Recently, at his Informed Comment
blog the estimable Juan Cole noticed a new leap forward (or backward)
in that country. Southern Iraqi rice farmers are evidently reportedly
taking Bush-inspired reality yet another horrific (as well as logical)
step into a hopeless future. They are beginning to experiment with
turning in their rice shoots for a potentially far more valuable crop
-- poppies. Next thing we know, someone will rename the country
"Afghanistan II" and we'll have a second chaotic narco-kingdom on our
hands. Even in the Bush administration's wildest dreams, it could never
have topped that potential reality.
Danner, New York Review of
Books regular and author, most recently, of The Secret Way to War,
offers a remarkable college-level mini-course on the Bush
administration's record of words -- and the reality it tried to
discipline and punish -- from the 2000 election to late last night. He
then graduates all of us into a world almost beyond words. Tom
By
Mark Danner
[Note:
This commencement address was given to graduates of the Department of
Rhetoric at Zellerbach Hall, University of California, Berkeley, on May
10, 2007]
When my assistant greeted me, a number of weeks ago,
with the news that I had been invited to deliver the commencement
address to the Department of Rhetoric, I thought it was a bad joke.
There is a sense, I'm afraid, that being invited to deliver The Speech
to students of Rhetoric is akin to being asked out for a romantic
evening by a porn star: Whatever prospect you might have of pleasure is
inevitably dampened by performance anxiety -- the suspicion that your
efforts, however enthusiastic, will inevitably be judged according to
stern professional standards. A daunting prospect.
The only
course, in both cases, is surely to plunge boldly ahead. And that
means, first of all, saluting the family members gathered here, and in
particular you, the parents.
Dear parents, I welcome you today
to your moment of triumph. For if a higher education is about acquiring
the skills and knowledge that allow one to comprehend and thereby get
on in the world -- and I use "get on in the world" in the very broadest
sense -- well then, oh esteemed parents, it is your children, not those
boringly practical business majors and pre-meds your sanctimonious
friends have sired, who have chosen with unerring grace and wisdom the
course of study that will best guide them in this very strange polity
of ours. For our age, ladies and gentlemen, is truly the Age of
Rhetoric.
Now I turn to you, my proper audience, the
graduating students of the Department of Rhetoric of 2007, and I salute
you most heartily. In making the choice you have, you confirmed that
you understand something intrinsic, something indeed…. intimate about
this age we live in. Perhaps that should not surprise us. After all,
you have spent your entire undergraduate years during time of war --
and what a very strange wartime it has been.
When most of you
arrived on this campus, in September 2003, the rhetorical construction
known as the War on Terror was already two years old and that very real
war to which it gave painful birth, the war in Iraq, was just hitting
its half-year mark. Indeed, the Iraq War had already ended once, in
that great victory scene on the USS Abraham Lincoln off the coast of
San Diego, where the President, clad jauntily in a flight suit, had
swaggered across the flight deck and, beneath a banner famously marked
"Mission Accomplished," had declared: "Major combat operations in Iraq
have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies
have prevailed."
Of the great body of rich material
encompassed by my theme today -- "Words in a Time of War" -- surely
those words of George W. Bush must stand as among the era's most
famous, and most rhetorically unstable. For whatever they may have
meant when the President uttered them on that sunny afternoon of May 1,
2003, they mean something quite different today, almost exactly four
years later. The President has lost control of those words, as of so
much else.
At first glance, the grand spectacle of May 1, 2003
fits handily into the history of the pageantries of power. Indeed, with
its banners and ranks of cheering, uniformed extras gathered on the
stage of that vast aircraft carrier -- a stage, by the way, that had to
be turned in a complicated maneuver so that the skyline of San Diego, a
few miles off, would not be glimpsed by the television audience -- the
event and its staging would have been quite familiar to, and no doubt
envied by, the late Leni Riefenstahl (who, as filmmaker to the Nazis,
had no giant aircraft carriers to play with). Though vast and
impressive, the May 1 extravaganza was a propaganda event of a
traditional sort, intended to bind the country together in a second
precise image of victory -- the first being the pulling down of
Saddam's statue in Baghdad, also staged -- an image that would fit
neatly into campaign ads for the 2004 election. The President was the
star, the sailors and airmen and their enormous dreadnought props in
his extravaganza.
