This is the CBC lede: "Our Turning Point panel looks at Iran and its increasingly aggressive behaviour surrounding its nuclear program."
Her appearance reminded me of Iraq, and the media drum beat thrummed by the CBC then, and remembered Ms. Stein sharing her Middle East expertise with the Canadian House in the days leading to the 2003 war against Iraq.
I had the opportunity to read the unedited testimony of
witnesses who have already appeared before you on the issue of Iraq. It
seems to me you've had a fairly exhaustive examination of the legal
implications of Resolution 1441. You've also gone through a
consideration of what would and would not constitute a material breach
and the ambiguous processes through which a material breach would be
declared were that to be an issue.
I would like to use our brief time together today to talk about
two issues the committee really has not had a chance to consider. These
are two possible outcomes that the Government of Canada may confront
over the next several months. The first is that President Saddam Hussein
of Iraq complies fully with Resolution 1441, the UN inspectors
certify that Iraq is fully disarmed, and he remains in office. Canada
and the rest of the international community are then confronted with a
whole set of policy challenges on how to deal with what is, I think,
universally regarded as probably the most repressive regime in the
Middle East.
A second contingency that could confront our government is that
Iraq is found in material breach, the Security Council authorizes the
use of force, coalition forces led by the United States go to war,
and Saddam Hussein is removed from office. Here, too, the challenges
for Canada and the international community will be enormous. They will
be, first of all, to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq and,
second, to begin the construction of a more pluralistic society within
Iraq. That is an enormous challenge for a country that for the last 20
years has had every layer of intermediary association stripped away.
There have been no debates in Iraq of the kind I just witnessed in the
last 25 years. I think it would be a tragic outcome were Saddam to be
replaced by a military officer who differed little from him due to a
lack of attention by Canada and other countries.
These are the two contingencies I'd like to talk about in the
five minutes that are left. But I will certainly be prepared to answer
questions on any other aspects.
I would like to make just one introductory remark, which
reflects my own position as we approach quite a dangerous time over the
next three months. The argument I would like to make is that I find
very little moral clarity on the issues surrounding this matter. Our
Prime Minister has said that Canada will support a war only if it comes
through the deliberate action of the United Nations Security Council.
It strongly opposes any unilateral decision by the United States, and
the objective of Resolution 1441 is clear: the disarmament of Iraq,
not regime change. I think the weight of international law is quite
clear here that there would be no grounds under international law to go
to war to change the regime under existing UN resolutions.
Following from that, it is also clear that the disarmament of
Iraq will have been effected only because there has been a credible
threat of force. For the last four years, it has been impossible for UN
investigators and inspectors to return to Iraq. This process of
returning the investigators and inspection teams to Iraq has been the
result of a credible threat of force, not only by the United States but
backed by the Security Council as a whole.
So we have an outcome here. If we succeed, I think it will be an
important moment for the United Nations, but it is a moment that was
arrived at by the credible threat of the use of force.
The third point I would make is that were this to succeed, were
Iraq to be disarmed, were the inspectors to certify that Iraq is free
from weapons of mass destruction, the people of Iraq will have to
continue to live with Saddam Hussein. It is impossible for those of us
who have worked with the opposition in Iraq, who have colleagues in Iraq
who have paid a very heavy price for living with this regime, to find
that a satisfying outcome. The last ten years have been enormously
difficult within Iraq for all those who have paid with their personal
liberty for the continuance of the regime of Saddam. I suggest that as
we move forward through this period of debate, no one should be free of a
troubled conscience, whichever position they take in this debate.
Let me move to the challenges. The successful process of
inspection is certification that Iraq is free of weapons of mass
destruction. The following would then be expected to happen.
The sanctions would have to be lifted, since they were put in
place because Iraq was not in compliance with resolutions that were
passed more than a decade ago. It is conceivable, then, with President
Saddam in office with a sanctions regime that could not be justified
under current UN resolutions, that Saddam would have full use of Iraqi
oil revenues in the post-certification phase to return to building
programs of weapons of mass destruction. That probably would be a
nightmare scenario for almost any government in the Middle East and I
think would pose significant challenges for the UN. Let me identify
just four.
