on America's first-strike nuclear arsenal.
A Strategic Command
Fact Sheet published
in June told us that Cyber Command "plans, coordinates, integrates,
synchronizes, and conducts activities to: direct the operations and
defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and;
prepare to, and when directed, conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace
operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied
freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries."
Gates ordered that the organization "must be capable of
synchronizing warfighting effects across the global security environment
as well as providing support to civil authorities and international
partners."
What form that "support" will take is clear from previous agreements
between the U.S. secret state and their "international partners."
Beneath the dark banner of the
UK-USA Security Agreement that
powers the ECHELON signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection and
analysis network, agencies such as NSA and Britain's Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) keep a watchful eye on global
communications.
On the domestic front, as I
reported last month, a
Memorandum of Agreement forged
between the Department of Homeland Security and the National Security
Agency means that "protecting" critical civilian infrastructure and
communications assets, including the internet, is for all practical
purposes now part of the Pentagon's cyberwar brief.
With authority to troll our communications handed to NSA by the Bush
and Obama administrations under top secret provisions of the
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (
CNCI),
the American people have no way of knowing what cybersecurity programs
exist, who decides what is "actionable intelligence," or where private
communications land after becoming part of the "critical infrastructure
and key resources" landscape.
And with civilian control over "black" Pentagon programs off the
table since the darkest days of the Cold War, the Defense Department's
announcement last week that Cyber Command has achieved "full operational capability" should give pause.
Long-Running Feud
War
criminal, arch geopolitical manipulator and corporate bag man Henry
Kissinger once famously said, "covert action should not be confused with
missionary work."
While true as far as it goes, bureaucratic blood-sport between the
CIA and the Defense Department over control of world-wide cyber
operations reflects a long-running battle within the secret state over
which covert branch of government will command resources and run
clandestine programs across the global "War on Terror" landscape.
Currently in the driver's seat when it comes to the deadly drone war
in Pakistan and protecting America's opium-growing and heroin-dealing
regional allies, the Agency vigorously objects to Pentagon maneuvers to
carry out offensive cyber operations away from acknowledged war zones,
because, so goes the argument, they have exclusive rights to the covert
action brief.
Such claims have been challenged by the Pentagon, and considering
the formidable assets possessed by Cyber Command and NSA, the Agency is
likely to lose out when the Obama regime issues a ruling later this
year.
This raises an inevitable question, not that its being asked by
congressional grifters or corporate media stenographers: should NSA, the
Pentagon or indeed any other secret state agency, including the CIA, be
tasked with cybersecurity generally, let alone given carte blanche to
conduct clandestine and legally dubious missions inside our computer
networks?
As security expert Bruce Schneier
wrote last
year, "Cybersecurity isn't a military problem." In fact when the Bush
and Obama governments gave the Pentagon a free hand to driftnet spy on
the American people, Schneier averred that programs like the NSA's
warrantless wiretapping program "created additional vulnerabilities in
our domestic telephone networks."
Vulnerabilities not likely to be addressed by administration
proposals that would further weaken encryption standards and order
telecommunications and computer manufacturers to build
surveillance-ready backdoors into their devices and networks, as
The New York Times disclosed in September.
Despite a warning last year by former DHS National Cyber Security
division head Amit Yoran that "the intelligence community has always and
will always prioritize its own collection efforts over the defensive
and protection mission of our government's and nation's digital
systems," the securitization of America's electronic networks is
proceeding at break-neck speed.
Describing the military's power-grab in benign terms, NSA/CYBERCOM
director Alexander characterized Pentagon operational plans as an
"active defense," one that "hunts" inside a computer network "for
malicious software, which some experts say is difficult to do in open
networks and would raise privacy concerns if the government were to do
it in the private sector," The Washington Post reports.
An unnamed "senior defense official" described the process as an
"ability to push 'out as far as we can' beyond the network perimeter to
'where the threat is coming from' in order to eliminate it."
Never mind that pushing out "as far as we can" will mean that the
American people will be subject to additional constitutional breaches or
that current Pentagon initiatives, such as NSA's warrantless
wiretapping programs are not subject to meaningful public oversight and
are hidden beneath top secret layers of classification and the continual
invocation of the "state secrets" privilege by the Bush and Obama
administrations.
Regardless of which secret state agency comes out on top in the
current dispute, where choosing between the CIA and the Pentagon offers a
Hobson's choice of whether one prefers to be poisoned or shot, as Doug
Henwood points wrote in
Left Business Observer following
the mid-term elections: "A country that's rotting from the head,
poisoned by alienation, plutocracy, and an aversion to thinking, careens
from one idiocy to another."
And so it goes, on and on...