Despite Federal Accountability Act, many of the alleged questionable actions in the Mulroney-Schreiber affair are still legal
In fact, because the Conservatives only included 30 of their more
than 50 promised measures in the FAA (and have only implemented 24 of
the 30), and because the FAA did not address dozens of other loopholes,
it is still legal (or effectively legal because of lack of
enforcement): to make unlimited donations to some political candidates;
to give large gifts to federal politicians, to lobby in secret; to
become a lobbyist soon after leaving office; to make patronage
appointments; to hand out large contracts without a bidding
competition, and; for politicians to make decisions in which they have
a financial interest. (To see details about the Conservatives' broken
FAA promises,
click here -- To see details about the 85 loopholes that
still exist in the federal government's accountability system,
click
here)
Unfortunately, the same highly questionable,
undemocratic activities are also still legal in most provincial,
territorial and municipal governments across Canada.
And while
the FAA did make more changes than any similar law in Canadian history,
it only requires a few public servants to do a couple of things more
transparently (which doesn’t slow them down at all), and did nothing
that would drive any good person away from working in the government.
Given
that the devil is in the details of any law, let alone the 214-page
FAA, it is somewhat understandable that the assessments of so many
politicians and political commentators are so inaccurate. At the same
time, one would think that these people and organizations (at least the
journalists) would feel some responsibility to stick to the facts.
So
what are the devils in the details? Concerning money in politics, the
FAA banned any donations of money, property or services from
corporations, unions and other organizations, and limited annual
donations by individuals to $1,100 to each party, and another $1,100
combined total to each party’s riding associations.
The FAA
also limited individual donations to each party’s election candidates
to a combined total of $1,100 during each election, whether or not the
candidate uses the donation for their campaign.
However, it is
still legal to donate an unlimited amount of money, property or
services in secret to a nomination race or party leadership candidate
(as long as the candidate doesn’t use the donation for their
campaign). Such a donation would not be a bribe or a violation of
federal ethics rules because the Criminal Code only covers bribes to
elected politicians, as do the ethics rules.
And while federal
ethics rules prohibit gifts that could influence a politician or
government official, they are only required to disclose to the Ethics
Commissioner things they own worth more than $10,000, and the
Commissioner does not audit the disclosure statements. As a result, it
is very easy for an federal politician or official to hide a gift worth
up to $9,999.
It is also very easy to get around the rules on
secret, unlimited donations because the federal government has not yet
implemented the United Nations Convention Against Corruption measures
that would ensure monitoring of the bank accounts of politicians and
other government decision-makers for suspicious transactions.
But,
you may be saying, at least we can track who is lobbying these people
so we can keep an eye on their relationships. Unfortunately no --
secret lobbying is still legal. If you work at a for-profit
corporation, you don’t have to register as a lobbyist if you spend less
than 35 days actively lobbying every six months. You also don’t have
to register if you do unpaid lobbying (for example, as a retired
executive or as a favour for a friend). And, like the Ethics
Commissioner, the Registrar of Lobbyists (who is a lapdog controlled by
a Cabinet minister) doesn’t do regular audits to prevent undisclosed
lobbying.
As well, lobbyists are still not required to
disclose details of exactly whom they are lobbying, nor how often, so
it isn’t even possible to determine whether a registered lobbyist has a
close relationship with a particular politician, staff person, or
official.
Well, you may be thinking, at least the revolving
door has been shut down so that former politicians and government
officials are not lobbying their former colleagues in government.
Sorry, but no. While the FAA bans former Cabinet ministers and top
government officials from becoming a lobbyist for five years, ministers
can exempt their staff from the ban, most government officials can
start lobbying after one year, and all other federal politicians and
their staff can start lobbying the day after they leave office.
In
addition, the ban is only on becoming a lobbyist (ie. a person who is
paid to contact or arrange meetings with politicians, their staff and
government officials to try to influence their decisions). Everyone in
the federal government can still, the day after they leave government,
be paid to give advice in secret to anyone about how to influence the
government’s decisions (or do any other job in Canada).