The first of these is that the UN Security Council will have to
design a new regime of inspection. The regime we currently have is only
to certify that Iraq is in compliance and that it is not an ongoing
regime of inspections for Iraq. The new regime would have to be more
invasive and aggressive than most inspection regimes currently mandated
are.
Secondly, there is the issue of sanctions. This is not an
uncomplicated issue. We can discuss it in the questioning. The issue
of sanctions is complicated by the whole problem with dual-use
technology. The problem is that many civilian imports of chemical and
pharmaceutical products have multiple uses. They can be used
simultaneously for medicine and to make biological weapons. It sounds
easy to design a smart sanctions regime, or a targeted sanctions regime,
but in fact it's quite difficult to do so, and that would be an urgent
challenge.
The third challenge, and I hope this is one that the committee
and our government will consider, is not to stop simply with the
objective of disarmament but to consider the position of minorities
within Iraq--the Kurdish minority, the Turkoman minority, the Assyrian
minority--who have paid a particularly high price for this regime over
the last 20 years.
Let me bring to your attention one pressing issue, the legal
status of the no-fly zones in the north and in the south of Iraq. They
were not established as a result of the UN resolution that ended the
Gulf War in 1991. They have no legal status under the UN.
Nevertheless, it is because there is a no-fly zone in the north that up
to one million Kurds have been able to establish an autonomous area in
which there has been self-government and in which the Kurds for the
first time have been able to develop at least some approximation of
democratic governance in that part of northern Iraq.
º 
(1610)
Again, were Iraq to be certified as free of weapons of mass
destruction, were the inspections ended, and were the sanctions ended,
there would be no legal justification for the no-fly zone. That would
put a grave and imminent risk to the future of the Kurdish population in
northern Iraq. At the end of such a process it would be imperative that
Canada and other members of the United Nations consider, in a proactive
way, putting in place credible safeguards to assure the security of the
Kurdish population in the north.
I'll move to the other scenario, which is that the two
inspection teams do declare Iraq in material breach, the UN Security
Council then authorizes these supports under chapter 7, and military
force is used. Of the urgent questions--which again are not receiving
the kind of attention that in my view they deserve because so many
governments have focused on the war or no war question--there are three.
The first of these is, what kind of interim regime would be
established and by whom in the wake of the use of force authorized by
the United Nations? Here I think there are direct implications for
Canada. We have no hard evidence about what the intentions are, but
there are two models. One would be a military occupation by the United
States. The second would be a UN-administered regime similar to the kind
of process that was created in Afghanistan, where the UN was
responsible for administration and for developing the political process.
It seems to me it would be preferable that the UN be charged with that
responsibility.
Flowing out of that is a choice for Canada, because the United
States is currently asking over fifty governments for assistance, and it
is asking governments to make a choice between two kinds of assistance:
military assets, where they participate directly as part of coalition
forces in the event of a war, or military assistance to be used in
post-war reconstruction on what is called day plus one. Here Canada has
considerable expertise, experience, and assets that would be relevant,
and that will be a choice our government will be asked to make quite
quickly.
A second issue I won't talk about but one I'd be happy to
discuss in question period--and it is a very important issue--is the
management of Iraq's oil fields. That is a highly contentious issue. I
will only say that if that issue is mismanaged and if Iraqis feel that
long-term oil leases are signed with international oil companies without
due Iraqi representation, this will be an inflammatory issue in this
part of the world for at least a decade.
The final issue is political reconstruction. What kind of
political process needs to be put in place to engage all the communities
of Iraq and to maintain its territorial integrity? Here I believe that
Canada could make a significant difference. A critical urgent issue
will be policing. One of the primary objectives will be to avoid
enormous violence on the ground as different elements within the Iraqi
political system seek to settle scores. Here too we have considerable
experience and assets to bring to the table.
º (1615)
I will conclude by saying I think it is a mistake to think
that kind of assistance would not be valued by any coalition authorized
by the United Nations.
The Chair:
Thank you very much, Ms. Stein. Now we'll go for questions and answers.
Mr. Day, I remind you it's five minutes for the question and the answer, please. Thank you.
Mr. Stockwell Day:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ms. Stein, for your thoughts on
this. Can I just project how I and many people see the question of
stability in the region?
