Last year, when Karzai himself ran for reelection, he busied himself with backroom deals, while his supporters
were
caught red-handed stuffing
ballot boxes and having a good laugh. Every Afghan knew that the
president who had been foisted on them by foreigners in 2001 was
stealing the election.
Yet the international community, led by the
United States, proclaimed the process if not exactly “free and fair,” at
least “credible” -- which is to say: Hey, what’s a little fraud among
friends?
Tomgram: Ann Jones, The Vote We're Fighting For
The other day, on the front page of my hometown newspaper was a shocking tale of Iranian perfidy in Afghanistan headlined “Iran
Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful.” The mounds of
euros reportedly being passed to Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s chief
of staff Umar Daudzai were a familiar form of influence peddling --
intended, as the New York Times piece put it, “to buy the
loyalty of Mr. Daudzai and promote Iran’s interests in the presidential
palace, according to Afghan and Western officials here. Iran uses its
influence to help drive a wedge between the Afghans and their American
and NATO benefactors, they say.”
The Times even had a vivid account of a “large plastic bag
bulging with packets of euro bills” being passed to Daudzai on a plane
departing Iran. Strange, though, how few seem
to remember the way American “benefactors” launched this latest
disatrous chapter in Afghanistan's three-decade-old catastrophe by
proudly delivering their own bag-equivalents stuffed with cash. Back in
2001, with planning for a U.S. invasion ramping up, CIA agents reportedly appeared in
Taliban-free northern Afghanistan with devastatingly convincing
arguments for supporting Washington: metal “suitcases” -- okay, when it
comes to bribery, call us a little classier than our rivals -- stuffed
with millions of dollars in non-sequentially numbered hundred-dollar
bills. Back then, it was called “preparing the ground” for invasion
and, at the time, was considered not perfidious corruption but brilliant
spycraft. Of course, in one form or another, as Karzai -- who, as Juan
Cole recently commented, “appears not to understand the word ‘corruption’” -- noted in a news conference this week, American money has never stopped flowing in staggering amounts.
Or what about this for bribery, even if here it's called “a
classic carrot-and-stick approach”? The Obama administration recently
offered the Pakistani military another $2 billion in weaponry,
equipment, and training. However, the size, scope, and perhaps even
existence of the aid package will reportedly be
dependent on that military's launching an operation Washington
desperately wants against Taliban-allied forces in North Waziristan. In
a less-noted story, the Wall Street Journal reports
that the administration has been pushing Pakistan’s government hard to
let many more CIA agents into the country. If that request is finally
granted, who knows what they might be bringing in their suitcases.
After all, the CIA has quite an Iranian-style history of successfully
bribing politicians, including in Italy and Japan after World War II.
Of course, there the suitcases of cash went to “our” politicians and for
perfectly righteous reasons.
Meanwhile at home, in a midterm election season not exactly lighting
up the skies with democratic possibilities, cash is raining down, and
unnamed corporate entities are seizing the democratic day. What in our
media is called “fundraising” -- if the Iranians were doing it, we’d
have another name for it -- is heading for the $2 billion mark for
House and Senate races (or, on average, about $4 million for every
congressional seat up for grabs in 2010), and that doesn’t even include
the approximately $400 million being raised by what our media usually politely term “outside interest groups.”
As Ann Jones, TomDispatch regular and author of a remarkable new book, War Is Not Over When It’s Over: Women Speak Out from the Ruins of War (on
which more in a future post) suggests, perhaps it's time to be a little
less surprised when the “democracy” we installed in Afghanistan turns
out to be a democracy of cash-filled bags and suitcases. Tom
Big Men, Big Money, Big Voting Scam:
The American Midterm Election -- in Afghanistan
by Ann Jones
With that experience so fresh in memory, the current Electoral
Complaints Commission went to work with unusual efficiency, resolving
most complaints with unaccustomed speed. And last week the chairman of
the Independent Election Commission, an oversight body also selected by
President Karzai, announced that it would throw out as invalid almost a
quarter of the 5.6 million votes cast. Until that moment Afghans, who
aspire to democracy, had hoped for a more honest election than the
charade that returned Karzai to power in 2009. No such luck. The
partial results of this one look just as bad as the presidential vote,
with roughly the same percentage of ballots invalidated.