However ambitiously conceived, these were
all very traditional techniques, familiar to any fan of Riefenstahl's
famous film spectacular of the 1934 Nuremberg rally, Triumph of the
Will. As trained rhetoricians, however, you may well have noticed
something different here, a slightly familiar flavor just beneath the
surface. If ever there was a need for a "disciplined grasp" of the
"symbolic and institutional dimensions of discourse" -- as your
Rhetoric Department's website puts it -- surely it is now. For we have
today an administration that not only is radical -- unprecedentedly so
-- in its attitudes toward rhetoric and reality, toward words and
things, but is willing, to our great benefit, to state this attitude
clearly.
I give you my favorite quotation from the Bush
administration, put forward by the proverbial "unnamed Administration
official" and published in the New York Times Magazine by the fine
journalist Ron Suskind in October 2004. Here, in Suskind's recounting,
is what that "unnamed Administration official" told him:
"The
aide said that guys like me were 'in what we call the reality-based
community,' which he defined as people who 'believe that solutions
emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.' I nodded and
murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He
cut me off. 'That's not the way the world really works anymore,' he
continued. 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own
reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you
will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can
study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's
actors.... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.'"
I
must admit to you that I love that quotation; indeed, with your
permission, I would like hereby to nominate it for inscription over the
door of the Rhetoric Department, akin to Dante's welcome above the
gates of Hell, "Abandon hope, all ye who enter here."
Both
admonitions have an admirable bluntness. These words from "Bush's
Brain" -- for the unnamed official speaking to Suskind seems to have
been none other than the selfsame architect of the aircraft-carrier
moment, Karl Rove, who bears that pungent nickname -- these words
sketch out with breathtaking frankness a radical view in which power
frankly determines reality, and rhetoric, the science of flounces and
folderols, follows meekly and subserviently in its train. Those in the
"reality-based community" -- those such as we -- are figures a mite
pathetic, for we have failed to realize the singular new principle of
the new age: Power has made reality its bitch.
Given such
sweeping claims for power, it is hard to expect much respect for truth;
or perhaps it should be "truth" -- in quotation marks -- for, when you
can alter reality at will, why pay much attention to the idea of
fidelity in describing it? What faith, after all, is owed to the bitch
that is wholly in your power, a creature of your own creation?
Of
course I should not say "those such as we" here, for you, dear
graduates of the Rhetoric Department of 2007, you are somewhere else
altogether. This is, after all, old hat to you; the line of thinking
you imbibe with your daily study, for it is present in striking fashion
in Foucault and many other intellectual titans of these last decades --
though even they might have been nonplussed to find it so crisply
expressed by a finely tailored man sitting in the White House. Though
we in the "reality-based community" may just now be discovering it, you
have known for years the presiding truth of our age, which is that the
object has become subject and we have a fanatical follower of Foucault
in the Oval Office. Graduates, let me say it plainly and
incontrovertibly: George W. Bush is the first Rhetoric-Major President.
The Dirtied Face of Power
I overstate perhaps, but only
for a bit of -- I hope -- permitted rhetorical pleasure. Let us gaze a
moment at the signposts of the history of the present age. In January
2001, the Rhetoric Major President came to power after a savage and
unprecedented electoral battle that was decided not by the ballots of
American voters -- for of these he had 540,000 fewer than his Democrat
rival -- but by the votes of Supreme Court Justices, where Republicans
prevailed 5 to 4, making George W. Bush the first president in more
than a century to come to the White House with fewer votes than those
of his opponent.
In this singular condition, and with a Senate
precisely divided between parties, President Bush proceeded to behave
as if he had won an overwhelming electoral victory, demanding tax cuts
greater and more regressive than those he had outlined in the campaign.
And despite what would seem to have been debilitating political
weakness, the President shortly achieved this first success in
"creating his own reality." To act as if he had overwhelming political
power would mean he had overwhelming political power.