First, none of us wants war, obviously; we hope it can be
averted. Experts are now saying there's maybe a 50-50 chance. It has
been said, though, that if there is war, the instability in the region
will be so destructive and rampant, and everything will collapse. Yet I
question that, and I'd like your assessment of that.
Jordan does have strong economic ties with Iraq, and, yes,
Saddam Hussein is popular there. But Palestinians in Jordan hold King
Abdullah II in much higher esteem than Saddam Hussein. King Abdullah
would obviously not be in favour of having his region destabilized. We
have to remember that since the seventies, when the PLO and Yasser
Arafat were turfed out of Jordan, Palestinians on the east side of
Jordan have never raged against some of the Palestinian issues.
There's Turkey, of course, and the concern related to the Kurds
you mentioned. But Turkey is living with this new reality about the
Kurds being a self-governing region in northern Iraq. Millions of Kurds
have been integrated into the increasingly democratic Republic of
Turkey. That's a positive note for the past and present administration
in Turkey.
In Saudi Arabia, I can't see instability causing that
administration to collapse. Yes, Saudi Arabia has been financing
terrorism; they've been proxies at war. But the population have never
gone to the streets in any significant way, in terms of civil
disobedience against the Saudi leadership. Even though the Saudi
leadership has offered a protectorate, in terms of some U.S. turf there,
the population there have never raged, related to items on the
Palestinians, though they may have sympathy for them. That goes for the
very urban Hijaz region and the very rural Najd region. There's the same
sense. So democracy might break out.
On the question of the culture not being able to sustain
democracy, my hypothesis is that the culture in Japan for centuries, and
now in China related to Taiwan, never sustained or approached a
democracy. And yet they have thriving democracies that were relatively
quickly put upon them.
As you know, many exiled members of Iraq are now working toward a
democratic situation, should they have the opportunity. Do you think
the culture itself would prohibit the outbreak of democracy in a
successful way?
º (1620)
The Chair:
Ms. Stein, please.
Ms. Janice Stein:
If I take your question to be whether there are obstacles within the
Arab Middle East that would prohibit it, absolutely not. I think that
underestimates the enormous talent and the ability of much of the Arab
world to both build and sustain democracy. Nor do I accept the
argument that Islamic societies are inherently hostile to democracy.
That is also historically misleading. If we look around the world, there
are societies in Asia that have large majorities of Islamic
populations and they sustain democratic processes.
So I do not think the explanation for the failure of democracy in the modern Middle East is cultural or religious.
[Translation]
The Chair:
Go ahead, Mr. Bergeron.
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was somewhat surprised by your comment that inspectors were
allowed back into Iraq only as a result of a credible threat of force. I
find that pronouncement rather ironic given that we now know for a fact
that inspectors left Iraq in the first place at the request of the
United States which was preparing to launch an attack on the country.
It's ironic, although I do understand the underlying issue here.
By claiming that Iraq acted under threat of force, we're
employing the same carrot and stick approach that the Americans employ
so very skilfully to ensure their way prevails internationally. When we
read resolution 1441, we see that we aren't the ones wielding the stick
and that there is no carrot. You seem to think that if Iraq complies
with resolution 1440, the sanctions that have been imposed will
eventually be lifted.
Shouldn't the fact that resolution 1441 makes no provision for
sanctions to be lifted if Iraq complies with the terms set out serve as
an indication that any eventual move on Iraq's part to comply with the
terms of the resolution might not necessarily lead to the lifting of the
sanctions?
Ms. Janice Stein:
You've asked two questions.
[English]
On the first one, I think it is unambiguously clear, whether we
like it or not, that it was the threat, the credible threat of the use
of force, that led to the return of the inspectors. I think the issue
is not how the inspectors left four years ago, but how the regime
treated the inspectors for the previous three years, when the record, I
think, is unambiguously clear that there was every effort to subvert
their mission, to hide critical information, and to deny the inspectors
the access they needed to establish meaningful inspections.
The valuable information that was discovered about the
biological weapons program and the nuclear program were in fact
discovered only as a result of information from defectors from Iraq.
