Saying NO to the Hunters of Goliath
by Gilad Atzmon
The Israelis tend to personalise conflicts. Yet, by doing this, they are neither original nor innovative. They in fact follow a Biblical lesson.
Within the Judaic worldview, history and ethics are often reduced into a banal single binary opposition principle. For instance, the deadly battle between the ‘righteous’ David and the ‘evil’ Goliath personalises the struggle between the ‘good’ Israelites and the ‘bad’ Philistines.
“A few reasons help to create the Nasrallah obsession
(‘dibuk’), that influenced decision makers along the (Second Lebanon)
war. Primarily, Israel always perceived the Arab (leaders) as (private)
people rather than representatives of political systems. Even amongst
media analysts and politicians the references were pointing at
“Assadâ€, “Arafat†or “Nasrallah†rather than the states and
organisations they represent. In the eyes of the (Israeli)
decision-makers, as well as the media and public, the Arab world was
led by individuals rather than by governmental systems and the best way
to influence it was in most cases to drop a bomb in the right place.â€
- 'Captives in Lebanon', Ofer Shelah and Yaov Limor
Though the Biblical specific tale could be understood in a mere
literary terms, the similarities to the Israelite of our time are
rather concerning. In Israel, there is a direct express path that leads
from the ‘role of the assassin’ to the Government seat. Time after time
our contemporary Israelite supplicate their highly decorated assassins
to become their kings, to lead their army and then to integrate into
the cabinet. This obviously happened to Sharon, Barak, Mofaz, Halutz,
Dichter and many more.
However, Israelis are not alone
here. The tendency to personalise and concretise history is rather
common amongst Jews. In the eyes of many Jews the Third Reich is
reduced into Hitler and Goebbels. Anti-Semitism is often reduced into
Wagner, Marx, Weininger and so on. On the face of it, personification
indeed simplifies the surrounding reality, the course of history and
its interpretation. Once Hitler is gone, the Third Reich may be gone as
well, once Wagner is banned, the same may happen to anti-Semitism.
This
tendency to personalise conflicts, ideologies and worldviews follows an
infantile perception: that which you no longer see may cease to exist.
It fits as well with the Biblical “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth†paradigm. Yet, it is nothing but a pattern of self-deception. It
misleadingly associates the abstract with some banal concretisation.
It saves its followers from any intellectual engagement with ideology,
criticism or self-reflection.
Clearly, the Zionist
interpretation is engaged with nothing more than the concrete symptom,
with the simplest manifestation of the animosity that surrounds it
rather than with the core of the problem itself. Hitler was indeed
defeated, Jews are now more than welcome in Germany and in Europe, yet,
the Jewish state and the sons of Israel are at least as unpopular in
the Middle East as their grandparents were in Europe just six decades
ago. Seemingly, it is the personification of WW2 and the Holocaust that
blinded the Israelis and their supporters from internalising the real
meaning of the conditions and the events that led towards their
destruction in the first place.
Would the Zionists understand the real
meaning of their Holocaust, the contemporary Israelite may be able to
prevent the destruction that may be awaiting them in the future.
Similarly, Wagner may be banned in Israel, yet, the conditions that led
Marx, Weininger and Wagner to say what they had to say remain
unchanged. As it seems, more and more people in wider circles are now
reacting critically, politically and ideologically to Israel, Zionism,
Jewish tribalism and the atrocious inhuman policies that are implied by
Jewish nationalism and its political and cultural offshoots.
But
let’s face it, it isn’t just the Israelis who personalise conflicts.
Thanks to the Neocons and their tremendous current influence within the
Anglo-American political realm, we are all subject to some
oversimplification and personalisation of almost every Western
conflict.
Seemingly, every current Western war has a ‘face’ attached to
it. The ‘war against terror’ has the bearded face of Osama Bin Laden.
The alleged ‘liberation of the Iraqi people’ had Saddam Hussein’s face
on top of the ‘hit list’. Within the Neocon’s Zionised war, every
ideological conflict becomes a personal ‘targeted assassination’ plot.
May I remind us all that before Neocons launched their pretty
successful attempt to Zionise America and Britain, these two countries
were engaged in proper impersonalised ideological wars and political
conflicts.
Britain and the USA fought courageously against Third Reich
Germany (rather than just against Hitler). They coldly clashed with
‘The Reds’ as well (rather than with just Stalin).
Clearly,
this isn’t the case anymore. Within a world shaped by Neocons, the
political system is reduced into a simplistic Biblical Goliath chase.
We the righteous, the Davids, pursue the Goliaths: Saddam, Bin Laden,
Assad, and Ahmadinejad.
