A Precursor to War? As Washington Renews Military Threats Against Iran, Cyber Attacks Escalate
As evidence mounts that the U.S. secret state is launching
cyber weapons against official enemies, while carrying out wide-ranging
spy ops against their "friends," Gen. Keith Alexander, the dual-hatted
overlord of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, says
that the Obama administration is "working on a system" that will "help"
ISPs thwart malicious attacks.
Speaking at the Security Innovation Network (
SINET) "Showcase 2011"
shindig
at the National Press Club in Washington, Alexander told security
grifters eager to gouge taxpayers for another piece of lucrative
"cybersecurity" pie:
"What I'm concerned about are the destructive
attacks. Those are the things yet to come that cause us a lot of
concern."
That's rather rich coming from the head of a secretive
Pentagon satrapy suspected of designing and launching the destructive
Stuxnet virus which targeted Iran's civilian nuclear program.
According to fresh evidence provided by IT security
experts it now appears that the same constellation of shadowy forces
which unleashed Stuxnet are at it again with the newly discovered Duqu
spy Trojan.
In a follow-up analysis, Kaspersky Lab researcher Alex Gostev wrote
that "the highest number of Duqu incidents have been recorded in Iran.
This fact brings us back to the Stuxnet story and raises a number of
issues."
Not least of which is the continuing demonization of the
Islamic Republic by an unholy alliance of U.S. militarists, their
Israeli pit bulls and congressional shills hyping the "Iran threat."
War Drums Beating
With the United States and the other capitalist powers
incapable of digging the world economy out from under the slow-motion
meltdown sparked by 2008's market collapse, and with tens of millions of
enraged citizens rejecting austerity measures that will further enrich
financial elites at their expense, will the Obama administration "go for
broke" and set-off a new conflagration in the Middle East?
Ratcheting up bellicose rhetoric, John Keane, a retired
four-star general, former Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army now
currently perched on the board of General Dynamics, a major purveyor of
cyber attack tools for the government, told
the House Homeland Security Committee October 26, "We've got to put our
hand around their throat now. Why don't we kill them? We kill other
people who are running terrorist operations against the United States."
AFP
reported that "Iran made a formal protest" over Keane's remarks which
urged "the targeted assassination of members of its elite Quds Force
military special operations unit," over a fairy-tale plot allegedly
cooked-up by Tehran, which employed a failed used-car salesman, a DEA
snitch and members of the Zetas drug gang in a scheme to assassinate the
Saudi ambassador in Washington.
While the plot lines are as preposterous as allegations
prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion that Saddam Hussein's regime was
involved in the 9/11 attacks, one cannot so easily dismiss the propaganda value
of such reports by administration "information warriors." The same can
be said of the series of controlled leaks emanating from London, Tel
Aviv and Washington urging immediate air strikes against Iran's nuclear
facilities.
The Guardian
reported that "Britain's armed forces are stepping up their contingency
planning for potential military action against Iran amid mounting
concern about Tehran's nuclear enrichment programme."
Chillingly, the "Ministry of Defence believes the US may
decide to fast-forward plans for targeted missile strikes at some key
Iranian facilities. British officials say that if Washington presses
ahead it will seek, and receive, UK military help for any mission,
despite some deep reservations within the coalition government."
On the same day that MoD's sanctioned leak appeared in the British press, Haaretz
disclosed that "Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister
Ehud Barak are trying to muster a majority in the cabinet in favor of
military action against Iran, a senior Israeli official has said.
According to the official, there is a 'small advantage' in the cabinet
for the opponents of such an attack."
"Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya'alon said he
preferred an American military attack on Iran to an Israeli one. 'A
military move is the last resort,' he said."
The Associated Press
reported that as Netanyahu moved to persuade his cabinet to "authorize a
military strike against Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program,"
Israel successfully test-fired "a missile believed capable of carrying a
nuclear warhead to Iran."
Adding to the disinformational witch's brew, The Washington Post
reported that "a new spike in anti-Iran rhetoric and military threats
by Western powers is being fueled by fears that Iran is edging closer to
the nuclear 'breakout' point, when it acquires all the skills and parts
needed to quickly build an atomic bomb if it chooses to," anonymous
"Western diplomats and nuclear experts said Friday."