This,
however, was only the overture of the vast symphonic work to come, a
work heralded by the huge, clanging, echoing cacophony of 9/11. We are
so embedded in its age that it is easy to forget the stark,
overwhelming shock of it: Nineteen young men with box cutters seized
enormous transcontinental airliners and brought those towers down. In
an age in which we have become accustomed to two, three, four, five
suicide attacks in a single day -- often these multiple attacks from
Baghdad don't even make the front pages of our papers -- it is easy to
forget the blunt, scathing shock of it, the impossible image of the
second airliner disappearing into the great office tower, almost
weirdly absorbed by it, and emerging, transformed into a great yellow
and red blossom of flame, on the other side; and then, half an hour
later, the astonishing flowering collapse of the hundred-story
structure, transforming itself, in a dozen seconds, from mighty tower
to great plume of heaven-reaching white smoke.
The image
remains, will always remain, with us; for truly the weapon that day was
not box cutters in the hands of nineteen young men, nor airliners at
their command. The weapon that day was the television set. It was the
television set that made the image possible, and inextinguishable. If
terror is first of all a way of talking -- the propaganda of the deed,
indeed -- then that day the television was the indispensable conveyer
of the conversation: the recruitment poster for fundamentalism, the
only symbolic arena in which America's weakness and vulnerability could
be dramatized on an adequate scale. Terror -- as Menachem Begin, the
late Israeli prime minister and the successful terrorist who drove the
British from Mandate Palestine, remarked in his memoirs -- terror is
about destroying the prestige of the imperial regime; terror is about
"dirtying the face of power."
President Bush and his
lieutenants surely realized this and it is in that knowledge, I
believe, that we can find the beginning of the answer to one of the
more intriguing puzzles of these last few years: What exactly lay at
the root of the almost fanatical determination of administration
officials to attack and occupy Iraq? It was, obviously, the classic
"over-determined" decision, a tangle of fear, in the form of those
infamous weapons of mass destruction; of imperial ambition, in the form
of the neoconservative project to "remake the Middle East"; and of
realpolitik, in the form of the "vital interest" of securing the
industrial world's oil supplies.
In the beginning, though, was
the felt need on the part of our nation's leaders, men and women so
worshipful of the idea of power and its ability to remake reality
itself, to restore the nation's prestige, to wipe clean that dirtied
face. Henry Kissinger, a confidant of the President, when asked by
Bush's speechwriter why he had supported the Iraq War, responded:
"Because Afghanistan was not enough." The radical Islamists, he said,
want to humiliate us. "And we need to humiliate them." In other words,
the presiding image of The War on Terror -- the burning towers
collapsing on the television screen -- had to be supplanted by another,
the image of American tanks rumbling proudly through a vanquished Arab
capital. It is no accident that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
at the first "war cabinet" meeting at Camp David the Saturday after the
9/11 attacks, fretted over the "lack of targets" in Afghanistan and
wondered whether we "shouldn't do Iraq first." He wanted to see those
advancing tanks marching across our television screens, and soon.
In
the end, of course, the enemy preferred not to fight with tanks, though
they were perfectly happy to have us do so, the better to destroy these
multi-million dollar anachronisms with so-called IEDs, improvised
explosive devices, worth a few hundred bucks apiece. This is called
asymmetrical warfare and one should note here with some astonishment
how successful it has been these last half dozen years. In the
post-Cold War world, after all, as one neo-conservative theorist
explained shortly after 9/11, the United States was enjoying a rare
"uni-polar moment." It deployed the greatest military and economic
power the world has ever seen. It spent more on its weapons, its Army,
Navy, and Air Force, than the rest of the world combined.
It
was the assumption of this so-called preponderance that lay behind the
philosophy of power enunciated by Bush's Brain and that led to an
attitude toward international law and alliances that is, in my view,
quite unprecedented in American history. That radical attitude is
brilliantly encapsulated in a single sentence drawn from the National
Security Strategy of the United States of 2003: "Our strength as a
nation-state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a
strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes and
terrorism." Let me repeat that little troika of "weapons of the weak":
international fora (meaning the United Nations and like institutions),
judicial processes (meaning courts, domestic and international),
and.... terrorism. This strange gathering, put forward by the
government of the United States, stems from the idea that power is, in
fact, everything. In such a world, courts -- indeed, law itself -- can
only limit the power of the most powerful state. Wielding preponderant
power, what need has it for law? The latter must be, by definition, a
weapon of the weak. The most powerful state, after all, makes reality.
Asymmetric Warfare and Dumb Luck.
