Moreover, of the 14 men whose stories are described in this chapter,
many appear to be victims of the same failures of intelligence or
opportunism as those already released. This is particularly true of nine
men seized not with Abu Zubaydah (although there are, of course,
serious doubts about his significance, as described below) but in a
guest house close to a university, as five others seized in that raid
have been released, two of whom won their habeas petitions in rulings
that were notable for the level of criticism leveled at the government
by the judges in question. In addition, one of the remaining nine also
won his habeas petition (although the government is appealing that
decision), and another has been cleared for release and, recently, came
close to being offered a new home in Germany.
The following five men were seized in the house raid in Faisalabad that led to the capture of
Abu Zubaydah, the alleged “high-value detainee” for whom the CIA’s torture program was
initially developed. Zubaydah’s case reveals the true horror at the heart of the “War on Terror,” because, despite being
waterboarded 83 times and
held in secret CIA prisons
for four and a half years, he was not a senior al-Qaeda operative at
all, and was, instead, the mentally troubled gatekeeper of the Khaldan
training camp in Afghanistan. Even so, the five men seized with him
have, for the most part, been accused of having connections to al-Qaeda,
although one other, an Algerian named Labed Ahmed, was
released in November 2008, and all appear to be more fortunate than
three others seized in the same raid
— two young men named Omar Ghramesh and Noor al-Deen, and an
unidentified teenager — who were rendered to Syria as part of the CIA’s
“extraordinary rendition” program, and who have never resurfaced in any
form.
ISN 682 Al Sharbi, Ghassan (Saudi Arabia)

Al-Sharbi, who speaks fluent English and graduated in electrical
engineering from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University in Arizona, is one
of very few Guantánamo prisoners to have publicly declared membership
of al-Qaeda. In his tribunal at Guantánamo, he
accepted all the allegations
against him, which included claims that he received specialized
training in the manufacture and use of remote-controlled explosive
devices to detonate bombs against Afghan and US forces, that he “was
observed chatting and laughing like pals with Osama bin Laden,” and that
he was known in Guantánamo as the “electronic builder” and “Abu
Zubaydah’s right-hand man.”
Charged in the first incarnation of the
Military Commissions, he appeared at a pre-trial hearing on April 27,
2006, and was
equally open
about his activities, telling the judge, “I came here to tell you I did
what I did and I’m willing to pay the price,” “Even if I spend hundreds
of years in jail, that would be a matter of honor to me,” and “I fought
the United States, I’m going to make it short and easy for you guys:
I’m proud of what I did.” Perhaps surprisingly, al-Sharbi, who was a
member of
the short-lived Prisoners’ Council in the summer of 2005, along with
Shaker Aamer
(ISN 239) and four others who have been released, was befriended by
Guantánamo’s warden, Col. Mike Bumgarner, despite his avowed allegiance
to al-Qaeda, and despite the fact that he later became one of
Guantánamo’s most persistent hunger strikers.
In June 2008, he was again
put forward for a trial by Military Commission, along with Sufyian Barhoumi, Jabran al-Qahtani and Noor Uthman Muhammed (see below), but
the charges were dropped by the Pentagon in October 2008, after their prosecutor,
Lt. Col. Darrel Vandeveld, resigned,
stating that the trial system was designed to prevent the disclosure of
evidence essential to the defense. New charges against all four men
were
filed in January 2009,
in the dying days of the Bush administration, but with the exception of
Noor Uthman Muhammed, have not been revived under President Obama,
perhaps because, as in the majority of cases involving Abu Zubaydah, the
government has
stepped back from its discredited claims about his significance.