Post stenographer Joby Warrick informed us that a
"Western diplomat who had seen drafts of the report" told him "it will
elaborate on secret intelligence collected since 2004 showing Iranian
scientists struggling to overcome technical hurdles in designing and
building nuclear warheads."
And late last week Reuters
disclosed that "a senior U.S. military official said on Friday Iran had
become the biggest threat to the United States and Israel's president
said the military option to stop the Islamic republic from obtaining
nuclear weapons was nearer."
"'The biggest threat to the United States and to our
interests and to our friends ... has come into focus and it's Iran,'
said the U.S. military official, addressing a forum in Washington."
Conveniently, "reporters were allowed to cover the event on condition
the official not be identified."
While some critics
argue that Israel does not presently have the capacity to launch such
an attack, and that "the volume of the war hysteria is being turned up
with one purpose in mind: the Israelis want the US to do their dirty
work for them," such reasoning is hardly reassuring.
Indeed, as the World Socialist Web Site points out, "the Israeli government has already made advanced preparations for an attack on Iran."
"On the military front," analyst Peter Symonds warned that
"Israeli warplanes last week conducted a long-range exercise--of the
type required to reach Iran--using a NATO airbase on the Italian island
of Sardinia." In other words, the IDF drill was not a "rogue" exercise
unilaterally conducted by Israel, but further evidence of Washington's
"desperate bid to offset its economic decline by securing its hegemony
over the energy-rich regions of the Middle East and Central Asia."
In the context of escalating tensions over Iran's nuclear
enrichment program, seeded by manufactured "terror" plots, the
imperialist powers may choose the "cyber" route prior to launching
devastating missile and bomber strikes against Iranian military
installations and civilian infrastructure.
Pentagon planners now believe that attack tools have
reached the point where blinding Iran's air defenses while sowing chaos
across population centers with power outages and the shutdown of
financial services may now be a viable option.
This is not idle speculation. During the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, the National Journal
disclosed that Central Command "considered a computerized attack to
disable the networks that controlled Iraq's banking system, but they
backed off when they realized that those networks were global and
connected to banks in France."
Facing growing opposition at home and abroad to endless
wars and imperial adventures, would the Obama administration have such
qualms today?
Attack Tools Already in Play
As Antifascist Calling previously reported, when the Duqu virus was discovered last month, analysts at Symantec believed that the remote access Trojan (RAT) "is essentially the precursor to a future Stuxnet-like attack."
"The threat was written by the same authors (or those who
have access to the Stuxnet source code) and appears to have been created
since the last Stuxnet file was recovered," researchers averred.
Since their initial reporting, Symantec, drawing on research from CrySyS
lab at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics in Hungary,
the organization which discovered the malware, reported they located an
installer file in the form of a Microsoft Word document which exploits a
previously unknown zero-day vulnerability.
Like Stuxnet, Duqu's stealthiness is directly proportional
to its uncanny ability to capitalize on what are called zero-day
exploits hardwired into it's digital DNA; security holes that are
unknown to everyone until the instant they're used in an attack.
Similar to other dubious commodities traded on our
dystopian "free markets," zero-days are bits of tainted code sought by
criminal hackers, financial and industrial spies and enterprising
security agencies that can sell for up to $250,000 a pop on the black
market.
When Stuxnet appeared in dozens of countries last year,
targeting what are called programmable logic controllers (PLCs) on
industrial computers manufactured by Siemens that control everything
from water purification and food processing to oil refining and
potentially deadly chemical processes, researchers found it was designed
to harm only one specific target: PLCs processing uranium fuel at a
nuclear facility in Iran.
As Wired Magazine
reported, when Symantec analysts who had been picking Stuxnet apart
convinced internet service providers who controlled "servers in Malaysia
and Denmark" where the virus "phoned home" each time it infected a new
machine, to reroute the virus to a secure "sinkhole," they were in for a
shock.
"Out of the initial 38,000 infections," journalist Kim
Zetter wrote, "about 22,000 were in Iran. Indonesia was a distant
second, with about 6,700 infections, followed by India with about 3,700
infections. The United States had fewer than 400. Only a small number of
machines had Siemens Step 7 software installed--just 217 machines
reporting in from Iran and 16 in the United States."