OK,
you may claim, but at least Cabinet ministers can’t stack the boards of
Crown corporations, agencies, boards, commissions and tribunals with
unqualified party loyalists, former staff, or friends. Sad to say, but
such patronage and cronyism is still legal because the federal
Conservatives broke their promise to establish an independent Public
Appointments Commission (which would have advertised positions and used
a merit-based process to select appointees).
Alright, you may
think, but at least federal politicians and officials can’t be involved
in decisions if they have an interest in the outcome, especially if
they have a financial interest. If only it were so, but in fact the
FAA cut the rule that prohibited Cabinet ministers and top officials
having even the appearance of a conflict of interest (and, as a result,
everyone in the government can take part in any discussion or vote on
general matters or matters that affect a lot of Canadians).
Yes,
that’s right. A finance minister could own $1 million of one bank’s
stock and still be responsible for changes to the Bank Act (because the
Act affects all banks); an environment minister could own $1 million of
one polluting company’s stock and still be responsible for changes to
the Environmental Protection Act (because the Act affects all polluting
companies), etc.
Really? So ministers can make policies that
help themselves, but at least the government can’t hand out contracts
without a bidding competition, right? Well, generally no, but one big
exemption to this rule allows government officials to designate one
company as the only company that can provide a specific product or
service (and, since the Conservatives were elected, this exemption has
been used to hand out billions in military hardware contracts without
any competitive bidding process).
OK, one last try, you say,
at the very least federal politicians and government officials can be
penalized if they lie about or hide such activities. Sorry to
disappoint you even further, but the FAA actually cut the rule that
require Cabinet ministers, their staff and senior government officials
to be honest, and the FAA didn’t contain the eight promised measures
that would have made the federal government much more transparent.
In
other words, the federal government’s accountability system still
allows many highly questionable, even scandalous, activities, and
another, stronger Accountability Act is needed to give Canadians the
honest, ethical, open, representative and waste-preventing federal
government they want and deserve (and every provincial, territorial and
municipal government needs to enact similar measures).
So, if
you want such a government, get in touch with your local politician
while most of them are home for a holiday, and tell them you know they
can’t be held accountable in many ways, and that you won’t vote for
them next time around unless they fully and completely clean up their
government.
[The following editorial was] submitted to the Globe and Mail in response to op-eds by Preston Manning and Norman Spector published in the newspaper in December, and an even shorter, letter-length version of the op-ed was also submitted to the Globe and Mail, but the newspaper refused to publish either the op-ed or the letter even though they both corrected factual errors in Mr. Manning's op-ed.
Preston
Manning's fixes would weaken political ethics enforcement and, similar
to Norman Spector's fixes, would leave loopholes open Preston
Manning’s proposed priority three steps for fixing the political ethics
deficit have all been tried for the past few decades, with little
measurable effect (“How do we fix the ethics deficit†- Globe and Mail,
December 3, 2007). In contrast, Norman Spector proposes two key
anti-corruption measures to stop "I scratch your back, you scratch
mine" relationships between lobbyists and public officials ("Government
of the people who buy the people" - Globe and Mail, December 10, 2007).
However, both of their proposed plans would leave open many
loopholes that allow dishonest, unethical, secret, unrepresentative
(and, as a result, often wasteful) political activities.
The
fact that an experienced ex-politician like Manning proposes the steps
he has proposed reveals clearly that the attitude of elite political
insiders, and former insiders, is a key part of the Canada’s ongoing
government ethics problems.
Thankfully, the federal government
has taken a few different steps toward ensuring effective ethics
enforcement since 2004, but unfortunately they have also weakened
rules, and also left dozens of loopholes open, and enforcement agencies
hindered by lack of powers, and so the system still essentially allows
everyone in the federal government to be dishonest, unethical,
secretive, non-representative, and even wasteful.