ISN 685 Ali, Abdelrazak (Algeria)
The story of Abdelrazak Ali is so confusing that I have no idea what to
believe, and can only hope that the truth will emerge when the supposed
evidence is examined by a District Court judge in his habeas corpus
petition. In the
Summary of Evidence
for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal in 2004, he was identified as
Abdelrazak Ali Abdelrahman, a Libyan, but by the time of his second
Administrative Review Board in 2006, he was identified as Abdullah Azak,
and in the third round of the ARBs, in 2007, he was identified as Said
Bin Brahim Bin Umran Bakush, an Algerian. This led to the US authorities
accusing him of having “lied for a period of two years eight months
prior to revealing his real name and actual place of birth,” and using
this as part of the evidence against him, even though, as
I have stated,
this “may not have been advisable, but was understandable.”
According
to the US authorities, he was accused, by an unidentified “source,” of
staying in various guest houses in Afghanistan from July to October
2001, and of attending the Khaldan training camp “circa 1996/1997,” and
by an unidentified “al-Qaeda operative” of being “a member of his
Martyrs’ Brigade.’” In response, he has stated that he traveled to
Pakistan “to go to school to learn how to read and write,” and has also
claimed, like Labed Ahmed (released in November 2008), that he was taken
to Abu Zubaydah’s house by other people, and did not know the
inhabitants. Given that the allegations against him are such clear
examples of unverifiable hearsay, it may well be that this is the case.
ISN 694 Barhoumi, Sufyian (Algeria)

Barhoumi, who lost his habeas corpus petition in September 2009, was
accused
of being a trainer for the bomb-making group in the house rented by Abu
Zubaydah, but has strenuously denied the allegations against him. In
his tribunal at Guantánamo, he admitted traveling to Afghanistan for
military training in 1999, but pointed out that this was long before
9/11, and insisted that, having been shown a video of atrocities in
Chechnya at a mosque in the UK, where he lived for two years, his
intention was to train to fight in Chechnya. He explained that, after
leaving Afghanistan, he traveled “from house to house,” ending up at the
safe house in Faisalabad where he was seized with Abu Zubaydah.
He
added, however, that he was only there for ten days before the raid, and
claimed that the allegations were the result of “hearsay” and of
“people testifying against me.”
He claimed that his interrogators told
him, “people are talking about you a lot,” and suggested that, because
he was arrested with Abu Zubaydah, “they dumped everything on me and
said I was al-Qaeda also.” In 2006, at
a pre-trial hearing
after he had been put forward for a trial by Military Commission, he,
like Ghassan al-Sharbi, refused legal representation, but was primarily
concerned with showing the courtroom his hand, which was severely
damaged after a land mine accident in Afghanistan, and complaining about
the conditions of his imprisonment.
Although he was charged for a
second time in June 2008, and the charges were dropped in October 2008
and refiled in January 2009, he has not been charged under President
Obama, and the fact that his habeas petition proceeded to a ruling may
indicate that he is one of the 48 men that the Guantánamo Review Task
Force
recommended for indefinite detention without charge or trial. Noticeably, when his habeas appeal was
denied by the D.C. Circuit Court in June this year,
and the reasons for the denial of his habeas petition were first
publicly revealed, it became apparent that, although the judge in his
case (Judge Rosemary Collyer) noted that Barhoumi “said that he is not
now and has never been a member of al-Qaeda,” and added, “I have no
reason not to believe that,” she nevertheless concluded that “he was
with an associated force that was engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners and therefore was properly
detained.”
That “associated force,” it transpired, was an alleged
militia associated with Abu Zubaydah, whose existence was apparently
revealed in the diary of another of Zubaydah’s associates, Abu Kamil
al-Suri, (someone previously unheard of, and whose current whereabouts
are unknown). It also became apparent that, in the absence of any other
evidence, the government was using this not only as a new way of
justifying Abu Zubaydah’s detention, but also to implicate others like
Barhoumi.