While dumping fraudulent votes may give the appearance of rigorous
oversight, the numbers raise a new mystery: where did those votes come
from? In the two days following the election last month, the running
total of votes cast rose from 3.6 million to 4.4 million. Now, it has
suddenly jumped again to 5.6 million -- of which 1.3 million ballots
have been discarded, leaving a total of 4.3 million valid votes.
Election-watcher Martine van Bijlert of the Afghanistan Analysts Networkdescribed
the attitude of the Independent Election Commission this way: “If you
want to know where the additional votes came from: they were added
fraudulently, now they have been removed, and that is really all you
need to know.”
Perhaps noting that the fraud factor was holding steady, a spokesman
for the Independent Election Commission declared that a level of fraud
with more than one in five votes considered phony is “normal” in an election.
Thus do official bodies in Afghanistan’s widely advertised new
democracy -- the one for which our troops are fighting -- smooth over
all irregularities and make short work of making do, of overseeing elections as usual: not free, not fair, just good enough for Afghans.
But are they?
Without waiting for final results, what passes for “the international community” has already pronounced the elections a “success,” but an email from a parliamentary candidate, a woman I know named Mahbouba Seraj, tells a different story:
“I honestly
don’t know from where to start. My frustration, disappointment, and
anger are so great I am afraid they might get the better of me. I was
involved in the first presidential election of Afghanistan in 2004 and
the first parliamentary election in 2005, but oh how different those
elections were. I won’t say they were better because they too were
captured by the War Lords, Commanders, and criminals -- just like this
election -- but the level of fraud and corruption was nothing compared
to this. Those men used force and got elected by their rifles and
machine guns, but this election was… unbelievable. I have no other word
to use.”
Many “unbelievable” stories litter this election, but Seraj’s tale is
especially instructive because, in the end, it is all too believable.
In fact, it’s a pretty simple story of courageous idealism confounded by
big men with money.
On the Campaign Trail
When I last saw candidate Seraj in Kabul, the Afghan capital, in
July, she was about to leave for Nuristan Province to campaign. It was a
brave undertaking. Nuristan lies in the northeast of the country,
sandwiched between Panshir Province and Pakistan, along the southern
face of the Hindu Kush, a monumental sub-range of the Himalayas. Its
precipitous slopes and high valleys are so forbidding and remote that
even Islam did not reach Nuristanis until the late nineteenth century,
and they are to this day considered a unique people.
The Taliban move freely in Nuristan. In 2008, they almost overran
a U.S. base there, killing nine American soldiers. Then-Afghan war
commander General Stanley McChrystal responded by withdrawing American
troops from all four of their major bases in the province. The U.S.
military high command has given up on certain Afghan locales -- in 2010,
American troops notably left the deadly and unattainable Korengal Valley, not far from Nuristan -- but never before to my knowledge had they given up on a whole province.
Nevertheless, Seraj, a woman of fierce energy, wanted to represent
the people of the Duaba and Mondawel districts in western Nuristan,
where her grandmother was born. She put it this way to me: “I believe in
democracy so much. I want it so much for Afghanistan. I tell my
constituents, ‘I don’t believe in buying votes as so many candidates
do. Please give them to me willingly, because then you will have your
representative in Parliament who will truly serve you.’”
Worried for her safety, I reminded her that, during the 2005
parliamentary campaign in her province, another female candidate, Hawa
Nuristani, and several of her staff had been shot.
“Yes,” Seraj agreed, “but she survived, and she won.”
Mahbouba Seraj’s recent email about her election race was not meant
for me alone. It was addressed this way: “To my beautiful and forgotten
province and its lovely and amazing people.” It was an English
translation of an open letter she had written to her constituents
explaining why, in this important election, they had not been able to
vote at all. Reading it made clear why she considered the
election of 2010 even more outrageous than previous shameful Afghan
escapades in electioneering and fraud.