However, by now we should all
know how futile this philosophy is. As much as Israel failed to defeat
Palestinian resistance by killing every noticeable emerging Palestinian
leader, as much as Israel failed to defeat the Hezbollah by aiming at
its leadership, America and Britain are doomed to fail in their current
murderous Zionised battles. Saddam is dead and yet, Iraq and its oil
fields are still far beyond reach. Bin Laden never shows his face in
public and yet the war against terror has yet to achieve a thing.
I
want to believe that the emerging defeat of Israel and its supporting
lobbies will be appropriately grasped by the Western public. We must
say NO to Zionised tactics, we must say NO to Zionist agents, we must
say NO to the hunters of Goliath.
Anatomy of a Colossal Defeat
One
year after the humiliating Israeli defeat in Lebanon I found myself
reviewing the Israeli fiasco through the eyes of two renowned Israeli
military analysts, Yoav Limor and Ofer Shelah. In a recent book named
‘Captives Of Lebanon’ the two have managed to assemble a very detailed
journal of the chain of events that led to the war, the war itself and
the endless lists of Israeli operational, tactical and strategic
failures. However, Limor and Shelah do not stop just with the Army and
its commanders, they skilfully convey an image of a society that has
lost its way, a society that has gradually become detached from its own
reality and from its surrounding environment. A society that is facing
total moral collapse, led by an egotistic, self-centred leadership,
both politically and militarily.
Israel’s military defeat
last year in Lebanon took the world by surprise. It initially shocked
Bush’s Administration as well as Tony Blair who were both very quick
and keen to give Israel a green light to destroy Lebanon’s Shia
leadership, not to mention obliterating Lebanon’s civilian
infrastructure. Bush and Blair weren’t the only ones who came in for a
shock, it also stunned the Arab world. Arab leaders are not used to the
defeat of the Israeli Army.
Moderate Arab leaders found themselves
following the TV images in which a single Muslim cleric was teaching
Israelis what defiance was all about. Seemingly, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah
and an insignificant number of warriors, proved to be the first Arabs
to defeat the Israeli Army on the ground. Their victory left Israel in
shatters.
The Israeli power of deterrence disappeared completely. It
became a subject for historical research. The IDF Supreme Command was
shocked as well: a month after the war, General Udi Adam, the IDF Chief
Commander of the northern front, had resigned. It didn’t take too long
for Dan Halutz, the IDF Chief of Staff, to follow his lead. Amir
Peretz, the Minister of Defence, was ousted by former PM Ehud Barak.
It
is rather clear that the Israelis are fully aware of the scale of their
defeat in Lebanon. Yet, it seems as if the Israelis do not know how to
amend the damage. They are truly in love with their ‘good life’, they
are captivated by the image of technology and wealth.
Though
I am not so sure whether the book is going to be translated into other
languages (it is in Hebrew), I would classify this book as a ‘must
read’ for anyone who is interested in the affairs of this region. The
book is a glimpse into Israeli society in what seems to be its final
dysfunctional yet destructive state. I am convinced that those
Americans who have been moronically sponsoring the Israeli death
apparatus for almost four decades, those who still believe that Israel
is a ‘regional super power’ better read this journal of Israeli
military cowardice and general political malfunctioning.
Though
the book wouldn’t say it, the message is rather clear. Israel operates
as a megalomaniac violent Jewish ghetto motivated by some bizarre
murderous zeal flooded with American lethal technology. As Limor and
Shelah reveal, in spite of the fact that the conflict on the ground
took place on a very narrow strip of land (the Israeli border on the
south and Litani River on the north), the Israeli artillery had managed
to shoot over 170,000 shells. In comparison, in the 1973 war while
fighting against two strong state armies over two very large fronts,
the Israelis had launched only 53,000 shells.
The figures relating to
the Air Force are even more striking. Though less than a few concrete
targets were available for the IDF intelligence, the IAF (Israeli Air
Force) had launched as many as 17,550 combat missions, this translates
into 520 missions a day, almost as many as in the 1973 war (605 a day).
Yet, in 1973 the IAF was fighting two well-equipped air forces, it was
engaged in a fair amount of air-to-air combat and a relentless struggle
against the latest Soviet ground-to-air missiles. None of that happened
in the Second Lebanon War.
The IAF was engaged solely in hammering the
Lebanese soil. It literally threw and launched everything it had in its
disposal, presenting a merciless method that in places (southern Beirut
for instance), had a similar effect to the infamous 1940s
Anglo-American carpet bombardment.