"The sophistication of the code," Wired averred,
"plus the fraudulent certificates, and now Iran at the center of the
fallout made it look like Stuxnet could be the work of a government
cyberarmy--maybe even a United States cyberarmy.
"This made Symantec's sinkhole an audacious move," Zetter
wrote. "In intercepting data the attackers were expecting to receive,
the researchers risked tampering with a covert U.S. government
operation."
Writing in the Journal of Strategic Studies,
Thomas Rid, a former RAND Corporation employee and "Reader in War
Studies at Kings College in London," who has close ties to the Western
military establishment, observed in relation to Stuxnet that network
"sabotage, first, is a deliberate attempt to weaken or destroy an
economic or military system. All sabotage is predominantly technical in nature, but of course may use social enablers."
"The resources and investment that went into Stuxnet could
only be mustered by a 'cyber superpower', argued Ralph Langner, a
German control system security consultant who first extracted and
decompiled the attack code."
In an interview with National Public Radio,
Langer said that the "level of expertise" behind Stuxnet "seemed almost
alien. But that would be science fiction, and Stuxnet was a reality."
"Thinking about it for another minute, if it's not aliens, it's got to be the United States."
"For the time being it remains unclear how successful the
Stuxnet attack against Iran's nuclear program actually was" Rid noted.
"But it is clear that the operation has taken computer sabotage to an
entirely new level."
Researcher Vikram Thakur, commenting on the latest Duqu
discoveries reported: "The Word document was crafted in such a way as to
definitively target the intended receiving organization." And whom,
pray tell, was being targeted by Duqu? Why Iran, of course.
"Once Duqu is able to get a foothold in an organization
through the zero-day exploit, the attackers can command it to spread to
other computers."
Thakur wrote, "the Duqu configuration files on these
computers," which did not have the ability to connect to the internet
and the author's command and control (C&C) server, "were instead
configured not to communicate directly with the C&C server, but to
use a file-sharing C&C protocol with another compromised computer
that had the ability to connect to the C&C server."
"Consequently," Thakur concluded, "Duqu creates a bridge
between the network's internal servers and the C&C server. This
allowed the attackers to access Duqu infections in secure zones with the
help of computers outside the secure zone being used as proxies."
As Kaspersky Lab
researchers pointed out, "in each of the four instances of Duqu
infection a unique modification of the driver necessary for infection
was used."
"More importantly," analysts averred, "regarding one of
the Iranian infections there were also found to have been two network
attack attempts exploiting the MS08-067 [MS Word] vulnerability. This
vulnerability was used by Stuxnet too."
"If there had been just one such attempt, it could have
been written off as typical Kido activity--but there were two
consecutive attack attempts: this detail would suggest a targeted attack on an object in Iran." (emphasis added)
Simply put, before the Pentagon decides to "kill them" as
Gen. Keane indelicately put it, battlefield preparations via directed
cyber attacks and other forms of sabotage may be part of a preemptive
strategy to decapitate Iranian defenses prior to more "kinetic" attacks.
'Boutique Arms Dealers'
Despite media hype about future cuts in the so-called "defense" budget, Defense Industry Daily disclosed that "the US military has announced plans to spend billions on technology to secure its networks."
According to the Defense Department's FY 2012 budget
proposal, "the Pentagon said it plans to spend $2.3 billion on
cybersecurity capabilities."
However, when NextGov
"questioned why the Air Force's $4.6 billion 2012 budget request for
cybersecurity was $2.3 billion more than Defense's servicewide spending
proposal, Pentagon officials upped their total figure from $2.3 billion
to $3.2 billion."
Why the discrepancy? A "Pentagon spokesperson explained
that the service's estimate differed dramatically because the Air Force
included 'things' that are not typically considered information
assurance or cybersecurity."
What kind of "things" are we talking about here?
As BusinessWeek
reported in July, firms such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General
Dynamics, "the stalwarts of the traditional defense industry," are
"helping the U.S. government develop a capacity to snoop on or disable
other countries' computer networks."
Capitalizing on the Defense Department's desire to develop
"hacker tools specifically as a means of conducting warfare," this
"shift in defense policy gave rise to a flood of boutique arms dealers
that trade in offensive cyber weapons."
Investigative journalists Mike Riley and Ashlee Vance
averred that "most of these are 'black' companies that camouflage their
government funding and work on classified projects."