ISN 696 Al Qahtani, Jabran (Saudi Arabia)
As I explained in June 2008, when al-Qahtani, a graduate in electrical
engineering from King Saud University in Saudi Arabia, was
put forward for a trial by Military Commission
with Ghassan al-Sharbi, Sufyian Barhoumi and Noor Uthman Muhammed, he
has had little to say about the allegations against him: that he
traveled to Afghanistan after 9/11 “with the intent to fight the
Northern Alliance and the American forces, whom he expected would soon
be fighting in Afghanistan,” and that he was part of a group at Abu
Zubaydah’s house who were provided with money to buy the components to
make remote-controlled explosive devices. He refused to take part in his
tribunal at Guantánamo in 2004, and spoke very little in April 2006,
during the pre-trial hearing for his first, aborted Military Commission,
when he was concerned only to refuse the services of his military
lawyer. As with the other three men, the charges against him were
dropped in October 2008, and new charges were filed in January 2009,
although he has not been charged under President Obama.
ISN 707 Muhammed, Noor Uthman (Sudan)

Muhammed was
put forward for a trial by Military Commission
on May 23, 2008, accused of serving as the deputy emir and a weapons
instructor at the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan from 1996 to
2000, when the camp was closed. Noticeably, these charges do not relate
to the 9/11 attacks, and in his tribunal at Guantánamo in 2004, Muhammed
insisted that Khaldan was “a place to get training” that had nothing to
do with either al-Qaeda or the Taliban. “People come over to that camp,
train for about a month to a month and a half, then they go back to
their hometown,” he said, adding that what the people did with the
training they received was their own business.
Muhammed’s case ought to
raise troubling questions about Khaldan — and, specifically, about how
his claims about the camp’s lack of affiliation with either al-Qaeda or
the Taliban echo the US authorities’ belated conclusions about Abu
Zubaydah, and how his alleged role as the camp’s deputy emir ought to
raise troubling questions about the camp’s emir, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi.
The CIA’s most notorious “ghost prisoner,” al-Libi
died in a Libyan prison in May 2009 after being
rendered back to the country,
having served his purpose when, in 2002, under torture in Egypt (where
he had been flown by the CIA), he falsely confessed to connections
between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda that were
used to justify the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
However, despite these problems, Muhammed is one of five prisoners
put forward for a trial by Military Commission
under the Obama administration, and although there are serious doubts
about whether the court is empowered to try him for his alleged
involvement with terrorism before the 9/11 attacks, prosecutors made a
point, in a pre-trial hearing on September 21 this year, of
stating
that, “for a number of years,” Muhammed “was the principal trainer and
in charge of all training at the Khaldan training camp in Afghanistan
that provided numerous individuals who went on to serve for al-Qaeda.”
His trial is scheduled to begin in February 2011.
The following nine men were seized in a separate house raid in
Faisalabad on March 28, 2002, at the Crescent Mill guest house, also
known as the “Issa house,” after its Pakistani owner (who was not
seized) or the “Yemeni house,” because most of its inhabitants were
Yemenis. Although the house was purported to have a connection to Abu
Zubaydah, the majority of the 15 prisoners known to have been seized in
the raid have always maintained that they were students at the nearby
Salafia University, or that they had traveled to Pakistan for cheap
medical treatment, and that the house was a student guest house.
One of
the prisoners, Salah Ahmed al-Salami,
died in mysterious circumstances
in Guantánamo on June 9, 2006 (on the night that two other men died in
what was described as a triple suicide), and five others have been
released. In May 2009, Judge Gladys Kessler, ruling on the habeas corpus
petition of one of the five,
Alla Ali Bin Ali Ahmed,
who described himself as a student, savaged the government for drawing
on the testimony of witnesses whose unreliability was acknowledged by
the authorities, and for attempting to create a “mosaic” of intelligence
that was thoroughly unconvincing, and she also made a point of stating,
“It is likely, based on evidence in the record, that at least a
majority of the [redacted] guests were indeed students, living at a
guest house that was located close to a university.”