Why did the Israelis
react so harshly to a local border incident? Why did Israeli
politicians and military chiefs lose their ability to employ strategic
and tactical considerations? Why did they all fail to define
achievable military goals, something that would give their war a time
frame, shape and justification? In short, why did the Israelis lose
their way? This is indeed a crucial question. Though Limor and Shelah
refrain from asking these questions, their book manages to provide some
answers. I will try to summarise some of their points.
The Military
Let’s
start with the Army. The Israeli Army has undergone a serious
transition in the last four decades. In the years that followed the
rapid 1967 invasion, it was ground officers and tank brigadiers in
particular who were promoted to lead the Army. Post 1967 Israel
believed in Blitzkrieg, an offensive onslaught that simultaneously puts
into action some large ground forces together with close air support.
After the 1973 war, following the limited success of ground forces and
tank divisions, this trend has changed.
Gradually, it was the veterans
of the Israeli special units who had been promoted to high command
positions. Probably the most famous among those veterans was Ehud
Barak, the highly decorated commando officer who ended his military
career as the IDF Chief of Staff. It was Barak who as Chief of Staff
appointed his ex subordinates for high positions in the Israeli Supreme
Command. Ground officers were pushed aside.
This
transformation within the Israeli Army had two motivations behind it:
first, the intelligence assumption that not a single Arab state would
consider a total war against Israel in the near future; and second,
since the first Intifada and the general rise of Palestinian civil
resistance, the Israeli army found itself engaged in more and more
policing operations. Within such a shift there was not much need for
massive ground training.
Tank and artillery brigades seemed to be
useless and even irrelevant to the newly emerging defence needs of the
Jewish state. Large units of combatant soldiers were diverted into
policing tasks in the West Bank and Gaza. Within the changing
scenario, it was initially Israeli special units and security chiefs
who took the lead in what the Israelis perceived as their ‘war against
terror’. Consequently, more and more Israeli commando veterans found
their way to the IDF high command and later straight into the highly
militarised Israeli political life.
But things didn’t
stop just there; it didn’t take long before Israeli special units
failed to provide the solutions to what seemed to be a constantly
growing Palestinian civil resistance. Sending the salt of the Jewish
earth into Gaza in the wee hours proved to be too dangerous. It must be
told that as much as Israelis love to see their young boys terrorising
Palestinians, they cannot stand seeing their beloved Rambos being
ambushed and killed.
It was just a question of time before
the Air Force was left to deal with Palestinian defiance. Capitalising
on some advanced American technologies, Israel let its F-16s and Apache
helicopter gunships launch guided missiles against Palestinian civilian
and military targets. The philosophy was rather simple: the IAF was
there to maintain the Palestinians in a state of a constant awe. As it
happened, in the last decade, the IAF has become the leading force in
the war against Palestine, the Palestinian people and their imminent
Islamic leadership.
The IAF was quick to develop a tactic that was soon
named ‘targeted assassination’. According to the new Israeli military
doctrine, all that was needed was some intelligence on the ground,
which would be followed by a single Israeli jet launching an American
guided missile in highly populated Gaza. The achievements were rather
clear. In many cases targeted Palestinians were assassinated, in very
many cases they found their death alongside innocent civilian
bystanders who were unlucky enough to be in the proximity. These
unfortunate people were in the wrong place at the very wrong time. In
many other cases the pilots just missed or were misled by intelligence.
As a result, many Palestinian civilians, old people, women and children
found their death. Clearly, no one in Israel could care less. When Dan
Halutz, still the IAF commander, was asked how it feels to drop a bomb
that kills fourteen Palestinian civilians, his answer was short and
simple. ‘It feels like a light bounce on your left wing’. Halutz, the
cold-blooded officer, the man who ordered the murder of so many
Palestinians, was the right man in the right place, it didn’t take long
before he was asked to take the lead of the Israeli Army.
As
time went by, the Israeli government refrained from endangering young
Israeli soldiers. The Israeli ‘war against terror’ has become very safe
warfare on the verge of a computer game. Sheik Yassin, Dr. Rantisi and
many other civilians fell victim to this form of murderous tactic.
Apparently, Israeli military leadership has been overwhelmed with the
success of their new killing method. The people of Israel had a new
God, namely ‘technological superiority’. The last Israeli wave of
generals, many of them pilots and special units’ veterans, got
accustomed to the belief that Israel may maintain its regional supreme
power by capitalising on its technological superiority and overwhelming
firepower.