As last winter's hack of HBGary Federal by Anonymous revealed, "black" firms, including those like Palantir which received millions of dollars in start-up funding from the CIA's venture capital arm In-Q-Tel, hacker tools, such as sophisticated Trojans and stealthy rootkits,
believed to be the route used to introduce the Stuxnet virus, have also
been used to target political activists and journalists in the United
States at the behest of financial institutions such as the Bank of
America and the right-wing U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
As researcher Barrett Brown revealed, "Team Themis was a consortium made up of HBGary, Palantir, and Berico (with Endgame Systems
serving as a 'silent partner' and providing assistance from the
sidelines) that was set up in order to provide offensive intelligence
capabilities to private clients."
Although Endgame Systems "went dark" after Anonymous released thousands of HBGary files, The Register
disclosed that the firm "helps US intelligence identify and hack into
vulnerable networks, and is targeting a similar role in Britain's
nascent national cyber security operations."
The Register noted that the "limited publicly
information currently available on the firm hints at its further role
assisting clandestine government cyber operations by identifying targets
and developing exploits."
As BusinessWeek revealed, the firm is "a major
supplier of digital weaponry for the Pentagon. It offers a smorgasbord
of wares, from vulnerability assessments to customized attack
technology, for a dizzying array of targets in any region of the world."
Unsurprisingly, this was a major draw for venture capital
firms "Bessemer Venture Partners and Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Byers," who collectively fronted Endgame some $30 million. According to
Riley and Vance, "what really whet the VCs' appetites, though, according
to people close to the investors, is Endgame's shot at becoming the
premier cyber-arms dealer."
While a client list has yet to emerge, it's safe to assume
that secret state agencies on both sides of the Atlantic are lining up
to purchase Endgame's toxic products.
Although no definitive answer has emerged as to whom might targeting Iran with Duqu, as BusinessWeek
revealed Endgame "deals in zero-day exploits. Some of Endgame’s
technology is developed in-house; some of it is acquired from the hacker
underground. Either way, these zero days are militarized--they've
undergone extensive testing and are nearly fail-safe."
"People who have seen the company pitch its
technology--and who asked not to be named because the presentations were
private--say Endgame executives will bring up maps of airports,
parliament buildings, and corporate offices."
According to Riley and Vance, "the executives then create a
list of the computers running inside the facilities, including what
software the computers run, and a menu of attacks that could work
against those particular systems."
Indeed, "Endgame weaponry comes customized by region--the
Middle East, Russia, Latin America, and China--with manuals, testing
software, and 'demo instructions.' There are even target packs for
democratic countries in Europe and other U.S. allies."
"The quest in Washington, Silicon Valley, and around the globe is to develop digital tools both for spying and destroying," BusinessWeek
observed. "The most enticing targets in this war are
civilian--electrical grids, food distribution systems, any essential
infrastructure that runs on computers."
"This stuff is more kinetic than nuclear weapons," Dave Aitel, the founder of a computer security company in Miami Beach called Immunity told Riley and Vance. "Nothing says you've lost like a starving city."
While Aitel and a host of other "little Eichmanns" who
enrich themselves servicing the American secret state refused to discuss
his firm's work for the government, a source told the publication that
Immunity "makes weaponized 'rootkits': military-grade hacking systems
used to bore into other countries' networks," and that Aitel's clients
"include the U.S. military and intelligence agencies."
We do not know if, or when, the United States, NATO and
Israel will opt for a military "solution" to the so-called "Iranian
problem."
We do know however, as the World Socialist Web Site
warned, "as global capitalism lurches from one economic and political
crisis to the next, rivalry between the major powers for markets,
resources and strategic advantage is plunging humanity towards a
catastrophic conflict that would devastate the planet."
Tom Burghardt is a researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition to publishing in Covert Action Quarterly and Global Research,
an independent research and media group of writers, scholars,
journalists and activists based in Montreal, he is a Contributing Editor
with Cyrano's Journal Today. His articles can be read on Dissident Voice, The Intelligence Daily, Pacific Free Press, Uncommon Thought Journal, and the whistleblowing website WikiLeaks. He is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press and has contributed to the new book from Global Research, The Global Economic Crisis: The Great Depression of the XXI Century.