Now,
here's an astonishing fact: Fewer than half a dozen years into this
"uni-polar moment," the greatest military power in the history of the
world stands on the brink of defeat in Iraq. Its vastly expensive and
all-powerful military has been humbled by a congeries of secret
organizations fighting mainly by means of suicide vests, car bombs and
improvised explosive devices -- all of them cheap, simple, and
effective, indeed so effective that these techniques now comprise a
kind of ready-made insurgency kit freely available on the Internet and
spreading in popularity around the world, most obviously to
Afghanistan, that land of few targets.
As I stand here, one of
our two major political parties advocates the withdrawal -- gradual, or
otherwise -- of American combat forces from Iraq and many in the other
party are feeling the increasing urge to go along. As for the Bush
administration's broader War on Terror, as the State Department
detailed recently in its annual report on the subject, the number of
terrorist attacks worldwide has never been higher, nor more effective.
True, al-Qaeda has not attacked again within the United States. They do
not need to. They are alive and flourishing. Indeed, it might even be
said that they are winning. For their goal, despite the rhetoric of the
Bush administration, was not simply to kill Americans but, by
challenging the United States in this spectacular fashion, to recruit
great numbers to their cause and to move their insurgency into the
heart of the Middle East. And all these things they have done.
How
could such a thing have happened? In their choice of enemy, one might
say that the terrorists of al-Qaeda had a great deal of dumb luck, for
they attacked a country run by an administration that had a radical
conception of the potency of power. At the heart of the principle of
asymmetric warfare -- al-Qaeda's kind of warfare -- is the notion of
using your opponents' power against him. How does a small group of
insurgents without an army, or even heavy weapons, defeat the greatest
conventional military force the world has ever known? How do you defeat
such an army if you don't have an army? Well, you borrow your enemy's.
And this is precisely what al-Qaeda did. Using the classic strategy of
provocation, the group tried to tempt the superpower into its adopted
homeland. The original strategy behind the 9/11 attacks -- apart from
humbling the superpower and creating the greatest recruiting poster the
world had ever seen -- was to lure the United States into a ground war
in Afghanistan, where the one remaining superpower (like the Soviet
Union before it) was to be trapped, stranded, and destroyed. It was to
prepare for this war that Osama bin Laden arranged for the
assassination, two days before 9/11 -- via bombs secreted in the video
cameras of two terrorists posing as reporters -- of the Afghan Northern
Alliance leader, Ahmed Shah Massood, who would have been the United
States' most powerful ally.
Well aware of the Soviets'
Afghanistan debacle -- after all, the U.S. had supplied most of the
weapons that defeated the Soviets there -- the Bush administration
tried to avoid a quagmire by sending plenty of air support, lots of
cash, and, most important, very few troops, relying instead on its
Afghan allies. But if bin Laden was disappointed in this, he would soon
have a far more valuable gift: the invasion of Iraq, a country that,
unlike Afghanistan, was at the heart of the Middle East and central to
Arab concerns, and, what's more, a nation that sat squarely on the
critical Sunni-Shia divide, a potential ignition switch for al-Qaeda's
great dream of a regional civil war. It is on that precipice that we
find ourselves teetering today.
Critical to this strange and
unlikely history were the administration's peculiar ideas about power
and its relation to reality -- and beneath that a familiar imperial
attitude, if put forward in a strikingly crude and harsh form: "We're
an empire now and when we act we create our own reality." Power,
untrammeled by law or custom; power, unlimited by the so-called weapons
of the weak, be they international institutions, courts, or terrorism
-- power can remake reality. It is no accident that one of Karl Rove's
heroes is President William McKinley, who stood at the apex of
America's first imperial moment, and led the country into a glorious
colonial adventure in the Philippines that was also meant to be the
military equivalent of a stroll in the park and that, in the event, led
to several years of bloody insurgency -- an insurgency, it bears
noticing, that was only finally put down with the help of the extensive
use of torture, most notably water-boarding, which has made its
reappearance in the imperial battles of our own times.