But for virtually the whole period those inspectors were on the ground,
the regime of Saddam Hussein did not cooperate.
º (1625)
[Translation]
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron:
I'm sorry. You haven't yet answered the second question, but I feel
compelled to respond to what you're saying. The members of the
inspection team, in particular Scott Ritter, clearly stated that they
acted largely on the instructions of the United States. Iraq had the
distinct impression that the inspectors were engaged in spying
activities.
Ms. Janice Stein:
I'm not truly convinced of that, because exactly the same could be said
today. Inspectors are intermediaries acting at the behest of the United
States.
[English]
If we see a difference on the ground right now, it's because
this regime has finally come to the conclusion that there is no
alternative. There is no alternative but to cooperate with the United
Nations, because they have exhausted every other option.
I think that's important to recognize as we think about the
future of the UN. If we are serious about avoiding war, we have to
understand that the UN has to be reinforced at times when you're
dealing with regimes like this. The United Nations needs to be
reinforced by a credible threat of the use of force. That may be what
it takes against governments of this kind, because this is truly one of
the most brutal governments we have, certainly in the Middle East and in
many parts of the world.
[Translation]
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron:
But have you not...
The Chair:
You should let Ms. Stein finish, Mr. Bergeron.
[English]
Do you have anything else, Ms. Stein?
Ms. Janice Stein:
On the second question, refresh my memory.
[Translation]
Mr. Stéphane Bergeron:
I wanted to talk about the carrot and stick approach and about the lifting of the sanctions.
[English]
Ms. Janice Stein:
You are absolutely right that there is no wording in Resolution 1441
that requires the lifting of sanctions against the Government of Iraq,
but in the amendments to the sanction regimes over the last three or
four years, the clear expectation is that once Iraq is certified as free
of weapons of mass destruction, the obligation is in fact to lift the
sanctions. There are two or three other requirements it must
meet--the return of archives to Kuwait, compensation for Kuwait--but the
understanding in the discussions among the Security Council members is
that if Iraq is certified as free of weapons of mass destruction, the
obligation will be to lift the sanctions regime or to create a sanctions
regime that does not punish civilians.
The Chair:
Thank you.
Mr. Harvard, please.
Mr. John Harvard (Charleswood —St. James—Assiniboia, Lib.):
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Professor Stein, for your presentation. I must say
that I particularly enjoy your frequent appearances on television. Keep
up the good work.
I have four short questions that I think we can deal with in the five-minute time limit.
The first one is really the seeking of a clarification. I think I
understood you to say that if the UN inspectors find no evidence of
Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, the UN would then have to come
up with a new inspection regime. I'm not too sure whether I understand.
Why would there have to be another inspection regime?
I think there's a lot of cynicism around, Professor Stein, in
believing that the U.S. is bound and determined to find Iraq, one way or
the other, in non-compliance of the UN resolution because they're
really hell-bent on regime change. Is there any evidence the U.S. has
already lined up what you might call a “puppet regime” or friendly folk
to replace Saddam, if he's taken out?
You mentioned the subversion, Saddam Hussein subverting the work
of the inspectors the last time around. Is there any reason to believe
things have changed?
You say this is a terrible regime. We all know that. Is there
any reason to believe he would be any different in his attitude now, as
opposed to three or four years ago?
The Chair:
Thank you, Mr. Harvard.
Madam Stein.
Ms. Janice Stein:
Why would I argue that a new inspection regime would be necessary
because of the brutality of this regime? It has demonstrated the
determination, over ten years, to develop chemical and biological
weapons, and in fact demonstrated evidence that it did go quite far down
the road in developing a nuclear weapons program.
The existing IAEA procedures are not adequate because they do
not provide for challenge inspections. I doubt very much the Security
Council would be comfortable with any kind of regime in the future that
did not ensure there were challenge inspections as long as Saddam
Hussein remained in office.
Is the United States hell-bent on regime change? That is
certainly the view of many experts. There has been a change in the tone
of the administration in the four weeks preceding the passage of
Resolution 1441. There is clearly a debate ongoing within the
administration. I would certainly say the United States has very strong
incentives to find that Iraq is not in compliance with Resolution 1441
and will look for those opportunities.