Some
provincial and territorial governments have also taken steps in
different directions than those proposed by Mr. Manning, but loopholes
in rules and weak enforcement agencies still undermine their
accountability systems.
Mr. Manning’s top priority is
“political education†through programs that, he lets us all know, the
Centre he heads up just happens to be developing right now (sign-up
quickly classes are filling up!). In making this proposal, did Mr.
Manning at all think that readers might view it as ironic, possibly
even unethical, for him to promote his own organization in his column
about preventing conflicts of interest?
Is he aware that the
federal government, and provincial and territorial governments, and
their ethics enforcement agencies, and political parties at all levels,
all have internal education programs that have included courses about
government ethics rules (including, of course, election rules) for
decades?
Given the little effect past training has had in
improving compliance with expected ethics standards, it is highly
questionable that further training would be helpful, especially if it
is paid for by governments but delivered at the usual high-cost
consulting rate by non-governmental organizations like Mr. Manning’s
Centre whose specific aim is to “inculcating the values and principles
of democratic conservatism†in all Canadians through programs like
seminars on “’Navigating the Faith/Political Interface’ designed to
assist [only?] faith-oriented citizens.â€
Mr. Manning’s second
proposal is that the federal Justice Department and provincial
attorneys-general (ie. politicians) and deputy-attorneys-general should
enforce their own government’s and political system’s ethics standards,
not independent agencies such as, at the federal government level,
Elections Canada, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, the
Auditor General, the Public Sector Integrity Commissioner, the Director
of Public Prosecutions, the Information Commissioner, the Privacy
Commissioner and the federal Conservatives’ promised Commissioner of
Lobbying.
Is Mr. Manning completely unaware that the few,
loophole-filled ethics laws and rules that existed between 1867 and
2004 were enforced by politicians and their hand-picked deputy
ministers (who could be fired or shuffled for any reason at any time).
Given the many political ethics scandals throughout that time period,
scandals which he admits are an ongoing problem, how can he believe
that such self-enforcement has been effective in any way?
Mr.
Manning views fully independent, fully empowered enforcement agencies
as an unnecessary “add-on†to government when in fact they are
independent of politicians, as opposed to controlled by them, and
therefore when more immune to political pressure to cover up
wrongdoing.
Mr. Manning also claims that in the early 1990s it
became popular to draft “new codes of conduct for politicians and
public servants†and to appoint “ethics commissioners or watchdogs to
enforce them†but they “did nothing to prevent the sponsorship scandal
or the ethical laxity that permitted it.â€
With all due
respect, Mr. Manning must have been in a different Ottawa than the real
one during the 1990s, and must be unaware that the sponsorship scandal
activities occurred from 1996 to 1999.
In fact, only one code
of conduct was created in the early 1990s, for federal public servants,
and no watchdog who had independence from Cabinet was established to
enforce it until 2007 (as a result, there was no place for sponsorship
scandal whistleblower Allan Cutler to file a complaint about broken
rules in 1996).
The ethics rules for Cabinet ministers, their
staff, Cabinet appointees, and senior government officials were created
by then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1985, but were enforced by
prime ministers until spring 2004.
Does Mr. Manning not
remember that more than 20 Cabinet ministers and/or their staff
violated ethics rules between 1994 and 2004, and in all but two cases
the lapdog Ethics Counsellor (who only advised the prime minister and
was completely under his control) rubber-stamped the activities as
ethical?
And the ethics rules for MPs were not in effect until
October 2004, and for senators were not in effect until spring 2005
(and the Senate Ethics Officer is still completely under the control of
a committee of senators (he cannot even investigate a complaint without
the committee’s approval, and reports back in secret to the
committee)).
Meanwhile, at the provincial and territorial
level, little changed from the early 1990s until now in terms of
government ethics rules, with only four provinces only creating
ineffective lobbying disclosure registries in the late 1990s (the new
territorial government of Nunavut being the exception, as its creation
included enacting government ethics rules).