Ali Ahmed was
finally released
last September, and in the meantime another student in the house, Abdul
Aziz al-Noofayee, a Saudi who stated that he had traveled to Pakistan
to receive cheap medical treatment for a back problem, was
released last June,
following the deliberations of President Obama’s Guantánamo Review Task
Force. In addition, two other Yemeni students, Mohammed Tahir and Fayad
Yahya Ahmed, were
released last December.
Since then, one other man has also won his habeas petition (although
the government is appealing that decision), and another has been cleared
by the Task Force, and is seeking a third country to offer him a new
home.
ISN 680 Hassan, Emad (Yemen)
In Guantánamo, Hassan has repeatedly stated that he never set foot in
Afghanistan (until the US took him there after his capture), and that he
was near the end of a seven-month trip to the university to study the
Koran when he was seized. He has also explained that, while in Pakistani
custody, “the person who was in charge came and told us we didn’t have
anything to worry about,” and that “our sheet was clean.” Nevertheless,
he has been subjected to
numerous allegations
made by unidentified individuals, who have claimed that he trained at
al-Farouq, where he was one of 50 men chosen to be Osama bin Laden’s
bodyguards, that he swore
bayat to Osama bin Laden, and that he
was present in Tora Bora, at the showdown between al-Qaeda and US forces
in December 2001.
These dubious sounding allegations have not been
tested in court, of course, and it may be that Hassan has simply aroused
the wrath of the authorities in Guantánamo because of his refusal to
accept the conditions in which he and the other prisoners are held. In
2006, one of his lawyers,
Douglas Cox, explained
how he was “regarded as a leader by other detainees,” and how he “went
on a hunger strike. A few months into it, military doctors started
force-feeding him by inserting a tube through his nose. The process was
so painful that Hassan felt he couldn’t take it anymore. He didn’t want
to quit, though, because he thought he would be letting down the other
detainees.” Weight records released by the Pentagon show that, although
Hassan only weighed 113 pounds on arrival at Guantánamo, his weight
dropped at one point in December 2005 to a skeletal 85 pounds (
PDF).
ISN 684 Tahamuttan, Mohammed (Palestine)

Tahamuttan, who was 22 years old when seized, had been a member, since
the age of 14, of Jamaat-al-Tablighi, the vast missionary organization,
with millions of members worldwide, which, in Guantánamo, was routinely
described as a front for terrorism (a description that is akin to
describing the Catholic Church as a front for the IRA). According to
his own account,
he had traveled to Pakistan in October 2001, and had been part of two
missions from the Tablighi headquarters in Raiwand, but in Guantánamo he
was subjected to claims that he had traveled to Afghanistan for
military training, even though a more plausible explanation of his
activities was also provided by the government, in passages in his
Unclassified Summary of Evidence in which it was stated that “he met two
Afghani men during a lecture at the Jamaat-al-Tablighi headquarters in
Raiwand, Pakistan, who pressured him into traveling to Afghanistan …
even though the Jamaat-al-Tablighi expressly forbade travel to
Afghanistan as too dangerous.”
However, although “he traveled with the
two Afghan men to Quetta, Pakistan, where he was taken to a compound
containing Afghan refugees and Arab men who looked like fighters,” he
“was advised not to travel to Afghanistan, and his travel was arranged
to Lahore, Pakistan.” Cleared for release by President Obama’s
Guantánamo Review Task Force, he was
recently considered
for rehousing in Germany, but at the last minute the German government
decided to accept only two of the three prisoners offered. However, on
September 27, 2010, the Foreign Minister of the Maldives,
Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, said
the government “was going to invite the sole remaining Palestinian
detainee in Guantánamo Bay to live a ‘peaceful, free’ life in the
Maldives,” and “expressed hope that the parliament would endorse the
decision as a gesture of affection to the Palestinian brothers and as an
expression of solidarity with the Palestinian people.”