In 2005, the men in power in Nuristan had tried to murder the candidate they opposed. Since then they
have learned that the internationals -- read Americans -- will accept
any results as long as the election process looks reasonably good. In
2010, far more sophisticated, they murdered democracy simply by killing
time.
As Seraj wrote:
“First of all,
Nuristan had not been made ready for an election. They didn’t have Army
and police personnel to provide security as promised. Then the
hard-working head of the election committee of Nuristan was fired two
weeks before polling day because some powerful candidates complained
about him to the Election Commission. The young man who replaced him
seemed to have no idea what his job was, yet he made sure the ballot
boxes didn’t get to Mondawel and Duaba districts, which very conveniently happened to be my constituencies.
“The
most incredible part of the story is that this young man had the power
to stop a plane that was ready to take off to deliver the ballot boxes.
He refused to hand over the ballot boxes for Mondawel district
to the official in charge of the district and the staff of armed men
designated to carry the ballots through the mountains to all the remote
polling centers in Mondawel. He created delays and made excuses for days until it was too late.”
Officials in Kabul were also well versed in the technique. When
Seraj tried to contact the head of the Independent Election Commission
in Kabul, she reported:
“His very polite
assistant would talk to me and tell me, ‘I will ask Mr. So-and-so to
call you back,’ but he never did. Finally, I had to leave Nuristan and
come to Kabul to meet with him, but when I arrived for our appointment,
he had left the city to take care of other problems, and somehow I had
not been notified.
“That day I tried to get in touch
with anyone I could think of who might be able to help -- the Minister
of Defense, the Head of the United Nations in Kabul, Mr. de Mistura, and
other officials at UNAMA [The U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan]
-- but everyone was engaged. By then I knew the level of fraud and
corruption in Nuristan was going to hit the roof, and it did. Ballots
were stolen from polling stations and scattered on the mountainsides or
taken to people’s houses and filled out. To the last minute, people
were offering to buy and sell voting cards and votes. What could we do?
My campaign manager and I filled out complaints to the Election
Complaints Commissions in both Nuristan and Kabul.”
Those complaints must now be among the thousands filed by people all
over the country with similar disappointed dreams of real Afghan
democracy -- the very complaints now being so efficiently dealt with in
Kabul even as disgruntled voters take to the streets of
Herat, Kunduz, Paktia, Ghor, and other cities to protest mass
disqualifications that seem to fall inequitably on certain areas or
ethnic groups. Yet angry voters and candidates are turned away from the
Election Complaints Commission with useless, unregistered receipts.
Recognizing election proceedings that look “eerily familiar,” analyst
van Bijlert notes: “the processes that are aimed at cleaning up the vote
and dismissing fraudulent ballots have become so murky that they
themselves are now widely seen as simply the next phase of
manipulation.”
Democratic Dreaming
Mahbouba Seraj acquired her dreams of democracy from her ancestors --
and from America. She is the granddaughter of Habibullah, who was the
progressive amir or king of Afghanistan from 1901 to 1919, and the great granddaughter of Abdur Rahman, the amir
of Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901. He introduced Islam to Nuristanis,
gave Afghanistan its present borders, and for the first time subdued its
disparate tribes, bringing them under centralized rule. She is also
the niece of Amanullah, the modernizing amir who ruled from
1919 to 1929, pioneering in the fields of education and women’s rights,
winning a war against the British, and gaining the country its
independence.
Seraj herself graduated from Kabul University before being thrown
into prison with her family after the monarchy was overthrown in 1973.
The family fled the country in 1978 before the impending Soviet
invasion, and took refuge in the United States where, Seraj says, “I
lived, learned, worked, and in the end buried both my parents.” Her
life changed completely when she saw an Afghan video of the Taliban
executing a woman, clad in a faded blue burqa, in Kabul Stadium where,
as a girl, she had happily watched games of soccer and buzkashi -- Afghan polo -- and had once attended a concert given by Duke Ellington.
When the Taliban fell, she returned to Kabul and went to work as a
volunteer. She trained young diplomats for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs; she trained women parliamentary candidates in the arts of
political campaigning and, after they were elected in 2005, in the arts
of legislation. She also created and hosted a national public-service
radio program called "Our Beloved Afghanistan," and taught aspiring
Afghan businesswomen at the American University of Afghanistan.
