The Saakashvili Experiment
by Ramzy Baroud
Just as the world's attention was focussed on China's Beijing Olympics, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, on 7 August, invaded the tiny breakaway province of South Ossetia. The initial attack on the South Ossetian capital, Tskninvali, soon extended to an all out war, which eventually invited Russia's wrath, and the death of thousands of innocent civilians on both sides.
Prior to Saakashvili's war, little was known about the political specifics of that area and the brewing decades-long territorial disputes which date back to the early 20th century, highlighted during an intense civil war that followed the break-up of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Georgia's successful secession from the Soviet grip, understandably, inspired independence fervour in ethnic regions within Georgia.
The small region of South Ossetia -- majority ethnic Russians and
minority Georgians -- sought to join the North Ossetian province, which
remained part of Russia. Another region was Abkhazia, whose protracted
fight with the central Georgian government has also provoked much
violence.
The fact that South Ossetia belongs to Georgia was
hardly contested. Even Russia has long recognised Georgian sovereignty
in that region. Russia, nonetheless, remained largely involved in South
Ossetia -- mostly as a "peacekeeping force", rationalising such
involvement as essential for the national security of the country and
the safety of its citizens. Most South Ossentians -- like Abkhazians --
hold Russian citizenship.
But setting such rationale aside, the
fact is that South Ossetia is an important component in Russian foreign
policy, and particularly its policy and attitude towards former Soviet
republics and satellite states in Eastern Europe. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the Cold War was transformed into a political
scramble: the US and NATO expanded their boundaries of influence and
territorial outreach, while Russia struggled to maintain a level of
influence and halt the encroachment of the US-led NATO.
Georgia,
situated strategically between Russia, the Black Sea, Turkey and Iran,
deserved due attention. The US became keenly interested in ensuring the
inclusion of Georgia into its sphere of influence. Through dedicated
efforts, a pro-Western leader, Saakashvili, came to power through a
highly televised "Rose Revolution". While the integrity of the
elections that followed and the role of the CIA in concocting and
ensuring the success of the "revolution" are still intensely debated,
the fact is Georgia fell into a new sphere of influence. Saakashvili is
a man desperate for European-US validation. He too sought NATO
membership and heedlessly invited Israeli military "specialists" to
modernise his country's armed forces in anticipation of a battle with
Russia.
Evidently, Georgia's leader knew well that a victory
against Russia was unattainable. By embarking on a war against a tiny
province, because, as he claimed, he ran out of patience, Saakashvili
was following a script that was hardly of his own writing. The logic
behind the war was to test Russia's resolve, and the readiness of its
newest president, Dmitri Medvedev. A hesitant Russian response would be
taken as another sign of weakness or lack of political and military
decisiveness in Moscow, which might also inspire more such experiments.
Too harsh a response could also be decried as "genocide" and war crimes
and could be exploited to compel Russia's weaker neighbours to seek the
protection of NATO.
This is what indeed transpired since Russia called off military actions 13 August.
First,
leaders of pro-US countries in the region -- namely, Poland, Ukraine
and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia -- attended a
rally in support of Georgia's Saakashvili on 14 August in Tbilisi. The
televised event was accompanied by a flood of experts pedalling
Russia's evil intents to the world media while promoting a larger US
role to ensure the independence of these nations and to preserve their
fragile democracies. "They're all seriously worried that it's Georgia
today and one of them tomorrow," surmised Krzysztof Bobinski, director
of the Warsaw-based Unia & Polska Foundation.
Second, the
Russian response to Georgia's war in South Ossetia has resulted in a
remarkable breakthrough in negotiations between the US and East
European countries regarding the Bush administration's plans for a new
missile defence shield. On 14 August, "Poland and the US signed a deal
to build a controversial missile defence shield in Eastern Europe,"
reported the British Telegraph newspaper. "The agreement highlights how
Russia's invasion of Georgia has prompted a swift reappraisal of the
region's security and alliances. The US and Poland have been talking
about the missile shield for a year but rushed to cement their alliance
in the wake of this week's conflict."
It's rather interesting
how a controversial and unpopular plan that has raised the ire of the
Polish people -- 70 per cent of the country is against it -- was
overcome within days of war and is now embraced as a necessary
deterrent. One cannot help but question the relationship between the
decision to invade South Ossetia, which was certain to compel some
Russian response, and the rush to embrace Bush's military designs in
that region. The plan to place missiles in Poland seemed like a
resounding failure as late as last month when US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice "tried and failed just before leaving for Europe on
Monday [7 July] to seal a deal to place missiles in Poland, the State
Department said," according to CNN. Now Poland is all for it. It
return, Poland would receive US assistance in overhauling its military,
reminiscent of the Israeli-US efforts in aiding Georgia's military,
which emboldened the latter to pursue war with Russia.
While
Russia's decisive response to Saakashvili's war may have temporarily
reaffirmed Russia's military readiness, it has already provided the
needed justification for greater US-NATO intervention in Georgia,
Poland, the Czech Republic and elsewhere. That US presence might be
welcomed by the unnerved "democratic" leaders of these states but it
will pique the fury of Russia, whose political radars are intercepting
the Bush administration's every move in the region with great alarm.
The
ceasefire between Russia and Georgia, achieved through French
mediation, will hardly be the end of the new Cold War underway in an
area too accustomed to cold wars. The fact is that Russia will fight to
break away from the pro- US ring of former Soviet states that promise
to undermine its influence in a Eurasia, and the US will do its utmost
to maintain a level of tension, if not hostilities in the region, for
without it neither a missile shield nor the 270 billion barrels of oil
in the Caspian basin can be brought within Washington's reach.
Ramzy
Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an author and editor of
PalestineChronicle.com. His work has been published in many newspapers
and journals worldwide. His latest book is The Second Palestinian
Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle (Pluto Press, London).
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