ISN 686 Hakim, Abdel (Yemen)
As I explained in
The Guantánamo Files,
although Hakim stated in Guantánamo that he had studied the Koran for
five months in Lahore, and had then been directed by a religious figure
to the guest house near Salafia University, the US authorities alleged
that he had trained at al-Farouq. When a tribunal member asked him, “If
you were a student studying the Koran, how did you end up here?” he
replied, “This is the question I always ask myself … why was I captured
there, and why did they bring me here?”
ISN 688 Ahmed, Fahmi (Yemen)
As I explained in
The Guantánamo Files,
Fahmi Ahmed (also identified as Fahmi al-Tawlaqi) “said that he went to
Pakistan to buy fabrics, taking $3,500 that he had borrowed from his
mother, but explained that he actually spent most of his time in
Pakistan ‘like a wild man,’ drinking and smoking hashish. After staying
for a year and a half, during which time his visa expired, he was
eventually advised to go to Faisalabad, where there was a big Arabic
community, and where he was told he would be able to locate people who
could tell him how to bribe the government to renew his visa.
He said he
ended up staying for two months with a Pakistani family, but just as he
was planning to call his family to arrange to return home, because the
house he was staying in was too small, he met Ali Abdullah Ahmed
al-Salami [aka Salah Ahmed al-Salami, one of the three prisoners who
died in June 2006], who invited him to stay at a larger house, where he
was also staying, and where ‘they were all university students.’”
In
contrast, the US authorities
allege that he trained in Afghanistan, fought with the Taliban, and was a member of al-Qaeda, but this seems unlikely, because, as
his lawyers explained in 2006,
“Although he says he endured his share of abuse at Gitmo –once,
soldiers shaved his head in the shape of a cross — he has also made an
amazing discovery: rap music. Al-Tawlaqi adopted the rap name King
Daniel, which he drew on his prison jumpsuit. He filled two notebooks
with rap lyrics, in English, organized by subject. The lawyers can’t say
what the songs are about because Justice Department officials wouldn’t
declassify the lyrics, though they assured me they are ‘very lewd,’” and
he “asked his lawyers if they could persuade Eminem to perform his
songs.”
ISN 689 Salam, Mohammed (Yemen)
Salam, who was
reportedly seen
by “a senior al-Qaeda member” at al-Farouq, has actually presented a
far more coherent narrative, which involved traveling to Pakistan to get
treatment on his nose, and then meeting up with a missionary under
whose guidance he traveled to Faisalabad to study the Koran, where he
stayed for eight months until he was seized in the house raid. In his
tribunal at Guantánamo, after explaining that a “generous person” paid
for his trip, the following exchange took place, which demonstrated how
wide the cultural gap was between the Americans and Muslims from the
Gulf:
Tribunal Member: I don’t know your culture very well, but … in our culture people just don’t step up and say, “I’ll pay for the trip for you.”
Detainee: In our culture, in Islam, there is such a thing …
Indeed, it is an obligation for any Muslim who is rich to pay for
someone who is poor.
ISN 690 Qader, Ahmed Abdul (Yemen)
As I explained in
The Guantánamo Files,
Qader, who was just 18 years old when he was seized, said in Guantánamo
that he went to Afghanistan “to help the needy and the poor,” and tried
unsuccessfully to establish a charity organization. He admitted that he
visited the “back line,” encouraged by friends connected to the
Taliban, but insisted that he “never participated in any kind of
military activities.” After leaving Afghanistan before the US-led
invasion began, he said that he ended up in the house in Faisalabad,
where he became friends with Fahmi Ahmed (ISN 688, above). “We shared
the same vision and he has the same opinions,” Ahmed said of him,
adding, “He used to use hashish with me,” whereas the other students in
the house “were trying to inspire me to do the religious things, like
look at my religion, because most of the students were studying the
Koran and all things related to religious studies.”