If we
are an empire now, as Mr. Rove says, perhaps we should add, as he might
not, that we are also a democracy, and therein, Rhetoric graduates of
2007, lies the rub. A democratic empire, as even the Athenians
discovered, is an odd beast, like one of those mythological creatures
born equally of lion and bird, or man and horse. If one longs to invade
Iraq to restore the empire's prestige, one must convince the
democracy's people of the necessity of such a step. Herein lies the
pathos of the famous weapons-of-mass-destruction issue, which has
become a kind of synecdoche for the entire lying mess of the past few
years. The center stage of our public life is now dominated by a simple
melodrama: Bush wanted to invade Iraq; Bush told Americans that Iraq
had weapons of mass destruction; Iraq did not have such weapons.
Therefore Bush lied, and the war was born of lies and deception.
I
hesitate to use that most overused of rhetorical terms -- irony -- to
describe the emergence of this narrative at the center of our national
life, but nonetheless, and with apologies: It is ironic. The fact is
that officials of the Bush administration did believe there were
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, though they vastly exaggerated the
evidence they had to prove it and, even more, the threat that those
weapons might have posed, had they been there. In doing this, the
officials believed themselves to be "framing a guilty man"; that is,
like cops planting a bit of evidence in the murderer's car, they
believed their underlying case was true; they just needed to dramatize
it a bit to make it clear and convincing to the public. What matter,
once the tanks were rumbling through Baghdad and the war was won?
Weapons would be found, surely; and if only a few were found, who would
care? By then, the United States military would have created a new
reality.
I have often had a daydream about this. I see a
solitary Army private -- a cook perhaps, or a quartermaster -- breaking
the padlock on some forgotten warehouse on an Iraqi military base,
poking about and finding a few hundred, even a few thousand, old
artillery shells, leaking chemicals. These shells -- forgotten,
unusable -- might have dated from the time of the first Gulf War, when
Iraq unquestionably possessed chemical munitions. (Indeed, in the
1980s, the United States had supplied targeting intelligence that
helped the Iraqis use them effectively against the Iranians.) And
though now they had been forgotten, leaking, unusable, still they would
indeed be weapons of mass destruction -- to use the misleading and
absurd construction that has headlined our age -- and my solitary cook
or quartermaster would be a hero, for he would have, all unwittingly,
"proved" the case.
My daydream could easily have come to pass.
Why not? It is nigh unto miraculous that the Iraqi regime, even with
the help of the United Nations, managed so thoroughly to destroy or
remove its once existing stockpile. And if my private had found those
leaky old shells what would have been changed thereby? Yes, the
administration could have pointed to them in triumph and trumpeted the
proven character of Saddam's threat. So much less embarrassing than the
"weapons of mass destruction program related activities" that the
administration still doggedly asserts were "discovered." But, in fact,
the underlying calculus would have remained: that, in the months
leading up to the war, the administration relentlessly exaggerated the
threat Saddam posed to the United States and relentlessly understated
the risk the United States would run in invading and occupying Iraq.
And it would have remained true and incontestable that -- as the
quaintly fact-bound British Foreign Secretary put it eight months
before the war, in a secret British cabinet meeting made famous by the
so-called Downing Street Memo -- "the case [for attacking Iraq] was
thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors and his WMD capability
was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."
Which is to
say, the weapons were a rhetorical prop and, satisfying as it has been
to see the administration beaten about the head with that prop, we
forget this underlying fact at our peril. The issue was never whether
the weapons were there or not; indeed, had the weapons really been the
issue, why could the administration not let the UN inspectors take the
time to find them (as, of course, they never would have)? The
administration needed, wanted, had to have, the Iraq war. The weapons
were but a symbol, the necessary casus belli, what Hitchcock called the
Maguffin -- that glowing mysterious object in the suitcase in Quentin
Tarantino's Pulp Fiction: that is, a satisfyingly concrete object on
which to fasten a rhetorical or narrative end, in this case a war to
restore American prestige, project its power, remake the Middle East.
The
famous weapons were chosen to play this leading role for "bureaucratic
reasons," as Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy Secretary of Defense and until
quite recently the unhappy president of the World Bank, once remarked
to a lucky journalist. Had a handful of those weapons been found, the
underlying truth would have remained: Saddam posed nowhere remotely
near the threat to the United States that would have justified running
the enormous metaphysical risk that a war of choice with Iraq posed. Of
course, when you are focused on magical phrases like "preponderant
power" and "the uni-polar moment," matters like numbers of troops at
your disposal -- and the simple fact that the United States had too few
to sustain a long-term occupation of a country the size of Iraq -- must
seem mundane indeed.