As his third
priority step, Mr. Manning uses the classic political tactic of blaming
the victim. Despite overwhelming support by Canadians for effective,
loophole-free government ethics rules and strong enforcement, as shown
in every survey conducted in the past two decades, according to Mr.
Manning the public is to blame for the lack of ethics in politics.
True,
as Mr. Manning points out, some Canadians do lie to each other, and
some cheat and steal. But it is quite a leap of logic, and evidence,
to claim that therefore Canadians deserve it when politicians and
government officials lie, cheat or steal (especially given that
Canadians are required by law to pay taxes that pay the salaries of
people most of whom they did not even vote into office).
So
how do we actually fix the political ethics deficit? How about doing
what has proven to be most effective throughout the history of trying
to regulate the behaviour of humans in large organizations.
Norman
Spector proposes the key steps of banning political activity by
lobbyists, and banning donations by lobbyists to any public official,
including after the official leaves office.
However, both he
and Mr. Manning fail to address other loopholes in all Canadian
governments that history has shown will be exploited and that allow:
dishonesty in politics; secret unlimited donations to all types of
political candidates; secret trust funds by politicians, riding
associations and parties; secret lobbying; excessive secrecy overall;
patronage appointments; party-switching by politicians, and; that allow
politicians, their staff and government officials to be involved in
policy-making processes in which they have a direct financial interest,
and to become lobbyists soon after they leave office? (To see details
about the 85 loopholes that still exist in the federal government's
accountability system,
click here)
To give just one example to
show how loophole-filled the system still is, despite the measures in
the FAA, Karlheinz Schreiber and Brian Mulroney would still not be
required to be publicly listed as in-house corporate lobbyists (as long
as they lobbied less than 36 days every 6 months), and Schreiber could
still give $300,000 in secret to some federal candidates, and to all
federal politicians, political staff and public servants right after
they leave office, either as a donation or as payment for lobbying
services (and could give the same amount in secret to trust funds
maintained by every federal political party and their riding
associations).
In addition, neither Mr. Manning nor Mr.
Spector mention strengthening enforcement and penalties. In the area
of dishonesty, for example, if Canadians lie on their taxes, or welfare
applications, or if corporate executives lie in their financial
statements or company advertising, others can use special hotlines to
report the dishonesty, independent enforcement agencies will very
likely investigate, and the penalties are quite severe (including high
fines and the possibility of time in jail).
In complete
contrast, not only is dishonesty in politics legal: there are no
definite penalties for federal MPs, senators or public servants who
violate any of their ethics rules (or for anyone who violates the
federal open government law); the Registrar of Lobbyists is under the
control of a Cabinet minister who is lobbied (and will continue to be
as long as the Conservatives continue to break their promise to
establish an independent Commissioner of Lobbying); the Ethics
Commissioner doesn’t audit the financial statements of federal
politicians and government officials (even though the statements are
the basis for determining if they are in a conflict of interest); the
Information Commissioner and Auditor General can only make
recommendations not binding orders, and; if the Prime Minister violated
the most fundamental ethics rule the maximum possible penalty is $500
As
well, the federal Conservatives broke their promise to establish an
independent Public Appointments Commission, and as a result patronage
and cronyism continues, and Cabinet ministers continue to have the
power to appoint inquiry commissioners even when the inquiry is about
their own actions?
And again, almost all provincial, territorial and municipal governments have similarly weak ethics enforcement systems.
In
other words, in complete contrast to Mr. Manning’s prescription, it is
the attitude of politicians, their staff, and government officials that
needs to be changed, because for the past 140 years, they have been
resisting the measures, enforcement systems, and penalties needed to
have ethical politics and governments in Canada.
These people
know all the loopholes in the rules; they know what enforcement system
and penalties would effectively discourage them from breaking the
rules, and; they are the ones who have the power to make the changes to
give Canadians the honest, ethical, open, representative and
waste-preventing politics, and governments, they clearly deserve.
For more details, go to Democracy Watch's Clean Up the System page