ISN 691 Al Zarnuki, Mohammed (Yemen)
Although it was
alleged,
by unidentified sources, including “a senior al-Qaeda lieutenant,” that
al-Zarnuki was seen in various training camps and guest houses in
Afghanistan between 1998 and 2001 (and even that, after the bombing of
the USS
Cole in 2000, he attended a meeting in Kandahar with
Osama bin Laden to plan further operations), he has stated that he took a
break from farming to preach with Jamaat-al-Tablighi, and has claimed
that he spent four months preaching and then spent a month and a half at
the guest house where he was seized, where he became ill.
ISN 702 Mingazov, Ravil (Russia)
A former ballet dancer and Russian army officer, Mingazov, who
won his habeas corpus petition
in May 2010, has always claimed that he traveled to Afghanistan in
search of a new home for himself and his family, after he converted to
Islam and faced dangerous discrimination from the Russian military.
Following the US-led invasion, he said that he fled with other refugees
to a center in Lahore, in Pakistan, run by the vast missionary
organization Jamaat-al-Tablighi, where he stayed from January to March
2002.
Anxious to be reunited with his wife and child, but aware that
foreigners in Pakistan were prey for bounty hunters, he then accepted an
offer of safe passage to a house in Faisalabad with two other refugees,
Labed Ahmed (an Algerian, released in November 2008) and Jamil Nassir
(a Yemeni, see below), where, they were told, it would be easier for
them to leave the country.
After being accidentally delivered to Shabaz
Cottage, where Abu Zubaydah was living (and where Ahmed insisted on
staying), Mingazov and Nasser were then moved to the Crescent Mill guest
house, where they were seized after about ten days. Any doubts about
Mingazov’s innocence should have been removed not just by the ruling but
also because, during a military review board at Guantánamo,
Labed Ahmed had stated
that, because he, Mingazov and Nassir “did not have a connection or
relationship with Abu Zubaydah,” they “should have been placed in the
Yemeni house.”
As I have explained previously, “This indicates that,
although Abu Zubaydah had some sort of contact with the [Crescent Mill
guest] house, it was not a place that had any connection with terrorism,
and was, at best, a place where a few foreigners fleeing from
Afghanistan could be concealed alongside a group of students.” Despite
this, however, the Obama administration recently announced that it would
appeal Mingazov’s successful habeas petition.
ISN 728 Nassir, Jamil (Yemen)
The outline of Nassir’s journey to Faisalabad, and the reasons that he
should not be regarded as an associate of Abu Zubaydah, can be found in
the story of Ravil Mingazov, above. As for what Nassir had been doing
prior to his capture, the US authorities initially struggled to find
evidence of any anti-US activities. In 2004, at his
Combatant Status Review Tribunal,
the only information they had about him, beyond the spurious connection
with Zubaydah and the house, was a claim that he had stayed in “the
Afghani house” in Kandahar, after traveling from Yemen to Pakistan in
late July 2001.
By 2007, the US authorities had established a much more
exciting narrative, but its reliability is, of course, unknown.
According to this version of events, Nassir had traveled to Afghanistan
with his wife, had rented a house next door to Mullah Omar, the leader
of the Taliban, and was linked by unknown sources to “the purchase of
equipment used to assist al-Qaeda operatives in the production of
biological weapons.”
According to this allegation, Nassir was working
with al-Wafa, a Saudi charity that, for many years, the US authorities
believed was working with al-Qaeda on chemical and biological weapons,
although these claims appear to have evaporated in every case except
Nassir’s, as the director of al-Wafa,
Abdul Aziz al-Matrafi, and two other prisoners once accused of similar crimes —
Ayman Batarfi and Jamal Mar’i
— have all been released. Nassir has refuted the al-Wafa allegations,
and, in light of his own claim that he traveled from Pakistan to
Afghanistan to study and teach the Koran, it may be that
the most reliable unidentified source
is the one who stated that he was “not a guard nor affiliated with
al-Qaeda,” but a civilian who had “moved to Afghanistan with his wife
and children.”