Then, last summer she went to Nuristan to campaign. To her supporters back in Kabul she then wrote:
“I want to help
the most underserved people in the whole of Afghanistan, the Nuristanis.
If only the world knew how these magnificent people live in these great
valleys of Nuristan, without roads, schools, hospitals, electricity, or
any of the basic necessities of life. The women of Nuristan do all the
difficult physical work. They gather wood, they pick the fruit from the
trees, they tend their animals and their children and their husbands,
and they walk for miles, climbing steep mountains with huge loads on
their backs and their kids in their arms. I want to be a voice for
Nuristan. I want to put it back on the map of Afghanistan.”
In her most recent message to her constituents, she wrote:
“Now, I have no
idea how the Election Complaints Commission is going to decide who has
won this election. The ECC keeps saying, ‘We have criteria and will
decide accordingly.’ But I wonder what criteria they will apply to
candidates who have not received votes from their constituencies because
some few people got paid to prevent the votes from being cast. Perhaps
the government will abandon Nuristan, or perhaps it will pick its own
winner and call this “A SUCCESSFUL AND JUST ELECTION SPECIALLY FOR
NURISTAN PROVINCE, THE MOST BACKWARD, POOR, BEAUTIFUL, AND FORGOTTEN
PROVINCE OF AFGHANISTAN.”
Such a conclusion might be good enough for many Afghans whose dreams
of democracy faded even before last year’s presidential election when
word first began to circulate nationwide that the fix was in for
Karzai. At least it would be no more than they have come to expect from
repeated exercises in counterfeit democracy staged, it seems, more for
the benefit of international audiences (and voters) than for the Afghan
electorate.
Here’s a question for Americans: Would such a conclusion be good
enough for us? We are, after all, citizens of the democracy that
installed the largely fundamentalist government of Afghanistan in the
first place, labeled it “democratic,” and staged the first Afghan
presidential election in 2004 with unseemly haste as George W. Bush eyed
his own run for reelection. Assuming command in Afghanistan in 2010,
General David Petraeus was careful to set American expectations low:
"We're not trying to turn Afghanistan into Switzerland in five years or
less," he said. "What's good enough, traditional organizing structures
and so forth are certainly fine."
International apologists for “good enough” who foot the bill and
stage Afghan elections no longer even pretend to aim for standards like
those of Switzerland -- standards that nonetheless enter the democratic
dreams of a great many Afghans. They assume instead that Afghans
naturally cheat. As it happens, Mahbouba Seraj does not. And while it
may be unreasonable to expect perfection, the fact that Afghan elections
grow ever more crooked as the years pass, and Afghan voters
increasingly disillusioned, suggests that Afghans are learning to play
(if they care to play at all) by what they take to be American rules.
Put yourself in the place of an Afghan for a moment. When you see
photographs of President Karzai’s men stuffing ballot boxes, and an
American president not only telephones to congratulate him on his victory, while admitting that the election was “a little messy,” but also sends more troops
to shore up his government, what are you to make of it? What else
could you make of it but that Americans are complicit in the whole
corrupt and costly enterprise? If you were a Nuristani, eager to cast a
vote for a splendid woman candidate, and the ballots never came, what
in the world would you make of that?
If you were Mahbouba Seraj, believing fervently in democracy, such
things might break your heart. If you are an American voter uneasy
about the course of our democracy, well, maybe you ought to give some
thought to this other Afghan democracy: the one we’ve set up, paid for,
and sent our soldiers to fight for as an example to the world -- a small
but increasingly transparent replica of our own.
Ann Jones, a TomDispatch regular, is the author of Kabul in Winter: Life Without Peace in Afghanistan and the just published War Is Not Over When It’s Over: Women Speak Out from the Ruins of War
(Metropolitan 2010). Having returned temporarily from conflict zones,
she is undergoing culture shock as a fellow of the Radcliffe Institute
for Advanced Study at Harvard University.
Copyright 2010 Ann Jones