Imperial Words and the Reality-Based Universe
I
must apologize to you, Rhetoric Class of 2007. Ineluctably,
uncontrollably, I find myself slipping back into the dull and
unimaginative language of the reality-based community. It must grate a
bit on your ears. After all, we live in a world in which the
presumption that we were misled into war, that the Bush officials knew
there were no weapons and touted them anyway, has supplanted the
glowing, magical image of the weapons themselves. It is a presumption
of great use to those regretful souls who once backed the war so
fervently, not least a number of Democratic politicians we all could
name, as well as many of my friends in the so-called liberal
punditocracy who now need a suitable excuse for their own rashness,
gullibility, and stupidity. For this, Bush's mendacity seems perfectly
sized and ready to hand.
There is, however, full enough of
that mendacity, without artificially adding to the stockpile. Indeed,
all around us we've been hearing these last many months the sound of
ice breaking, as the accumulated frozen scandals of this administration
slowly crack open to reveal their queasy secrets. And yet the problem,
of course, is that they are not secrets at all: One of the most painful
principles of our age is that scandals are doomed to be revealed -- and
to remain stinking there before us, unexcised, unpunished, unfinished.
If
this Age of Rhetoric has a tragic symbol, then surely this is it: the
frozen scandal, doomed to be revealed, and revealed, and revealed, in a
never-ending torture familiar to the rock-bound Prometheus and his poor
half-eaten liver. A full three years ago, the photographs from Abu
Ghraib were broadcast by CBS on Sixty Minutes II and published by
Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker; nearly as far back I wrote a book
entitled Torture and Truth, made up largely of Bush administration
documents that detailed the decision to use "extreme interrogation
techniques" or -- in the First President of Rhetoric's phrase -- "an
alternative set of procedures" on prisoners in the War on Terror.
He
used this phrase last September in a White House speech kicking off the
2006 midterm election campaign, at a time when accusing the Democrats
of evidencing a continued softness on terror -- and a lamentable
unwillingness to show the needed harshness in "interrogating
terrorists" -- seemed a winning electoral strategy. And indeed
Democrats seemed fully to agree, for they warily elected not to
filibuster the Military Commissions Act of last October, which arguably
made many of these "alternative sets of procedures" explicitly legal.
And Democrats did win both houses of Congress, a victory perhaps owed
in part to their refusal to block Bush's interrogation law. Who can
say? What we can say is that if torture today remains a "scandal," a
"crisis," it is a crisis in that same peculiar way that crime or AIDS
or global warming are crises: that is, they are all things we have
learned to live with.
Perhaps the commencement address to the
Department of Rhetoric at the University of California at Berkeley is
not the worst of places to call for a halt to this spinning
merry-go-round. I know it will brand me forever a member of the
reality-based community if I suggest that the one invaluable service
the new Democratic Congress can provide all Americans is a clear
accounting of how we came to find ourselves in this present time of
war: an authorized version, as it were, which is, I know, the most
pathetically retrograde of ideas.
This would require that
people like Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Rumsfeld, and many others be called
before a select, bipartisan committee of Congress to tell us what, in
their view, really happened. I squirm with embarrassment putting
forward such a pathetically unsophisticated notion, but failing at
least the minimally authorized version that Congress could provide, we
will find ourselves forever striving -- by chasing down byways like the
revelation of the identity of Valerie Plame, or the question of whether
or not George Tenet bolstered his slam dunk exclamation in the Oval
Office with an accompanying Michael Jordan-like leap -- to understand
how precisely decisions were made between September 11, 2001 and the
invasion of Iraq eighteen months later.
Don't worry, though,
Rhetoric graduates: such a proposal has about it the dusty feel of past
decades; it is as "reality-based" as can be and we are unlikely to see
it in our time. What we are likely to see is the ongoing collapse of
our first Rhetoric-Major President, who, with fewer than one American
in three now willing to say they approve of the job he is doing, is
seeing his power ebb by the day. Tempting as it is, I will urge you not
to draw too many overarching conclusions from his fate. He has had,
after all, a very long run -- and I say this with the wonder that
perhaps can only come from having covered both the 2000 and 2004
election campaigns, from Florida, and the Iraq War.