On the replacement of Saddam Hussein, the reason I mentioned the
two scenarios is because this is still being debated inside the
administration. There is an opportunity for governments such as Canada
to make their voices known on it.
º (1630)
Mr. John Harvard:
Is there no one waiting in the wings, as it were?
Ms. Janice Stein:
There are several options being debated inside the administration.
There is no firm decision. One of the options is in fact military
occupation.
Mr. John Harvard:
Let's assume they do go through with a military invasion. Is there some Iraqi friend who is prepared to replace Saddam?
Ms. Janice Stein:
There is no single person who has been designated. There is no process
that has been designated. There are two broad options that are being
considered. One is a military occupation following the use of force, in
which the United States would be the principal occupying power.
Mr. John Harvard:
Like the McArthur era in Japan?
Ms. Janice Stein:
Right.
The second option is a UN-administered process. It's for that
reason that I bring the two options up. A country like Canada would
have, and should have, a voice on the issues.
Mr. John Harvard:
Could you answer the fourth question on the subversion?
Ms. Janice Stein:
Why will Saddam not subvert the inspections process this time? There
are two quick reasons. One, there is much better technology going in
with the inspectors than last time. It will make a critical difference.
Secondly, I think Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of
the IAEA inspection team, are aware of the fact that the Security
Council is very closely monitoring the inspections and that they have
the support of the Security Council. From the first inspection this
morning it is clear that Blix is demanding far more this time than he
did when he was head of the IAEA.
Mr. John Harvard:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair:
Thank you, Mr. Harvard.
Ms. McDonough, please.
Ms. Alexa McDonough:
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Welcome, Dr. Stein, to the foreign affairs committee. I too
want to commend you on your constant positive contributions to the broad
public understanding of what's happening in the Middle East.
You've made a fairly strong statement that it's really been the
credible threat of force more than anything else that has brought about
the resumption of the weapons inspections. I don't wish to contest your
view, but I'm seeking a little clarification. It seems to me that
it's been the fact that the international community has come together
and held together around the stand in demanding the resumption of
weapons inspections. Perhaps being backed by the potential threat of
force is an important part of it, but I worry about the assertion that
it is the threat of force that has done it, reinforcing those who would
advocate that the U.S. should unilaterally get on with a military
attack and that's really the only answer anyway. I wonder if you might
elaborate on that a little.
Secondly, I worry that we spend so much time focusing on the
despicable despot, Saddam Hussein. There's no disagreement among
civilized people about that. We don't concentrate enough, it seems to
me, on the fact that he's only one person in Iraq and there is an entire
nation there with which we have to find ways to advance democracy, to
build peace.
It surprises me that we haven't done more. Frankly, the United
Nations hasn't, and Canada hasn't played more of a role in really
pushing forward the notion that the removal of sanctions will be in fact
part of the response to cooperation with the weapons inspection and the
full disarming. Those are the only conditions under which we can help
people both to reconstruct their lives and to build any meaningful
democracy. I wonder if you might comment on this.
My third question is about the role of the League of Arab
Nations. I ask this question really in considerable ignorance. It seems
to me that the League of Arab Nations was really an important factor
in, first of all, understanding why they needed to pull Iraq in from its
total isolation, and they did that in April. Further, I don't think
there's any question there's a great deal of diplomacy going on, perhaps
a little below the radar screen, by a number of Arab nations. They
helped bring Iraq to the point of cooperation, not with a threat of
force, but by confronting the reality of what any possible military
attack would mean to the entire destabilization of the Middle East. I
ask the question about a continuing possibility for a constructive role
of the League of Arab Nations that we should be attentive to.
Then I have a final particular question in that regard. You
raised the concern about Iraq's managing of their oil fields in the
aftermath of whatever happens. Is there a role there that you would
care to elaborate upon somewhat? It seems obvious what the problem is.
What's the solution?
º (1635)
[Translation]
The Chair:
Ms. Stein.
[English]
Ms. Janice Stein:
The credible threat of the use of force was I think an absolutely
critical requirement, because in the past we've had resolutions by the
Security Council with respect to Iraq's requirement to cooperate with
the inspection teams that were unanimous, but they were not effective.
