The killings were committed around the country and by a large number of military units. They occurred because military units felt pressure to show success against the guerrillas through “kill counts”. There were incentives: an informal incentive system for soldiers to kill and a formal one for civilians who provided information leading to the capture or killing of guerrillas.
The latter system lacked oversight and transparency. Overall, there was a crucial failure of accountability, with problems at all stages of the investigatory and disciplinary processes.
Guerrilla forces continue to kill civilians, especially those caught in an impossible middle-ground between the guerrillas and State Armed Forces. Civilians are also killed by the guerrillas’ indiscriminate use of force and illegal use of landmines. The Government’s security strategy may contribute — even unintentionally — to the precarious situation of civilians when the Armed Forces adopt a “you’re either for us or against us” approach to civilians, seeing them as potential enemies to be stigmatized as opposed to neutral individuals or victims.
Other non-State armed actors, including groups composed of formerly demobilized paramilitaries, have also carried out many killings and the numbers are rising. The groups’ existence and growth are largely due to demobilization and transitional justice processes that have resulted in impunity for paramilitaries’ human rights violations. Neither victims nor the nation at large have seen justice done. The truth of why tens of thousands died and who was responsible remains hidden, and victims and their loved ones have been deprived of reparations.
My recommendations focus on four broad areas: First, the Government should scrutinize and reform aspects of its security policies
that have undermined the very goals it seeks to achieve. The Government’s legitimacy will be enhanced, rather than undermined, if it acknowledges that, despite the successes of its security policies, there have been some drawbacks and failures. In fact, State institutions, and specifically the military, will be among the primary beneficiaries of reforms. As the Government itself notes, the Armed Forces’ “most prized asset” is their legitimacy.
Increases in transparency, respect for the rule of law and accountability will promote respect for the military and enable it to carry out its critically important security function more effectively.
Second, the Government should devote more resources to and bolster the ability of State institutions to provide accountability for human rights and humanitarian law violations committed by all actors – State forces, guerrillas and illegal armed groups alike.
In some instances, this will require the removal of institutional barriers to cooperation among entities responsible for investigation, prosecution and adjudication of violations. In others, it will require greater accountability on the part of State institutions – for example, military courts that have failed to transfer cases of unlawful killings to the civilian justice system, as required by the Supreme Court. In still others, it will require rethinking entire processes, such as the Justice and Peace Law, which has not achieved the transitional justice intended for paramilitary crimes.
Third, although there is no substitute for the prosecution of human rights abuses, the Government should consider the establishment of a truth commission to conduct an independent and systematic investigation of the history of, and responsibility for, killings and other crimes committed by the paramilitaries, guerrillas and State forces during Colombia’s conflict.
Finally, the Government should ensure that its policies do not directly or indirectly contribute to the further victimization of groups that have been disproportionately targeted by all sides throughout the years of Colombia’s conflict: human rights defenders, including trade unionists and women’s, minority and lesbian, gay and transgender rights activists; Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities; and people who suffer a physical or mental disability.
During my mission to Colombia, I received a high level of cooperation from Government officials, who repeatedly expressed their openness to suggestions for reform. Colombia must be commended for its all-too-rare attitude, which is founded on its recognition of the benefits that accrue from international scrutiny, both to the country’s citizens and to its State institutions.
Annex
Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, on his mission to
Colombia (8–18 June 2009)
Human Rights Council
Fourteenth session
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development