As Limor and Shelah reveal in their book, in the
last decade Israeli soldiers literarily stopped training of any form of
large tactical operations. With the IAF chasing the enemies of Israel
in their bedrooms, who needs tanks and artillery? Young Israeli tank
drivers were redeployed soon after their initial and minimal training
into elementary guard tasks in the occupied territories. In practice
not only were those soldiers foreign to their original military tasks
in tanks and artillery, they were not familiar at all with any form of
large operational tactical manoeuvres. In other words, as far as the
Israeli army is concerned, it lost its readiness to war.
So The Palestinians Actually Won
Many
analysts regard the Palestinian resistance as a militarily futile
struggle. At the end of the day, not much harm can be inflicted by a
bunch of kids throwing stones. Reading Limor and Shelah may imply that
in reality, the Palestinian struggle was actually far from being
futile. In fact, it was precisely Palestinian civil resistance that has
managed to exhaust the Israeli army.
It was the Palestinian resistance
that led the Israeli army into a state of paralysis. It was the
Palestinian resistance that stretched the IDF manpower to its limit and
stopped the Israeli army from training towards the ‘next war’. It was
the Palestinians who turned the Israeli soldiers and their commanders
into a bunch of cowards who prefer to win wars while sitting in front
of computer monitors moving joysticks. It was actually the Palestinians
who devastatingly dismantled the IDF readiness for war.
It
is very much as Sheik Hassan Nasrallah has been suggesting in one of
his most declamatory speeches. Israel was indeed ‘hiding behind
technological superiority just to cover its cowardice and
incomprehension of what the living in the Middle East may entail’[2].
The Israeli army has become used to smashing Palestinian civilians in
their homes, to murdering their emerging leadership, to terrorising
pregnant women in roadblocks, to shelling young kids in their school
classes, so this was indeed very easy. Yet, when the IDF was asked to
engage some tiny groups of lightly trained paramilitary enthusiasts, it
collapsed shamefully. It collapsed in spite of its technological
superiority; it was defeated in spite of its overwhelming firepower, in
spite of Bush’s and Blair’s disgraceful support. The Israeli Army
collapsed because it was incompetent, it was not ready to fight, it did
not know how to fight and most concerning for the Israelis, it didn’t
even realise what it was fighting for.
Soon after the
conflict in Lebanon developed into a total war (at least in the eyes of
the Israelis) it became clear to most Israeli generals that the IDF
doesn’t have the means to address the rain of Hezbollah Katyusha
rockets. If the initial Israeli goal was to stop the Katyusha rockets
and to bring home the two captured Israeli reserves, these goals proved
to be beyond reach. The Israeli commander soon learned that without
proper and quality intelligence, their superior firepower and
technology lost any relevance.
As funny as it may sound, in a matter
of a few days the Israeli leadership adopted some post-structuralist
vocabulary. Rather than providing the people of Israel with a simple
straightforward ‘victory’ they all started to communicate in terms of a
‘narrative of victory’. Days from the launch of the Israeli campaign
the Israeli military began to talk in terms of ‘an Image of victory’
rather than ‘victory’ per se. Shimon Peres started to use the term
‘perception’ of a victory. Yet, even ‘perception’ and ‘image’ of a
victory proved to be far beyond reach.
The Only Democracy in the Middle East
As
useless as the Israeli army proved to be, the Israeli government wasn’t
any better. Ehud Olmert, the PM, the man who was voted to ‘disengage’
from Palestinian territories, had very little understanding of military
affairs. If this is not enough, Amir Peretz, the Labour leader, the man
whom Olmert appointed to be his Minister of Defence, lacked any
significant knowledge in defence matters as well. For the first time in
its history, Israel was led by two professional politicians who had no
military background.
On the face of it, one may expect that such a
dramatic shift would curve the Israeli hawkish tendency within the
military and political realm. In practice, the opposite happened. Both
Peretz and Olmert found themselves dragged and manipulated into a
large-scale conflict by the bloodthirsty Chief of Staff.
Considering
their inexperience and the short time that they had been holding
office, neither Olmert nor Peretz could come up with some creative
alternative solutions that might avoid conflict yet would achieve
something more. Rather than holding the Army back and giving diplomacy
a chance, they both let Halutz lead the country towards unnecessary
escalation. Without understanding the full picture, the Israeli
government ended up promising Halutz the necessary time and support to
achieve goals that were beyond reach to start with.
But
the truth must be said. Olmert and Peretz were not alone in their
cabinet. In fact, they were surrounded by military analysts,
intelligence experts, ex-generals and security services veterans.