So I think it's important for a country like Canada, which supports the
UN, to understand that it was the two conditions together, the
unanimity of the council but also the fact that a unanimous council
could make a credible threat of the use of force, that moved Saddam and,
frankly, that moved the Arab League.
I think you are right when you say that the Arab League,
individual foreign ministers and presidents, told Saddam unequivocally
that if he refused to come into compliance, it was unmistakable that
there would be a use of force, and that is why he is in compliance.
The issue of removal of sanctions is one important part of that.
But I think there is a second issue here. That is before the Iran-Iraq
war, Iraq was the most literate society in the Arab world. It had the
highest number of women employed of any country in the Arab world. It
has the largest number of universities. It has the largest number of
scientists in the Arab world. This is a country in the Arab world that
is richest in what we call human capital as well as in natural resources
and financial resources. It has had, frankly, a nightmare twenty years
under the leadership of this regime, but there is an enormous
opportunity to work financially with Iraq and to work politically with
Iraq. I wish I could tell you more.
The third issue is the management of the oil fields, and I think
that's very closely connected. I think to summarize the argument it is
imperative that there be a fair, and seen to be fair, regime that would
manage Iraqi oil resources.
I know there are members of the committee who understand the
issue of successor rights. France and Russia have signed very extensive
oil leasing arrangements with the government of Saddam Hussein. It is
unclear what the status of those leasing arrangements would be were this
government to fall. It will be critically important that there be a
fair and transparent process to award any new leasing arrangements. It
will be at least three to ten years of multi-billion-dollar investment
before Iraqi oil production returns to what it was in 1979.
The Chair:
Thank you, Madame Stein.
Mr. Eggleton, please.
Mr. Art Eggleton:
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate Professor Stein being with us today. I have a very high regard for her insights and analysis.
I might add that I also read a piece last week that I would
recommend members of the committee might have a look at for a little bit
more information about what happens after an attack, if there is an
attack. It was written in the Atlantic Monthly by James Fallows I
think. It's called “The Fifty-first State?” They're not referring to
us in that case for a change, they're referring to Iraq. The point he's
making is that if there is a military action, it will be a long time
before we in the international community or the west get out of Iraq.
I want to ask Professor Stein about this scenario that if
Saddam Hussein, Iraq, is found to be in material breach of Resolution
1441 it would lead to an attack. As I recall, before that could be
triggered, this would go back to the Security Council for consideration.
But isn't there an alternative to this, which is that whatever
weapons of mass destruction--chemical, biological, whatever--are found,
they in fact would be destroyed as opposed to there being an attack? I
wonder how you see that might unfold.
For the United States, from the current sabre-rattling one has
the impression that they would want to get in there very quickly on an
attack, and if they still wanted to have a regime change, then that
might just become the excuse they want. But what are the
possibilities--how do you see that unfolding--of destroying these
weapons of mass destruction? If that happens, would there be a penalty
against Saddam? How would they handle him from then on in if there's no
attack and presumably he manages to hang in there and stay in office
even though he will have been found to have lied? I don't know. Maybe
he's hidden all this stuff; he's gotten rid of it in time. But if there
is found to be a material breach, does it necessarily mean there's
going to be a military attack?
º (1640)
[Translation]
The Chair:
Ms. Stein.
[English]
Ms. Janice Stein:
Your question can be answered with at least three competing interpretations.
I think there is the interpretation of the majority of the
Security Council, that the two heads of the inspection teams are the
only people who can declare material breach. They would then report to
the Security Council. The United States disputes this and says there
are a series of actions they would consider a material breach,
independent of the inspectors.
The reason this disputed interpretation exists is that the
issue of what constitutes a material breach was not raised prior to the
passage of Resolution 1441. So there's no agreement among members of the
Security Council as to what constitutes a material breach. This was
deliberately kept out of the discussion because there was no agreement
on what it was. Were the inspectors to report back? So this is one fork
in the road.
The second fork in the road is if the inspectors do find a
material breach, they are obligated to report it immediately to the
Security Council. Then the issue is that the vast majority of the
Security Council says a second resolution is required—but the United
States says that no second resolution is required. As soon as Mr. Blix,
or the IAEA, declares a material breach, the U.S. believes that is
sufficient authorization under Resolution 1441 for a coalition of the
willing to use military force.
