Why Mitchell Said ‘No’: Hamas is
Not Ready to be ‘Engaged’
by Ramzy Baroud
One
key difference between Hamas and its rival, the Fatah movement in the
West Bank, is that Hamas is accountable to a much more complex set of
priorities and expectations.
While Fatah is effortlessly co-opted, Hamas
remains confined by ideological standards and the stringiest political
space. Although, on one hand this represents Hamas’ greatest strength,
on the other it shows just how truly arduous is its political
undertaking.
The
difference is relevant in light of the resumption of talks between
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington, followed by another round of talks in
the Middle East. Both once more raised the question: Can Israel and
Fatah achieve peace without Hamas’ involvement?
The
question itself can be interpreted in more ways than one. Dan Murphy,
writing in the Christian Science Monitor on September 16, asked: Can
ignoring Hamas lead to Israeli-Palestinian peace? Murphy, unlike many in
the US media, had enough insight to see the issue as worthy of
discussion. His use of the word ‘ignoring’, however, is greatly
misguided.
“But
there's a crucial missing element that will undoubtedly trouble the
Israeli-Palestinian talks as they move ahead. Gaza, the Palestinian
enclave ruled by the Islamist Hamas movement, is not at the table,”
Murphy wrote. With that he offered his version of what not ‘ignoring’
Hamas requires. Far from ‘engaging’ the party, it simply means placing
Gaza, that lonely enclave ruled by Islamic Hamas, on the table.
Gaza,
however, is not merely one issue among many. It represents the heart of
the matter. The Gaza Strip was placed under siege due to the Hamas’
victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections, which robbed Abbas and his
movement from any legitimacy in holding negotiations with Israel. The
suffocating siege on that resilient and overcrowded strip was Israel’s
attempt at quashing what could have been a promising democratic
experience, with the potential to inspire many more democratic
revolutions in the Middle East. Israel’s action was supported by the US
and much of Europe, as well as some Arab countries.
Yet,
considering the layers of meaning that Gaza and Hamas represent in any
future settlement in the Middle East, it seems utterly bizarre that US
President Obama’s Middle East envoy, George Mitchell, answered with a
simple “no” when he was recently asked whether Washington will reach out
to Hamas.
“No”
seems both too simple and too harsh, considering the gravity of the
situation. Even if the US administration wishes to write off Palestinian
democracy altogether, one would think that a sensible foreign policy
would at least wrangle with the Hamas dilemma. The Obama administration
cannot be serious about a lasting peace while continuing to play the
same nonsensical good guys/bad guys, carrot and stick political games
that were also employed by Bush.
On
the other hand, the resumption of talks between Fatah’s Abbas and
Israel is a blessing in disguise for Hamas. Very few in the Middle East,
and even fewer Palestinians will see in Abbas a legitimate and
representative leader. If anything, Abbas’ constant appearance with the
very Israeli leader who is robbing Palestine’s land and subjugating and
exacting racist laws against its population will further diminish his
discredited profile. Naturally, Abbas’ political loss is Hamas’ gain.
In
fact, it was this very ‘peace process’ that destroyed late Palestinian
leader Yasser’s Arafat’s political resume. It tarnished his reputation
and split his party. Arafat is remembered fondly because of his last
stance and death under Israeli siege in Ramallah. His political failure
through the years, however, gave Hamas its real birth as a mainstream
political movement. Abbas is simply boosting Hamas’ already high
political stocks. His future failures will deposit even more credit into
Hamas’ account.
But
that too represents a serious challenge to Hamas. Politically isolated
abroad, physically besieged and constantly derided by the media, Hamas
can hardly use its rising political profile among Palestinians, or
translate its gains into any tangible returns in or outside Palestine.
Abbas knows this fully, which explains his interest in Israel
maintaining its siege on Hamas and Gaza. Netanyahu understands this as
well, which explains his government’s insistence on holding still,
despite the PR disaster that Gaza has earned his country. The US also
fully agrees, thus Mitchell’s callous, yet telling “no” regarding a
possible engagement with Hamas.
Abbas,
despite his authority’s lack of legitimacy and shrinking popularity
among Palestinians, remains the best option of a ‘Palestinian
leadership’ as far as the US is concerned. He is flexible, both morally
and politically. His Authority’s bread and butter are US funds and
US-Western political validation. Abbas gleaned from the Gaza experience
that popular democracy is worthless in the age of draconian sieges and
Blitzkriegs. In fact he used both the siege and the Israel war on Gaza
to strengthen his political stance and to bargain with the US. But his
language and action will remain predictable.
While
‘engaging’ Hamas, however that is interpreted, is the only right option
if the US is truly interested in locating a legitimate Palestinian
leadership, Hamas is likely to prove a much tougher bargainer. Not only
is Hamas ideologically grounded – based on firm nationalistic and
religious dictates – but its target audience is not just a few heads of
states. Hamas’ audience is Palestinians at home and abroad, Arab and
Muslim populations and to lesser degree civil societies elsewhere. This
is a complex demographic, which requires an articulate political
thinking and language, which Hamas is not yet able to offer.
Fatah
under Arafat was held accountable largely to Arab governments, and
later to the US and Western donors. At the same time, it valiantly
resented Israeli pressures. Under Abbas, Fatah is held accountable to
all the above with little resentment. While Hamas factors all of these
players into its political calculation, it is also liable to its
commitment to its Palestinian constituency as incorruptible,
uncompromising and committed to resistance.
In
order for Hamas to become politically manageable, from the US point of
view, it would have to depart from these commitments, and become as
politically flexible, predictable and controllable as Fatah and Abbas.
The US can only work with a weak Palestinian leadership which it can
easily manipulate. Hamas, thus far, doesn’t fit the criterion, thus the
lack of any prospect of ‘engagement’, and the continued betting on Abbas
and Netanyahu, despite the predictable - and possibly disastrous -
outcome of their talks.
Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally-syndicated
columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is
My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story (Pluto Press,
London), now available on Amazon.com.