I last
visited that war in December, when Baghdad was cold and grey and I
spent a good deal of time drawing black X's through the sources listed
in my address book, finding them, one after another, either departed or
dead. Baghdad seemed a sad and empty place, with even its customary
traffic jams gone, and the periodic, resonating explosions attracting
barely glances from those few Iraqis to be found on the streets.
How,
in these "words in a time of war," can I convey to you the reality of
that place at this time? Let me read to you a bit of an account from a
young Iraqi woman of how that war has touched her and her family, drawn
from a newsroom blog. The words may be terrible and hard to bear, but
-- for those of you who have made such a determined effort to learn to
read and understand -- this is the most reality I could find to tell
you. This is what lies behind the headlines and the news reports and it
is as it is.
"We were asked to send the next of kin to
whom the remains of my nephew, killed on Monday in a horrific explosion
downtown, can be handed over...
"So we went, his mum, his other aunt and I...
"When
we got there, we were given his remains. And remains they were. From
the waist down was all they could give us. ‘We identified him by the
cell phone in his pants' pocket. If you want the rest, you will just
have to look for yourselves. We don't know what he looks like.'
"…We
were led away, and before long a foul stench clogged my nose and I
retched. With no more warning we came to a clearing that was probably
an inside garden at one time; all round it were patios and rooms with
large-pane windows to catch the evening breeze Baghdad is renowned for.
But now it had become a slaughterhouse, only instead of cattle, all
around were human bodies. On this side; complete bodies; on that side
halves; and everywhere body parts.
"We were asked what we were
looking for; ‘upper half' replied my companion, for I was rendered
speechless. ‘Over there.' We looked for our boy's broken body between
tens of other boys' remains; with our bare hands sifting them and
turning them.
"Millennia later we found him, took both parts home, and began the mourning ceremony."
The
foregoing were words from an Iraqi family, who find themselves as far
as they can possibly be from the idea that, when they act, they create
their own reality -- that they are, as Bush's Brain put it, "history's
actors." The voices you heard come from history's objects and we must
ponder who the subjects are, who exactly is acting upon them.
The
car bomb that so changed their lives was not set by Americans; indeed,
young Americans even now are dying to prevent such things. I have known
a few of these young Americans. Perhaps you have as well, perhaps they
are in the circles of your family or of your friends. I remember one of
them, a young lieutenant, a beautiful young man with a puffy, sleepy
face, looking at me when I asked whether or not he was scared when he
went out on patrol -- this was October 2003, as the insurgency was
exploding. I remember him smiling a moment and then saying with evident
pity for a reporter's lack of understanding. "This is war. We shoot,
they shoot. We shoot, they shoot. Some days they shoot better than we
do." He was patient in his answer, smiling sleepily in his young
beauty, and I could tell he regarded me as from another world, a man
who could never understand the world in which he lived. Three days
after our interview, an explosion near Fallujah killed him.
Contingency,
accidents, the metaphysical ironies that seem to stitch history
together like a lopsided quilt -- all these have no place in the
imperial vision. A perception of one's self as "history's actor" leaves
no place for them. But they exist and it is invariably others, closer
to the ground, who see them, know them, and suffer their consequences.
You
have chosen a path that will let you look beyond the rhetoric that you
have studied and into the heart of those consequences. Of all people
you have chosen to learn how to see the gaps and the loose stitches and
the remnant threads. Ours is a grim age, this Age of Rhetoric, still
infused with the remnant perfume of imperial dreams. You have made your
study in a propitious time, oh graduates, and that bold choice may well
bring you pain, for you have devoted yourselves to seeing what it is
that stands before you. If clear sight were not so painful, many more
would elect to have it. Today, you do not conclude but begin: today you
commence. My blessings upon you, and my gratitude to you for training
yourself to see. Reality, it seems, has caught up with you.
Mark
Danner, who has written about foreign affairs and politics for two
decades, is the author of The Secret Way to War; Torture and Truth; and
The Massacre at El Mozote, among other books. He is Professor of
Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley and Henry R.
Luce Professor at Bard College. His writing on Iraq and other subjects
appear regularly in The New York Review of Books. His work is archived
at MarkDanner.com.
Copyright 2007 Mark Danner