Mr. Art Eggleton: What if...? I'm out of time?
The Chair:
I just want to be sure. Mr. Casey has a question.
Ms. Janice Stein:
So there is no agreement. There is no agreement.
Mr. Bill Casey (Cumberland—Colchester, PC):
Some countries might force them back to the Security Council for consideration.
The Chair:
I know Ms. Stein needs to leave soon. Mr. Casey.
Mr. Bill Casey:
I think we all have about a half an hour of questions for you. We're certainly glad to have you here.
I just wonder, what do you see as a timeframe? If they find no
material breach, what are the timeframes...and then sanction being
lifted? If there is a material breach, what do you see as a timeframe?
Ms. Janice Stein:
Let me give you the most optimistic scenario, because the answer to
many of these questions depends on whether we get the best possible
result, or the worst possible result, one could imagine. The piece by
James Fallows, which the honourable member just mentioned, divides this
into a good result and a bad result, frankly.
For the short-term timeframe, the first critical date is December 8—
º (1645)
Mr. Bill Casey:
That's their commitment.
Ms. Janice Stein:
—when they have to list chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, which Saddam Hussein is forced to supply.
My expectation is that the inspectors will receive thousands and
thousands of pages of documents, which will take time for them to go
through, because Saddam's strategy is to run out the winter clock. If
he can in fact run that clock past March, it then becomes extremely
difficult to use military force.
Second, if he is found to be free of weapons of mass
destruction—which is the most optimistic scenario that one could
imagine—then the issue would return to the Security Council. There would
have to be action by the spring on a new sanctions regime. Some of
this has been discussed already, in terms of creating so-called very
smart, very targeted sanctions, which would be restricted to material
that is clearly dual use.
I think it is more difficult to do in practice than the people
who use the language of smart, targeted sanctions believe. But certainly
some of the things that are currently on the sanctions list will come
off it. I would expect that discussion to begin by the late spring.
Mr. Blix has said that the inspection process will take between 12 to 24
months, before Iraq can be certified as free of weapons of mass
destruction.
Mr. Bill Casey:
So nothing really should happen for a year?
Ms. Janice Stein:
Nothing should happen for a year, unless Iraq is declared in material breach.
Mr. Bill Casey:
So the inspectors could declare a breach at any time?
Ms. Janice Stein:
Correct.
Mr. Bill Casey:
But they can't certify it as clear for at least a year?
Ms. Janice Stein:
That's right. We could get a declaration of material breach at any
time. It will probably be at least 18 months before Iraq could be
certified as free of weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Bill Casey:
Have you ever done a calculation, or a prediction, of casualties if there is a war?
Ms. Janice Stein:
Is there any prediction of casualties, if there is a war? In a
two-sentence answer, you know that military planners give you a very,
very good, or highly optimistic, scenario and a very, very negative one.
The most optimistic scenario is one in which military officers in
Baghdad—virtually as soon as the first shot is fired—move to rid
themselves of somebody they've been waiting to rid themselves of for a
long time. In this scenario of a very, very short war, there could be
extremely low military casualties and very low civilian casualties. This
is the most optimistic scenario that one could imagine.
In the nightmare scenario, there could be 10,000 military
casualties and hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties, if there
were to be house-to-house fighting in the city of Baghdad.
Both scenarios are equally plausible. Any of this is possible.
The Chair:
Last word, Mr. Casey.
Mr. Bill Casey:
My last question is on the three possibilities you mentioned a minute
ago. If the United States determines, in its mind, that there's a
material breach, can you ever foresee it taking action by itself?
Ms. Janice Stein:
Certainly, I could, without a great deal of imagination.
Mr. Bill Casey:
That's a pretty straight answer.
The Chair:
Thank you very much, Professor Stein. It was a real pleasure to have you with us.
I know you need to catch a six o'clock flight, because you're
appearing on TVOntario tonight. Thank you again for being prompt.
Ms. Janice Stein:
Thank you for the opportunity.
The Chair:
We're going to suspend for five minutes, because we'll go in camera after that.
Thank you.