Olmert had in his government Reserved General Shaul Mofaz, the ex Chief
of Staff, a man who spent the late phase of his military career
fighting the Hezbollah. Avi Dichter, a Security Services veteran was
there to comment on the IDF operative suggestions. They had in the
government Benjamin Ben Eliezer as well, a reserve Brigadier who had
been an expert on Lebanese issues for the last three decades. Shimon
Peres was himself a Prime Minister and a Defence Minister in the past.
Reservist General Ami Ayalon, and ex-IDF General as well as a former
Chief of the Internal Security Services offered his help to Amir
Peretz. Yet, none of these experts managed to form a decision-making
body, none of the above managed to moderate the military enthusiasm of
Halutz, Olmert and Peretz. Like a leaf in the wind, the Israeli
government was manipulated by the Generals and later by the public
opinion that turned dramatically against the leadership and its
inadequate achievement.
As time went by, with military
failure becoming public knowledge, the more desperately Olmert, Peretz
and Halutz tried to change the course of the war just to save their
future careers. Though they realised that the chances of achieving a
victory were melting down by the hour, they were determined to present
the public something that would look like a victory or even simply as
an achievement. This is apparently what political survival in the
Israeli democracy means for real, you have to present something that
may look like a victory. To call it a name, Peretz, Halutz and Olmert
ordered the Army to cause some real devastation, assuming that this
would gratify the Israeli voter. The IAF and the artillery command
reacted instantly, some heavy barrages of cluster bombs, missiles and
shells rained over southern Lebanon. In the last 48 hours leading to
the ceasefire, Israel emptied it entire stock of weaponry. According to
Shelah and Limor, Israel’s ammunition stocks reached the ‘red light’
position.
In order to save the political careers of Olmert
and Peretz, the IDF launched more and more pointless risky operations
with very limited tactical value. These operations failed one after the
other without achieving a single thing. Yet they exposed the IDF’s
weaknesses. They revealed an Army and a political leadership in a state
of a panic. Towards the final hours of the war, some isolated patches
of Israeli special units were stranded and starved along the southern
Lebanese front with no access to water and food. A few units of
Hezbollah warriors had managed to encircle top Israeli commandos.
Seemingly, no one in Israel dared to risk logistic convoys into the
battlefield. Food and ammunition that was dropped from cargo airplanes
fell into the hands of the Hezbollah. In some areas, the wounded IDF
commandos were lying on the ground, waiting many hours for rescue
units. The defeat was total. The humiliation was colossal. Not only was
the ‘Israeli Defence Army’ unable to defend Israel anymore, it even
failed in defending itself.
Limor and Shelah expose many more interesting issues:
Brigadiers
who failed to fight alongside their soldiers, instead they preferred to
run the battle from secluded bunkers inside Israel.
Helicopter
gunships were not allowed to enter Lebanese air space just to avoid the
risk of being shot down, as a result, Israeli commandos were left to
fight Hezbollah on equal terms (lacking air support).
A Lieutenant Colonel who refused to lead his soldiers into Lebanon admitted being deficient in operative tactical knowledge.
Reservist
soldiers were heading towards the front with hardly any of their
combatant gear because of some severe shortage in the army emergency
stockrooms. Some of those reservists ended up spending their own money
so that they could buy the necessary gear.
More details
regarding Dan Halutz’s 12 July stock exchange affair. Apparently, the
Chief of Staff, General Halutz phoned up the bank and ordered them to
sell his investment portfolio soon after he learned about the clashes
in the north. All this happened just before he himself ordered a
further escalation.
Seemingly, the Israeli army is ‘all
over the place’, it is under trained, it is heavy, it is messy, and its
leaders are corrupted to the bone. The Israeli political leadership
isn’t any better. Though Peretz is no longer at the Ministry of
Defence, Olmert, Mofaz, Dichter and now Barak - all qualified mass
murderers - are still cabinet members. Considering the state of its
army, Israel may have to consider a swift change of direction, it
cannot fight anymore. It lacks the endurance. But seemingly this is not
going to happen. As it seems, in the next Israeli election we are
probably going to see the eloquent yet belligerent Benjamin Netanyahu
fighting the belligerent yet far less eloquent Ehud Barak.
For
years we tended to believe that Israel would not be defeated in the
battlefield. Learning in detail the events of the last war allows us to
consider that this may not be the case. The Jewish state has already
been defeated in battle and this may happen again sooner than we think.
[1] Captives in Lebanon, Ofer Shelah/Yaov Limor, Miskal, Yedioth Ahrononth and Chemed Books, 2007 Pg 95.
[2] Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, a speech given at Bint Jabel after the Israeli Evacuation.
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